

MODERN PHILOLOGY

Volume XLVI

FEBRUARY 1949

Number 3

THE METER OF THE *BEOWULF*—Concluded

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IV. ALLITERATION

Alliteration is probably the most primitive element of Anglo-Saxon meter and the most fundamental. It serves to mark the general movement of the staple line and also to unite the two parts of the line, as in modern verse rhyme joins the two parts of a couplet. It is therefore metrically functional. It has also what may be called "contributive" values. And, since it emphasizes significant words, it has a stylistic importance.

All vowels and diphthongs rhyme or alliterate with one another, and all single consonants with themselves. The consonant combinations *sc*, *sp*, and *st* regularly alliterate only with themselves, perhaps because they were felt as a single sound, not with *s* (but see below). But in the other consonant combinations the first element alone is considered; i.e., *w* and *wr*; *s* and *sn*; *c* and *cn*, *cw*; *h* and *hr*, etc., alliterate together. No distinction appears to be made between identical and approximate rhymes, i.e., between long and short vowels and diphthongs²⁵ or between front and back consonants (cf. *gomban gyldan* [11]) or between the vowels following the alliterating consonants.²⁶

²⁵ For tables and statistics of vowel alliteration in the *Beowulf*, cf. John Lawrence, *Chapters on alliterative verse* (London, 1893), pp. 58–62. Variation seems to be the rule; the repetition of *ea* (*earn . . . eazle . . . eal* [835]) is unique in the *Beowulf* and probably accidental.

The alliterating syllables form certain prevailing patterns in the long line, the commonest of which is *aa ax*, as in

geong in geardum,
þone God sende 13

The next pattern in frequency is *ax ay*, as in

on flodes æht
feor gewitan 42

These two patterns account for about three-fourths of the *Beowulf*. The remaining lines show a few varying patterns, the commonest of which is *xa ay*.

A detailed analysis of the first 500 lines—512 lines, to be exact, omitting 20, 62, 149, 204, 240, 332, 389, 390, 403, 457, 461 as textually uncertain, but including 21, 139, 307, 312 in which the emendations do not affect the alliteration—will illustrate these statements and may be taken as representing the peculiarities of the whole poem. In the following analysis the lines are grouped in units of 100 to show percentages. When the metrical stress falls on a syllable with secondary accent, it is marked *a'*, *x'*, *y'*. Little importance is to be attached to *x'* and *y'*, but the five instances of *a'* are notable:

²⁶ Occasionally the alliterating consonants are followed by the same vowel, but this is probably also accidental: cf. "*æctton segen*" (47), "*georne . . . geogoð*" (66), beside "*heah ofer heafod . . . holm*" (48); "*leof leodecning longe*" (54); etc.

wigweorþunga 176
 wið þeodþreaw 178
 æfter deaðdæge 187
 in hyra gryregeatwum 324
 heardhiegende 394

inasmuch as it is usually held that alliteration falls only on a principal word-accent.²⁷ In the first 500 lines, then, there are 228 examples of *aa ax*; 5 of *aa' ax*; 23 of *aa ax'*—an average of 50.4 per cent. Of *ax ay* there are 72 examples; of *ax' ay*, 44; of *ax ay'*, 10; of *ax' ay'*, 7—an average of 26.6 per cent. Of *xa ay* there are 41 examples; of *xa ay'*, 7—an average of 9.6 per cent. There are 5 examples of *ab ab*; and two each of *ab' ab*, *ab' ab'*, and *ab ba*. There are also 39 cases which I regard as doubtful and 13 as exceptional.

The clearest inference to be drawn from these figures is the preponderance of the two principal patterns, *aa ax*, *ax ay*; between them they set the alliterative tune. Another inference supports the recognition of the natural variation *xa ay*.²⁸ This accounts for nearly 10 per cent of the first 500 lines, and an examination of the doubtful lines will increase the proportion. The remainder include what may be regarded as minor variations and a few exceptional cases.

The most interesting of these minor variations is the crossed or transverse alliteration *ab ab*, some eighty examples of which have been noted in the whole poem.

²⁷ Other examples are:

geond wigwegas 1704
 þone cwealmeuman 792
 eallirene 2338 (emended away
 by some edd.).

Sievers observed that *aa* in the first verse seems to occur "als bewusste Kunstform" (*Altgermanische Metrik*, § 19.3) only in his Type A, never in Type C, and only once (459) in Type B. But, besides these examples, cf. also

wið urað werod 319
 gryrelcne gist 1441
 laðlicu lac 1584

²⁸ Cf. Professor Pope's extreme statement (p. 41): "Cases in the first half-line where the second [accented] syllable alliterates and the first does not are so rare that they must inevitably be regarded as exceptions to the rule, if not as violations of the law."

Sievers and his school denied its existence "als Kunstform,"²⁹ but it has been defended on the ground that if it "seems a pleasing ornament of verse to a modern reader, it was probably pleasing to the poet and his hearers at a time when poetry appealed mainly to the ear."³⁰ However it is explained, it must certainly be recognized.³¹ The clearest examples in the first 500 lines are:

aledon þa
 leofne þeoden 34
 þæt he dogora gehwam
 dream gehyrde 88
 cynna gehwylcum
 þara ðe cwide hwyrfaþ 98
 ðæm to ham forgeaf
 Hreþel Geata 374
 gesaga him eac wordum
 þæt hie sint wilcuman 388³²

Other examples, in which the *b* syllable has a secondary accent are:³³

Hwæt, we Gar-Dena
 in geardagum 1

²⁹ Frucht and others, accepted by Sievers, tried to prove by the mathematical doctrine of probability that this was not an "art form"; Emerson ("Transverse alliteration in Teutonic poetry," *JEGP*, III [1900], 127-37) tried to refute the claim; Bayard Morgan (*Zur Lehre von der Alliteration in der westgermanischen Dichtung* [Halle, 1907], a Berlin diss.) questioned Emerson's mathematical reasoning but accepted his conclusions.

³⁰ Emerson, p. 137. Lawrence (p. 47) goes even further; it is, he says, "not a merely haphazard thing, but . . . subject to certain rules of rhythm which the poet, consciously or not, has obeyed." It might be noted as possibly significant that the opening line of the poem exhibits this pattern.

³¹ The number of such lines is said to be proportionately larger in the *Beowulf* than in any other Anglo-Saxon poem. Lawrence's complete list may be found, on pp. 43-45; for Morgan's list see pp. 70-73. My own list would contain, besides those given above, 19, 201, 418, 525, 589, 591, 653, 699, 730, 803, 829, 907, 1182, 1203, 1475, 1488 [q.v.], 1611, 1824, 1849, 1968, 2091, 2170, 2186, 2187 (emend.), 2397, 2567, 2723 (*h, e, h, sp*), 2745, 2875, 3164.

³² I.e., "Tell them also in plain language that they are welcome." Cf. *Hwæt syndon ge* (237).

³³ The following lines alliterate *ab' ab*: 282, 343, 566, 919 (= 1016), 971, 1131, 1140, 1201, 1262, 1301, 1342, 1403, 1445, 1937, 1939, 1995(?), 2030, 2066, 2162, 2181, 2235, 2261, 2267, 2465, 2479, 2726, 2907, 2954, 2970, 2998, 3066, 3074—thirty-two or thirty-three in all. Two others alliterate *ab ab'*: 32, 209. Three others *ab' ab'*: 1, 39, 1910.

hildewæpnum
 ond *heaðowædum* 39
beodgeneatas;
Beowulf is *min nama* 343
 ond for *arstafum*
usic sohtest 458³⁴

A variant of this appears in the small number of instances of *ab ba*, e.g.,

þa me þæt gelærdon
leode mine 415
Siððan þa fæhðe
feo þingode 470

Some of them may have been accidental or unsought, but for attentive ears, accustomed to pick out alliterating sounds, they would at least have "a sensible æsthetic value."³⁵

In the analysis of the first 500 lines some 40 were set down as doubtful. The scansion of these can hardly be settled to every one's satisfaction, but an examination of them will expose the difficulties and indicate the possibilities—while still leaving each reader his own choice. Most of them turn on the question of anacrusis and Variation 1 (Sievers' Type C). The following verses seem to me genuinely ambiguous; they might be read almost equally well either way, as $\cup \cup / \backslash \cup$ or as $\backslash \cup / \cup \cup$:

ofer hronrade 10
buton folcscare 73
æfter wælniþe 85
æfter beorþege 117
ofer sæwylmas 393

Much would depend on the degree of emphasis given to the second member of the compounds; and this is a point on which we have but hazy knowledge. Others are

³⁴ On *s*, *st*, etc., see below.

³⁵ Lawrence found twenty-four examples in the whole poem, Morgan twenty-nine. Their lists differ in detail. Some of their examples I should reject, others seem dubious, but the following twenty-two are, *m.j.*, clear: 535 (the second *a* with secondary accent), 779, 813, 1222, 1294, 1482, 1535, 1573, 1721, 1728, 1732, 1892, 1933, 2020, 2158, 2337, 2377, 2615 (so MS. Klaeber; others transpose and make *ab ab*), 2707, 3058 (with both vowel and consonant rhyme), 3164, 3180 (the second *a* with secondary accent). Five others might be included: 649, 737, 1184, 2406, 2668.

somewhat less ambiguous and seem, in view of the rhetorical or syntactic emphasis in the context to have been intended and heard, with metrical stress on the first syllable:

Dæm eafra was 12
þanon untýdras 111
Swa ða drihtguman 99
Swa ða mælceare 189
Donne sægdon þæt 377
swylce ic maguþegnas 293
We synt gumcýnnes 260
ðinra gegnewida 367
Da se ellengæst 86
þa was eaðfynde 138
þæs þe him ylþade 228
gyf him edwendon 280

or on the second syllable:

mid þære wælfylle 125
on minre eþeltyrf 410
wið þam aglæcan 425
þæt þone hilderæs 300
þæt hie in beorsele 482

On the other hand, other verses are much less ambiguous because, if they are read as Variation 1, a metrical stress is forced upon a syllable which is less able to bear it than is an emphatic pronoun, adjective, or conjunction:

hu þa æþelingas 3
ond gefrætwaðe 96
Swa rixode 144
þæt ða liðende 221
þæt mid Scyldingum 274
þone yldestan 363

and in the second member:

para þe he cenoste 206
ic eow wisige 292

Two further examples, though slightly different in form, belong here and serve to strengthen the argument:

oð þæt him æghwyle 9
oð þæt hym antid 219

These are to be read as *aa*, with alliteration on a small word. Since, therefore, these are all natural readings, suitable to emphases implicit in the context, and

since they do not conflict with any metrical principles, it would seem reasonable to accept them. If so accepted, they add more than twenty examples of *xa* in the first verse, not included in the figures given on page 146, and thus strengthen substantially the case for *xa ay*—if there was ever any real doubt.³⁶

A few uncertain lines remain. Two of them are probably to be grouped with the three-beat verses:

þæt wæs wræc micel 170
Hwæt syndon ge 237

and also another,

þa wæs Hroðgare
heresped gyfen 64,

in which some rhetorical emphasis is expected on the adverb, as well as on the *h* and *g*. (And this adds one more *ab' ab* pattern not included above.)

A considerable number of lines—forty-odd, in fact—in the whole poem contain a secondary alliteration between a lightly stressed syllable in the first verse and the second stress (sometimes itself light) of the second, e.g.,

isig ond utfus,
æþelinges fæ 33
sundwudu sohte,
secg wisade 208³⁷

In a few others the syllable of the first verse is rather more prominent:

³⁶ On *ya* alliteration in the second member see below. The clearest examples are

ic eow wisige 292, 3103
ic him ðenode 560
þæt we fundlað 1819

but many other potential examples are to be found, e.g.,

wiste þam ahlecan 646
æfter selest 1388
ussum hlaforde 2684
ða ðe brentingas 2807, etc.

³⁷ Other examples are: 49, 65, 92, 288, 305, 350, 490, 506, 755, 938, 1065, 1161, 1162, 1200, 1243, 1311, 1319, 1400, 1420, 1454, 1460, 1650, 1702, 1705, 1799, 1852, 1937, 2108, 2120, 2147, 2161, 2285, 2300, 2393 (*ac, st*), 2535, 2588, 2593, 2731, 2819, 2965, 3084, 3150, 3165. These were first noticed by Lawrence (p. 50).

brim blode fah.

Blondenfeaxe 1594
heard swyrd hilted,
on his helm somod 2987
beagas ond brad gold.
Sie sio bær gearo 3105

Similarly, in seven lines the secondary alliteration is on a light syllable of the second verse:

ðonne healgamen
Hroðgares scop 1006
Hroðgar leofa,
Higelace onsend 1483³⁸

Finally, the light syllables with secondary alliteration appear in both verses in

þolode ðryðswyð
þegnsgorge dreah 131
mægenwudu mundum,
meþelwordum frægn 236
eg[lu] unheoru;
æghwylc gecwæð 987
Beowulf maðelode,
beotwordum spræc 2510

“Whether such rimes were designed or not by the poet, and emphasized or not in the delivery, it is impossible that they should have been without some effect. They must have been heard by ears far quicker and more trained than ours to catch alliteration, as a kind of under-current in the melody of the verse.”³⁹ Certainly, they are too numerous to be really accidental; and if the poet was as shrewd a craftsman in verse as in language, one may well believe that such effects were conscious artistry. Consider, for an example, lines 320–24:

Stræt wæs stanfah,
stig wisode
gumum ætgædere.
Guðbyrne scan
heard hondloen,
hringiren scir

³⁸ Other examples are: 1494, 2100, 2282, 2482, 2958.

³⁹ Lawrence, p. 50.

song in searwum,
 þa hie to sele furðum
 in hyra gryregeatwum
 gangan cwomon

and note, besides the formal alliteration *st* of the first line—carried forward by the *sc* at the end of the second and third lines and by the dominant *s* in the fourth—the *t* and other *s*'s and the two *w*'s; besides the dominant *g* of the second line the *m*'s, *n*'s, and *r*'s; and in the third the *r*'s and *n*'s with the dominant *h*'s; and so on. This is more than metrically functional alliteration; it is a woven design of consonant sounds. And add to this the vowel music: in the first line *æ* followed by *æ* and echoed in the second line; *ā* by *ā* and continued in the second line; and *ī* by *ī*, repeated in the third line. Note also the *ea*—*o* in the third line, repeated chiasmically in the fourth, with an echo in the fifth and with echoes of *e* and *a*. This is not the music of Tennyson and Swinburne; it is rather a sharp overinsistent music. And, though it may not have been all deliberately contrived, it is certainly the work of a poet with an ear.

There are still other peculiar and interesting patterns of alliteration, chiefly in the later part of the poem. In 365 the emphasis on the pronouns obscures the *ab ab* pattern:

þæt hie, þeoden min,
 wið þe moton.

In 1143 the *ab' ab'* pattern supports the reading of Bugge and others, "Hun Lafing":

þonne him Hunlafing
 hildeleoman

(cf., however, 131, 236, 987, 2510, quoted just above); similarly in 1314, 1443, 2637, 3089:

hwæper him Alwolda
 æfre wille
 scolde herebyrne
 hondum gebroden

gif him þysticu
 þearf gelumpe
 nealles swæslice
 sið alyfed

where without the alliteration one would be likely to scan differently; and much the same is true of 2907, 3066:

ofer Biowulfe,
 byre Wihstanes
 Swa was Biowulfe,
 þa he biorges weard.

Altogether the most striking of such variations are

þæt ðu þone walgæst
 wihte ne grette 1995
 oð þæt he ða banhus
 gebrocen hæfde 3147

because they point to the exceptional scansion $\cup \cup \cup \cup //$.

There are four grounds for considering these minor variations. The first may be called "a priori," namely, that in a system of versification which makes a consistently functional use of alliteration, any alliteration other than the functional would attract attention. The second ground is the demonstrable occurrence, though comparatively infrequent, of the *ab ab* and *ab ba* patterns, in which alliteration appears in the fourth place in the line. The third is a matter to be discussed presently and for the moment left *in suspenso*, the dogma of the key alliteration on the first stress of the second verse. In passing, however, it should be noted that if this dogma is rejected, then functional alliteration in the fourth place must be recognized. The fourth ground is the appearance of a few genuinely exceptional patterns—but no less real for being rare—in which the fourth stress clearly alliterates. For example:

aldre þinum,
 gif he us geunnan wile 346⁴⁰

⁴⁰ "... if he will grant to us" is the natural emphasis.

byder to þance,
 þæt he þritiges 379⁴¹
 heaþorof hæbbe.
 Hine halig God 381⁴²
 aldor East-Dena,
 þæt he eower æþelu can 392
 hafalan hydan,
 ac he me habban wile 446
 forþon þe he ne uþe,
 þæt ænig oðer man 503
 aldrum neþdon?
 Ne ine ænig mon 510⁴³

These readings may be questioned as unconventional, but they should commend themselves as at least plausible, if not quite acceptable, to minds already prepossessed by the Sievers rules. They may appear at first *unmetrical*, but they agree with natural emphases of the context; and, since it is always one of the functions of meter to bring out, by "continual slight novelties," the extra subtleties of meaning, they should certainly be recognized. If they are accepted provisionally, their weight will be cumulative with other similar "irregularities."

To these may now be added the more controversial lines:

Setton særeþe
 side scyldas 325
 secgað sæliþend,
 þæt sele stande 411
 þæt ic sweord bere
 oþðe sidne scyld 437
 scencte scir wered.
 Scop hwilum sang 496

These four lines appear to alliterate *aa aa*, save that they run counter to the usual view that *sc* and *st* do not alliterate with *s*. While there is no inherent reason why *s* and *sc*, *s* and *st*, should not rhyme together,

⁴¹ *þæt* is emphatic because it picks up and repeats the unstressed *þæt* of 377.

⁴² *Hine* is emphasized both by the alliteration and by its position. It is certainly more important than *hæbbe*. *God* receives sufficient stress as part of the three-beat verse.

⁴³ There are, of course, other similar lines in the later part of the poem.

as well as *s* and *sw* or *s* and *sn*, the poet may have made a distinction, and therefore it is necessary to examine the facts.

s alliterates with itself, either twice or thrice in the line—and in all cases I have reckoned these as one occurrence—over a hundred and fifty times in the whole poem; *s* and *sw* alliterate together nearly seventy-five times; *sw* with itself five times; *s* and *sn* eighteen times; *sl* with itself once and with *s* five times; *s*, *sl*, and *sw* together three times; *s* and *sm* three times; *s*, *sn*, and *sw* three times (including one instance of *sn* with secondary accent). Thus it is clear that *s*, *sl*, *sm*, *sn*, and *sw* may alliterate freely with themselves (though there are no examples in the *Beowulf* of *sn* or *sm*) and with one another.

st alliterates with itself eleven times and with *str* four times; and these fifteen occurrences account for all the examples of *st* and *str* in the principal patterns. When, however, the minor variations are considered, the usual statement has to be modified. In the fourth place *st* alliterates with *s* or *sw* four times (411, 782, 996, 1485) and once under secondary accent in the second place with *s* (524); and once similarly with *s* in the *ab' ab* pattern (458). *str* alliterates once in the fourth place with *sw* (2798); and once in the fourth place with *s* under secondary accent in the *ab' ab* pattern (2840). The necessary conclusion is this: In the three principal patterns *st*, *str* alliterate only with themselves or with each other, but in the fourth place of these patterns and in the *ab ab* variation they may occur as supplementary alliteration. That is, common practice separates them from the other *s* combinations, though the ear could not fail to hear them along with other *s*'s.

Words with initial *sp* are few (nine in the *Beowulf*, including two with the *ge*-prefix) and would hardly be expected in the principal patterns. In supplementary

alliteration *sp* occurs once with *s* in the *ab ab* pattern (3026) and once with *st* in the *ab' ab* pattern (759). *spr* alliterates once in the fourth place with *sw* (2966).

sc is more common. It alliterates sixteen times with itself and once with *scr*. In the fourth place it alliterates six times with *s* or *sw* or both. It occurs once with *s* in the *ab ba* pattern (132) and once with *st* (994). *sc*, *scr* as principal alliteration occur twice with *s*, *sw* in the fourth place. And in four other lines *sc* alliterates with *s* (106, 1694, 1004, 2004) in various combinations. It seems, then, that the case of *sc*, *scr* is the same as that of *st*, *str*; in the principal patterns they do not alliterate with *s*, but in the minor variations they do.⁴⁴

Double alliteration in the second verse is rare,⁴⁵ but it is well attested, both by the examples already given and by

Hwæpere me gesælde,
 þæt ic mid sweorde of sloh 574
 æscum ond ecgum,
 þæt ic me ænigne 1772
 gylpe wiðgripan,
 swa ic gio wið Grendle dyde 2521

for such is the most natural and effective way to read these lines. There are several similar verses, which have been missed either through a too rigorous application of the Sievers types or through failure to recognize that an unemphatic verb may go unstressed. The following examples will illustrate this kind of verse. Sometimes, to be sure, it is difficult to distinguish between it and verses with second-

⁴⁴ A few lines have been excluded from these tabulations for simplicity's sake: 90, 574, 901, 1149, 1226, 2076, 2155, 2659, 2708, 2767, 2987. The first of these—"awutol sang scopes"—is particularly interesting.

⁴⁵ Sievers, for example, says simply that it is "gemieden" (Altgermanische Metrik, § 21c) and cites a few exceptions, not in the *Beowulf*. Klaeber says of the *Beowulf* (p. 280): "Only apparently in 1251^b, 1351^b"; the apparent cases in 1161, 2916, 395 "are to be remedied by fairly certain emendation"; but 574 "looks like a real exception."—How many swallows make a spring?

ary alliteration merely, and judgment will accordingly differ in certain instances. Those which seem to me most reasonably to belong here are:

gif he us geunnan wile 346
 ac he me habban wile 446
 Ne inc ænig mon 510
 swa hie oft ær dydon 1238
 oðer earmsceapen 1351
 ær he in wille 1371
 minum magoþegnum 1480
 Me þin modsefa 1853
 ond he hean ðonan 2099
 þeah he him hold wære 2161
 gif me se mansceaða 2514
 þa gen guðcynning 2677
 ic him æfter sceal 2816
 Us wæs a syððan 2920

Other examples which seem to me less certain are:

Hine halig God 381
 þæt he eower æpelu can 392
 No ic on niht gefrægn 575
 geseah steapne hrof 926
 he on holme wæs 1435
 he ah ealra gewæld 1727
 forðon ic me on hafu 2523
 ond me þas maðmas geaf 2640
 þæt ic ærwelan 2747
 under Earnanæs 3031
 under inwithrof 3123

The examples which Klaeber noted as only apparent appear in my second group. His "apparent cases" which have been emended away are 395, 1151, 2916—the last two of which are certainly not in need of emendation.

There are a few instances of triple alliteration in the first verse, one of the three being secondary but unmistakable. Perhaps the clearest example is

Swylce he siomian geseah 2767

Other less striking examples are

synnædum swealh 743
 laðlicu lac 1548
 maðmæhta ma 1613
 oð þæt him on innan 1740
 Wæs þæs wyrmes wig 2316

Finally, there are four examples of mixed alliteration, probably accidental yet noticeable: in the first, *þ* with the *h*; in the second, *sc*, *sp* with the *f*; in the third, *h* with the *w*; in the fourth *h* (in the first half only) with the vowels:

Ic hit þe þonne gehate,
 þæt þu on Heorote most 1671
 freondscipe fæstne.
 Ic sceal forð spreca 2069
 wighete Wedra.
 Wif unhyre 2120
 Het ða eorla hleo
 in gefetian 2190

It is probably also accidental that sometimes two or more consecutive lines run on the same alliterating sound; e.g., two on *h*, 2137 f.; two on *m*, 2011 f.; two on *s*, *st*, 2717 f.; three on *s*, *sp*, 871 ff.; three on *w*, 897 ff.; and three on *s*, *sc*, 918 ff. Particularly curious are four instances of two consecutive lines alliterating together, followed by a third after two intervening lines: *w* in 216, 217, 220; *h* in 403, 404, 407; *s* in 489, 490, 493; *s* in 644, 645, 648.

Another special use of alliteration is the so-called "linking" or "enjambement," by which the alliterating sound of a line is (a) anticipated by the same sound in a stressed (or unstressed) position, usually at the end of the preceding line; or is (b) continued in the following line. For example,

- a) Gæþ eft so þe mot
 to medo modig,
 siþþan morgenleoht 603 f.
 ond on weg þanon
 fleon on fenhopu;
 wiste his fingra geweald 763 f.
 a mag God wyrcan
 wunder after wundre,
 wuldres Hyrde 930 f.
- b) brego Beorht-Dena,
 biddan wille,
 eodor Seyldinga,
 anre bene 427 f.

Heht þa se hearda
 Hrunting beran
 sunu Ecglafe,
 heht his sword niman 807 f.

Alliteration, and metrical stress without it, frequently falls on "small" words and on syllables which are not necessarily stressed. This is important to remember in the many instances when to our unfamiliar ears the scansion is uncertain. A few examples will suffice.

The word *man* sometimes carries the alliterating stress with somewhat forced emphasis, as in 1353 (repeated 1560), 1048, 1172, (repeated 1534)—"se man" (1398) is different—; and is sometimes not emphasized, as in 503, 534, 510.

The adverb *siþþan* is frequently unstressed, and on the other hand sometimes carries the alliteration, as in 567, 1453, 1901, 1951, 2071, 2175, 2217, 2702, 2806; also perhaps in 1875, 1937. It is stressed without alliteration in 283, 1206, 2395, 2501, 2630, 3002, 3127. As conjunction it carries the alliteration in 1204, 106 (with *sc*), 132 (*ab ba* with *sc*), and probably in 648. These instances support the scansion

sýþðan hildedeor 834
 sýððan Heremodes 901

and many other verses, e.g., 413, 604, 982, 1253, 1308, 1420, 1978, 2888, etc.

The adverb *after* is unstressed in 315, 341, 2154; it carries the alliteration in 12, 1389, 2731.

The adverb *hwilum* is unstressed in 496, 867, 2108, 2109, 2111; it is stressed without alliteration in 916; it carries the alliteration in 175, 864, 1828, 2107.

The prepositional adverb *bi* carries the alliteration once: *big* 3047.

The pronouns and pronominal adjectives occur frequently in the stressed position and may even carry the alliteration. Sometimes this is rhetorically effective, as in

ond þe þa andsware
ædre gecyðan,
ðe me se goda
agifan þenceð 354 f.

Sometimes it is merely conventional, as in

Hy benan synt
þæt hie, þeoden min,
wið þe moton
wordum wrixlan 364 ff.

and in 541 ff., 563, 785, 1285, 1521, 1840, etc. Sometimes a special emphasis is indicated, as in

ðiegean ofer þa niht 736
Dys dogor þu 1395

Similarly, the adjective varies from the conventional to the slightly forced emphasis, as in 418, 558, 596, 2095, over against

Na þu minne þearft 445
þæt ic anunga
cowra leoda 634
Meaht ðu, min wine,
mece gecnawan,
þone þin fæder . . . 2047 f.

The occasional use of pronouns and pronominal adjectives in stressed positions where no particular emphasis is needed suggests at least the possibility that they were intended to be heard clearly in what we call "secondary alliteration." Even *hyt* once carries the alliteration:

þenden hyt sý 2649

Beside

syððan ic on yrre 2092,

where the alliteration is plain, we have

Ic þæt unsofte 1655,

where the alliteration of *Ic* might be regarded as secondary.

The prepositional adverb *mid* is in the stressed position in 889, 1642, 1649, and carries the alliteration in 41, 1625. So *ymb* in

ond hine ymb monig 689

The adverb *þa* has the metrical stress in 34, 620, 1870. In

Ond þa sidfrome 1813

þa, whether it is conjunction (Klaeber) or pronoun, is probably stressed.

A few more interesting examples are:

Wæs, min fæder 262
Wes þenden þu lifige 1224

Rhyme, apart from initial rhyme or alliteration, occurs here and there in the *Beowulf*, but it is not functional and probably not intentional. The constant use of alliteration prepares the ear to catch any repetition of similar sounds, and any additional emphasis would detract from the artistic effect and functional use of alliteration. The frequent recurrence of inflectional endings, moreover, would add to the confusion, if at all recognized.

End rhyme in the two verses of the long line occurs five times (726, 734, 1014, 2258, 3172), with an approximate rhyme, *ecge: seg* 1813. The second verse of one line rhymes with the first of the next line three times (1404 f., 1718 f., 2389 f.). The first verse of one line rhymes with the first of the next three times (465, 466; 1132, 1133; 3070, 3071). Two long lines rhyme together four times (890 f., 1882 f., 2590 f., 2737 f.). Once there is a delayed rhyme, between 2377 and the middle of 2379. In no case, *m.j.*, is there any indication that a special effect is intended.

Besides these rhymes, properly so called, there are several echoes and quasi-rhymes, such as *wordhord* (259), *lond Brond-* (521), *hond rond* (2609), *foldbold* . . . *þæs fæste wæs* (773), *frod ond god* (279), *-mod . . . stod* (726), *Flod blode* (1422), *on mode frod* (1844), *broðor oðerne* (2440), *Stiðmod gestod* (2566), *slat . . . bat* (741-42), *sæl ond mæl* (1008), *sæla ond mæla* (1611), *ærest wære* (1697), *nyde genyðde* (1005), *efna swa hefene* (1571), *on gewæld gehwearf* (1684), *gehwylc . . . swylc*

(996), *swyllt* . . . *swylc* (2798); and grammatical rhymes like *lað wið laðum* (440), *wunder æfter wundre* (931). Besides these may be noted the *eo*'s in 820 and the *r*'s in 531; and the interesting

ðæm selestan,
be sæm tweonum 1685
guma guðum cuð,
godum dædum 2178

which would draw our admiration if we found them in Tennyson or Swinburne.

V. THE KEY ALLITERATION

One of the most generally accepted dogmas of the subject is that the first stress of the second verse sets the key alliteration of the whole line. This stress is called *Hauptstab* in German after the ON *hofuðstafr*. So Sievers, in *Altgermanische Metrik*, § 19.2, says: "Der hauptstab trifft von hause aus unweigerlich die *erste hebung* des zweiten halbverses."⁴⁶ In the revision of Sievers in Paul's *Grundriss*, II, 2 (1905) the dogma is qualified thus: "Der Hauptstab hat ordnungsgemäss seinen Platz auf der ersten Hebung von II; Ausnahmen zu Gunsten der zweiten Hebung sind selten und meist ein Zeichen sinkender Kunst." Is even this qualified statement accurate?

One or two unstressed syllables before a verse which theoretically begins with the stress or the variations which begin with unstressed syllables are common and present no difficulty. But when the anacrusis or prelude contains important words or several syllables, the matter is less clear. Thus, in such verses as

se þe his wordes geweald 79
þæt hie him oðer flet 1806

⁴⁶ Sievers admitted only isolated exceptions, in the later poets. Otherwise, the line is wrongly divided or the text corrupt. For his later recantation see "Zur Cynewulf," in *Neusprachliche Studien: Festgabe Karl Luick* (*Die Neueren Sprachen*, 6. Beiheft [Marburg, 1925]), pp. 60-81.

forþan hie mægenes cræft 418
hwæþere ic fara feng 578
swylce hie æt Finnes ham 1156

or

Him þa Scyld gewat 26
Nolde eorla hleo 791
Ða git him eorla hleo 1866

or even

ne hie huru heofena Helm 182

(where the extra alliteration may seem particularly to retard the tempo), it would have been easy to maintain the rhythm without destroying the pattern. But in other verses, of which there are not a few, the case is rather different:

gebad wintra worn 264
Næfre ic ænegum men 655
secan deofla gedræg 756
secean wynleas wic 821
Gehwearf þa in Franena fæþm 1210

All these examples belong, it will be noted, in Variation 1, in which the last syllable is stressed and in which therefore a longer prelude might well be expected. Examples of the other sort are in some cases ambiguous, inasmuch as the following specimens might be read in either of two ways:

þe hine æt frumsceaft 45
þæs þe him ylþlade 228
No ic me an herewæsmun 677
Ne hie huru winedrihten 862
ðeah hie hira beaggyfan 1102

These might be read with both stresses on the compound nouns or with a first stress on one of the small words. There is no means of deciding which reading represents the poet's intention, and it is not unlikely that he would read some of them one way and some the other. On the other hand, verses like

Wolde freadrihtnes 796

are hardly ambiguous; they would be a simple variant of the principal pattern. Even such verses as

Het þa up beran 1920
 Da com non dages 1600
 Da com in gan 1644

are ambiguous, with probability favoring the anacrusis. But in such verses as

druncen win weras 1233

the alliteration testifies clearly to the heavy anacrusis; and in view of verses like

gebád wintra worn 264

(cf. 756, 821, 1210, quoted above), we are obliged to recognize the heavy anacrusis, regardless of whether the verse ends in a stressed syllable or with a compound noun and an unstressed syllable.

The evidence, then, of the first verse is indecisive: there are unmistakable examples of both long and heavy anacrusis (prelude)—some of which, however, may be examples of the three-beat verse; and, passing over the really ambiguous verses, there are clear cases of what may seem like anacrusis yet probably is not; as in

wolde freatrihtnes 796
 næfre he on aldrordagum 718⁴⁷

This last in its context would be blurred and misrepresented without emphasis on *næfre*—

næfre he on aldrordagum
 ær ne siþðan
 heardran hæle,
 healdægnas fand!

yet ne'er in his life-day, late or early,
 such hardy heroes, such hall-thanes, found!

Now, when one examines the anacrusis in the second verse, the most obvious difference is its frequency. Heavy (an important word) or long (three or more syllables) anacrusis occurs in the first 200

⁴⁷ There are abundant unambiguous examples of the long compound with metrical stress only on the first element:

scriðan sceadugenga 703
 searoþoncum besmipod 775
 mere mæðpumsweord 1023
 wuldortorhtan weder 1136
 locene leoðsyrca 1505

lines of the *Beowulf* three or four times in the first verse to twenty-seven times in the second; and the same ratio continues throughout the whole poem. This should probably be taken as a fact, without attempts to explain it. One might say that the line begins smoothly and, gathering momentum, becomes more irregular. But this is not altogether true. One might point to the strong medial pause between the verses, for it is true that generally when the second verse shows long or heavy anacrusis there is a pause before it, represented at least by the editorial comma and often by a stronger stop.⁴⁸

Illustrations of the common varieties of anacrusis in the second verse are not necessary; they follow the same form as in the first verse. But some striking examples should be noted as bearing on the question of the *Hauptstab*:

leton holm beran 48
 scop him Heort naman 78
 swylce was þeaw hyra 178
 ne mihte snotor hæleð 190
 þeah he him leof wære 203
 hwæt þa men wæron 233
 Næfre ic maran geseah 247
 næfre him his wite leoge 250
 sohte holdne wine 376
 no ic fram him wolde 543
 hat in gan 386
 sealde his hyrsted sword 672
 Com on wanre niht 702

and so on. These and many more of similar sort show a real tendency to long or heavy anacrusis in the second verse. (Most of them have already been cited in the discussion of the three-beat verse.) Some of them may be ambiguous, but the following examples may well be regarded as invalidating the "dogma." That is, they may be read more naturally and effec-

⁴⁸ An instructive illustration is 626: five syllables precede the first alliterating stress of the second verse—Chambers and Schücking have a comma after the first verse, Klaeber and Sedgefield no punctuation.

tively if the alliteration is allowed to fall on the second stress and, in fact, would probably be so read if they happened to occur in the first half of the line. The list, which is nearly complete for the whole poem, is divided into two groups: the first (a) comprises the examples which I should consider most certain, the second (b) those which I should regard as properly belonging here but which might almost equally well be taken as verses with long or heavy anacrusis:

- a) Het him *yplidan* 198
cwæð, he guðcýning 199
para þe he cenoste 206
ic eow wisige 292, 3103
Ic eom Hroðgares 335
We synt Higelaces 342
Ic eom Higelaces 407

and also 560, 609, 646, 714, 805, 856, 904, 917, 989, 993, 1010, 1018, 1025, 1139 (ab ab), 1157, 1243, 1279, 1326, 1328, 1388, 1420, 1490, 1493, 1621, 1819, 1842, 1934, 1990, 1992, 2018, 2122, 2252, 2292, 2329, 2341 (if the emendation is correct), 2351, 2604, 2634 (cf. 2813), 2668, 2733, 2807, 2869, 2888, 2911, 2940, 2964, 3035, 3040, 3122, 3161.

b) The more one becomes accustomed to the type of verse in the preceding list, the more natural it will seem to read the following verses in similar fashion. These may therefore be regarded as corroborative rather than demonstrative:

- þonne scyldfrea* 1033
het hine wel brucan 1045
þæt þær ænig mon 1099
he to gyrnwraece 1139
swylce hire mandryhtne 1249

and also 1255, 1349, 1396, 1478, 1601, 1604, 1625, 1666, 1692, 1750, 1771, 1831, 1941, 1978, 2093, 2327, 2335, 2354, 2379, 2470, 2621, 2893, 2949, 3021, 3095.

It seems, then, that, although it remains the general rule that the first stress of the second verse sets the alliteration—

and from the frequency with which this is true the ear expects it so—the rule may sometimes be honored in the breach as an agreeable relief. Most scholars, however, have rejected this view and resorted to emendation to avoid it. Heusler, for example, refuses to recognize the obvious cases—

- ic eow wisige* 292, 3103
ic him þenode 560

and calls them "falsche Fälle" (§ 130 and n. 1). Professor Pope, on the other hand, avoids the difficulty by making a distinction between the first *strong accent* and the first metrical stress. He phrases the compromise neatly by saying: "If the first measure of the second half-line is weakly accented, the alliterating syllable can begin the second measure without ceasing to be the first of the two strongest syllables in the line."⁴⁹ This seems like casuistry to me. The distinction arises from a confusion of rhythm and meter, and the necessity for it from a belief in metrical "laws."

VI. QUANTITY AND STRESS

It seems to be generally taken for granted that the metrically stressed syllables in Anglo-Saxon verse are, with a certain few exceptions, "long." Nowhere have I found any real analysis of what constitutes a long syllable,⁵⁰ beyond the vague assumption of something like the Latin rules of length by position; and with this evasion goes an apparent misunderstanding of length per se, as well as a confusion between metrical and rhythmic

⁴⁹ *The rhythm of "Beowulf"* (New Haven, 1942), pp. 41 ff. If, he says, there are "prominent syllables" standing before the first stress, "the first of these prominent syllables ought to receive the primary accent in our rhythm."

⁵⁰ Sievers, *Allgermanische Metrik*, §§ 77-78, has some observations on quantity, but they appear to be based a posteriori on the poets' use of longs and shorts after he, Sievers, had assumed that a stressed syllable is always or ought to be long. Quite arbitrary, for example, is his statement that "alle mittelvocale müssen, auch wenn sie einen nebeton tragen, der regel nach für kurz gelten" (§ 77.2).

cal phenomena. Sievers, among others, though he never explained his procedure, seems to have assumed that syllabic length was determined by the historical length of the vowel or diphthong or by the number of consonants in the syllable. But this is merely to borrow one of the rules of classical prosody without saying so and without inquiring whether such a loan is proper. Surely, there is no reason to think that the *Beowulf* poet, who inherited a Germanic prosody, rudiments of which are traceable in inscriptions from the fourth century onward, consciously tried to superimpose on this a prosodic system borrowed from the Latin poets and based (as we understand it) mainly on temporal values with an almost complete subordination of word accent—an attempt to do what Naeuius and Ennius had done long before. If this had been the *Beowulf* poet's plan, he would have been obliged to regard the length not only of certain syllables which his native meter emphasized but also of *all* syllables; for a metrical system based on syllabic length would not be a system at all if it recognized duration in one element of the verse and not in all, that is, if it required long syllables under stress and left the unstressed syllables unmeasured, for in that way all sense of time value would be lost. He would have run into difficulties in such verses as

þē þā dēað fornam 488

Site nū tō symle 489

swā þīn sefa hwette 490

Since none of us has ever heard Anglo-Saxon spoken, we cannot be sure how much attention was given to the length of the vowels. But from the inflections and from the history of the development of the language into Middle English we can draw a few inferences. Thus, the NA plural of neuter *o*-stems distinguished between short stems (*hof, col, dor, loc, etc.*) with plural in *-u* and long stems (*word,*

bearn, etc.) with no ending. With the neuter *jo*-stems it is the other way around. So with the *ā*-stems: *giefu, sacu, etc.*, are short; *mearc, sorg, stund, etc.*, are long. So far as one can infer from these criteria, a closed syllable is short if the vowel is short, and this seems to be true also of the simplified long consonants, as in *cyn(n)*. Two consonants make the syllable long. This is put somewhat differently and from a different point of view by Wyld (*Short history*, §114; cf. Luick *Hist. Grammatik*, §§267 ff.): "Short vowels were lengthened before the combinations *nd, mb, (ng?), ld, rd*: *findan, lāmb, singan (?)*, *ēld, wōrd*, all of which had, originally, short vowels. The lengthening took place, probably, early in the ninth century. . . ." This sort of lengthening is, of course, a different matter from syllabic length for metrical purposes; but in default of better evidence it may be regarded as pointing a direction.

On the basis of these slight criteria a specimen section of the poem may be examined. Here are the statistics—for what they are worth—for the first hundred lines.⁵¹ Of the 402 stressed syllables, 162 are long by virtue of a long vowel or diphthong (46 + 44 + 33 + 39—the first, second, third, and fourth places, respectively); 137 may be called long by position, i.e., having a short vowel followed by two or more consonants (30 + 37 + 37 + 33); 103 are short (25 + 20 + 31 + 27). In a few cases the quantity is, of course, uncertain, and arbitrary decisions are necessary. The figures must therefore be taken as suggestive rather than as positive. A glance at the parenthesized numbers shows that the distribution over the first to fourth places is fairly even. For the rest, a little over 40 per cent of the stressed syllables are long (contain a long vowel or diphthong); about 34 per cent are "long by position"; and a little over

⁵¹ Actually, 1-104, omitting 6, 15, 20, 21, 47, 62, 68, and 84 as uncertain or corrupt.

25 per cent are short syllables.⁵² Most of these last are treated by Sievers as "resolution" (*Auflösung*), except in Type C, where he admits a short syllable under metrical stress, and occasionally by exception elsewhere.⁵³ The question of *Auflösung*, since the principle of reckoning two shorts as equal to one long is borrowed from classical prosody, may be dismissed as above: it is irrelevant and inappropriate. If, however, one should insist that it must be more than coincidence that in so many cases (Sievers counted 1,425 examples, or more than 12 per cent of the metrically stressed syllables of the poem) where metrical stress falls on a short syllable (as Sievers understood the term: he regarded all closed syllables, *hof, col, was*, etc., as long) there is a following short syllable, it may be replied that this is a natural compensation and has to do with temporal rhythm rather than with metrical law. Moreover, by mixing the two molds of an accentual system and the classical quantitative system, Sievers laid himself open to certain contradictions. There is no important difference, perhaps, between scanning

mægenes Denigea 155

as $\cup \cup \cup \cup \cup$ and scanning it as $/ \cup \cup / \cup \cup$; the movement remains the same; it is dactylic. Perhaps it is no great matter to read

in sela þam hean 714

as $\cup \cup \cup \cup /$ rather than as $\cup / \cup \cup /$; or

þær was maðma fela 36

as $\cup \cup / \cup \cup$, for it can be taken as iambic with feminine ending or as trochaic with anacrusis. But when Sievers classifies

forscrifan hæfde 106

⁵² Trautmann counted more than 400 examples of metrical stress on short syllables in the first thousand lines of the *Beowulf*; Sievers admitted only 865 in the whole poem. Their criteria were different from mine.

⁵³ Many of these "exceptions" to the Sievers theory (*System*) may be conveniently seen in Klaeber, p. 278 and notes.

(a rather frequent pattern) as Type C or $\cup // \cup$, the very characteristic of which is the adjacent stresses, it would seem that a principle is being violated, since $\cup / \cup / \cup$ is fundamentally different in effect from $\cup // \cup$. The same is true of his reading

nicorhusa fela 1412

as a variant of $/ \cup \cup /$. And by the same token to read

fæder alwalda 316

as a form of Type D ($/ / \cup \cup$) with the adjacent stresses, or

segen gyldenre 47

guma oðerne 653

hider wisade 370

(with the added difficulty of placing an unnecessary secondary stress on the penultima of *oðerne, wisade*) is to falsify rhythm for the sake of theory. If $\cup \cup$ may be substituted for $/$, one should be consistent and take verses like

þæt was god cyning

as variants of $\cup \cup /$, a pattern which Sievers does not admit; and

wundorsiona fela 995

would have to be scanned as $/ \cup \cup \cup /$.

But, coming at the question from a different point of view, we must recognize that syllabic length in metrical reading does not necessarily inhere in the word itself, but equally in the delivery. A naturally short syllable may be protracted both for rhetorical emphasis and for metrical effect, as in *THAT is the point* contrasted with *It is a point that may*. . . Or vice versa, a long syllable may be shortened, as in

Áll Love's lórdship láy between.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Rossetti, "Troy Town." It is not necessary to multiply illustrations, but note "How silver-sweet sound lovers' tongues" (*Romeo and Juliet* II, 2, 166) and Swinburne's

And áll time pást, was it áll for this?
Times únforgóten, and tréasures of things.

The truth is that it is not length in the sense of having a long vowel or so-and-so many consonants which counts in the reading of either verse or prose, but the time, the weight, the inflection which is given the syllable: the protraction of it or the pause after it to make it long, or the subordination of it to make it short. That is to say, what counts is not how long the syllable *is* but how long one *makes* it. For the element of time, which is so important in speech rhythm, depends not on any temporal value assignable to a syllable or on any constant relative value but on the emphasis, manifested either by stress or pitch or both together or by the extension of the syllable, to produce "length," and the omission of this emphasis to produce the effect of "shortness."

The conclusion is this: While it may look like an evasion to disregard quantity as functional in Anglo-Saxon because it involves us in elaborate and complicated "rules," it must nevertheless be admitted that the shifts and complexities and multiplication of variations which have to be resorted to in order to support the assumption of quantity as functional are themselves self-nugatory. Most of the difficulty lies in the belief that in any accentual verse the time element of rhythm is determined by the inherent quantity of the syllables. Stress and duration often go together, and a syllable which is "naturally short" may be lengthened or accepted as long by various kinds of emphasis. There is no doubt that usually the metrical stress in the *Beowulf* falls on a syllable which contains a long vowel or diphthong or which, if the vowel or diphthong is short, contains consonants that require an increment of time for clear enunciation. Moreover, the large number of words in the language with long radical vowels or diphthongs must be taken into consideration. But this, one must insist, is not the same as length according to classical

prosody and does not permit of regular substitutions (*Auflösung*); it is length as a rhythmic phenomenon and is not a metrical fact at all. For the roughly 25 per cent of stressed syllables in the poem which are actually "short," one may say that there is often a kind of compensation for rhythmic effect and often not. Compare

guðrine goldwanc 1881

and

since hremig 1882

And much might well be said of the *Beowulf* poet's skill in the handling of long and short vowels, as in the mingling of the different qualities of the vowels. But, so far as meter or scansion is concerned, it does not appear from the evidence that he regarded syllabic length as functional.

VII. "HYPERMETRICAL LINES"—EVOLUTION OF THE METER

There are eleven lines in the *Beowulf* which are generally regarded as so long—that is, so much longer than the "normal" lines—that they require special consideration. They were called by the German scholars *Schwellverse* (suggesting tumefaction) and are usually in English called *hypermetric* (suggesting something excessive). These lines are found, according to most scholars, only in groups of two or more, never singly, and were intended by the poet to enhance the dignity or solemnity of a passage.⁵⁵ Two views have been taken about these lines: one that they are a special form or pattern, the other that they differ from the common line only in being somewhat longer. Sievers, who gave them special and elaborate treatment, admitted (*Altgermanische Metrik*, §90) that it is often difficult to distinguish them

⁵⁵ This notion is regularly repeated but never explained or enlarged upon. In a poem like *The Dream of the Rood*, in which an unusual proportion of the lines are hypermetrical, some such intention and effect are fairly clear; it is not so in the *Beowulf*. In all the surviving Anglo-Saxon poetry there are some 450-60 such lines. For a recent tabulation of them, see Pope, pp. 99 ff.

from the other lines. Heusler (§§239 ff.) favors the second view. As the "normal" verse may range from

ane hwile 1762

yðelice 1556

þa selestan 416

to

þær was hearpan sweg 89

þæt næfre Grendel swa fela 591

to a verse which is ambiguously two-beat or three-beat, so this two/three-beat verse expands to a form which is unmistakably three-beat. Thus

gan under gyldnum beage 1163

sæton suhtergefæderan 1164

æghwylc oðrum trywe 1165

æt fotum sæt frean Scyldinga 1166

þæt he hæfde mod micel 1167

arfæst æt ecca gelacum 1168

which are recognized and marked by the editors as hypermetric, are not metrically or rhythmically very different from many of the verses listed above in the section on the three-beat verse, for example:

ne hie huru heofena Holm 182

Gehwearf þa in Francna fæm 1210

Ne sarga, snotor guma 1384

mæg þonne on þæm gold ongitan 1484

geseon sunu Hrædles 1485

Reste hine þa rumheort 1799

Hyrde ic þæt he ðone healsbeah 2172

Oferswam ða sioldæ bigong 2367

geaf me sinc ond symbel 2431

ofer fleon fotes trem 2525

Swylce he siomian geseah 2767

forleton eorla gestreon 3166

Some of them are longer as to number of syllables, but some of them match rather closely. The principal difference is that the latter examples occur singly, whereas the former are grouped and therefore seem to indicate a consistently altered rhythm.

The similarity is even closer when one compares the second half of these lines with the normal verses, thus:

þær þa godan twegen 1163

þa gyt was hiera sib ætgædere 1164

Swylce þær Unferþ þyle 1165

gehwylc hiora his ferhþe treowede 1166

þeah þe he his magum nære 1167

Spræc ða ides Scyldinga 1168

Set beside these, line for line, the following "nonhypermetrical" verses:

þær was madma fela 36

þonne he on þæt sinc starað 1485

Swylce was þeaw hyra 178

De usic on herge geceas 2638

næfre him his wite leoge 250

þæt ic þe wel herige 1833

The parallels are not exact, except for the first and third, but they are close enough to show that any of the verses 1163-68 might appear in the second half of "nonhypermetrical" lines without disturbing the meter or causing comment. It would seem, therefore, that if a difference is to be recognized it is most apparent in the first verse of the line.

The eleven lines of the *Beowulf* commonly cited as hypermetrical are, besides those just quoted, 1705-7 and 2995-96. To these might be added a number of verses which seem unusually long but do not occur in pairs; that is, the first or the second verse may be long, but not both together. And when the considerable number of verses is taken into consideration which are ambivalently two-beat or three-beat, it seems a tenable theory that the whole sequence of lines throughout the poem shows an interweaving of longer and shorter verses, usually in single units and sometimes in groups.

This, in turn, suggests that the basic line of Anglo-Saxon poetry was originally a longer line than that which survives in our extant poetry. There is no evidence for the existence of a common Indo-European meter or even for a common Germanic meter, though the latter may be inferred from the similarities between the earliest Scandinavian verse and that which the "Anglo-Saxons" brought with

them from the mainland. But by way of hypothesis we may recognize (with Sievers) the eight-beat Sanskrit line as vaguely in the historical background; and nearer at hand the "marching meter" of popular Latin verse, such as is preserved by Suetonius in the satiric verses sung by Caesar's conquering army:

Ecce Caesar nunc triumphat qui sube-
git Galliam
Nicomedes non triumphat qui subegit
Caesarem.⁵⁶

These verses permit us at least to assume the existence of a general popular measure of eight beats or four dipodies, which may or may not have any real connection with the Germanic line.⁵⁷ Dipodic verse has survived rather in oral tradition, nursery rhymes, etc., than as a literary form;⁵⁸ but now and then it has taken literary form. From an assumed line of four dipodies the evolution of what we now know as the four-beat line would be simple and natural. In fact, Meredith's "Love in the Valley" offers convenient illustrations of the stages of such a development.⁵⁹

Thus it may be guessed that, in the process of devolution from eight stresses or four dipodies to four stresses or two dipodies, the Anglo-Saxon verses which seem longer than normal in having two/three beats and then those with clearly

three beats are reversed steps. Or, to put the case the other way, we might follow a historical development from such verses as

næfre hit æt hilde ne swac 1460
sægde him þæs leanes þanc 1809

to

ðeah hie hiera beaggyfan 1102
ne sceal þær dyrne sum 271

to

leton holm beran 48
secan deofla gedræg 756

to

drihtsele dreorfah 485
nydwraeu niþgrim 193

to

sigehreð secgum 490

to

folces hyrde 1832

This, it must be repeated, is but a plausible hypothesis. Its principal interest is that it helps to account for the longer verses: they are, from this point of view, vestigial remains of the earlier meter.

VIII. CONCLUSION

First, with only the evidence of the three thousand-odd lines of a poem composed, say, soon after 700, probably from still earlier "lays," then handed down for some generations by oral tradition before it was committed to writing, then copied and recopied and preserved to us in a single manuscript of *ca.* 1000 in a different dialect from its original form, and this poem in a highly artificial style and difficult in many ways for the modern mind to understand and in many ways quite foreign to modern taste—from such evidence it cannot be expected that we should do more than construct a plausible hypothesis of its metrical form. Statistical analysis and simple deduction are not enough; but with these and with a few general principles based on our knowledge of modern accentual verse we may infer the main outlines of the prosody and

⁵⁶ Suetonius *De vita Caesarum* i. Divus Iulius 49. The "irregularity" of some of the other verses may be suggestive:

Gallus Caesar in triumphum ducit, Idem in curiam.
Galli bracas deposuerunt, latum clavum sumpserunt.
Brutus, quia reges eiecit, consul primus factus est:
Hic, quia consules eiecit, rex postremo factus est.

⁵⁷ Attempts to relate the Germanic verse with the mysterious Saturnian meter have not been successful (see, e.g., W. M. Lindsay, "The Saturnian metre," *AJP*, XIV [1893], 139-70, 305-34).

⁵⁸ Cf. George R. Stewart, Jr., *Modern metrical technique* (New York, 1922), chap. viii.

⁵⁹ This is a point which need not be developed here. It will be enough to observe that in Meredith's practice the full dipody may be reduced to / ∪ ∪ ∪, to / ∪ ∪, to / ∪, and to / ∪.

study the special metrical peculiarities of a very unusual poem, a poem as difficult and as highly wrought in its way as are *Paradise lost*, the *Divine comedy*, or a tragedy of Sophocles in their different ways.

Second, it appears that the *Beowulf* is composed of metrical units (which for the most part correspond with the grammatical units), consisting of short verses of two, and sometimes three, stresses each, united by alliteration to form a so-called "long line." The functional alliteration may fall on either or both of the metrically stressed syllables of the first verse, and it nearly always falls on the first metrical stress of the second verse. Thus the line may have two rhymes, but more often three, which form the common patterns *aa ax*, *ax ax*, *xa ax*. Besides these, however, there are many variations, as well as lines with nonfunctional alliteration on metrically subordinate syllables.

Third, the two-stress verses, or dipodies, are generally trochaic, with occasional anacrusis and with frequent use of additional light syllables. For variety a secondary word-accent, such as is common in a language rich in compounds, serves as metrical stress; and it goes without saying that a secondary word-accent may stand in the place of a metrically unstressed syllable. For further variety other, apparently different but related, forms occur, e.g., $\cup // \cup$ (i.e., $\cup / [\cup] / \cup$), $\cup / \cup /$ (i.e., $\cup / \cup / [\cup]$), $/ \cup \cup /$ (i.e., $/ \cup / [\cup]$), and $/ / \cup \cup$ (i.e., $/ [\cup] / \cup$), besides other similar variations. These are not fixed patterns which the poet selects in turn but natural extensions of the fundamental trochaic basis, which develop from the adjustment of the native language patterns to the metrical scheme. In many cases, as is inevitable, there are ambiguities, and a verse may be read, or scanned, in more than one way; no strict consistency

is therefore to be expected but rather a free and flowing series of accommodations of the rhythm of Anglo-Saxon to the fundamental trochaic base. For our modern ears, accustomed to the "equable iambs" of most of our poetry, these accommodations may sound excessively free and even unpleasantly varied; but we are not the judges of what pleased or satisfied the ears of listeners a dozen centuries ago to a poem in what is for us a foreign language. The best we can do is to read the lines as well as we can and learn their different music.

Moreover, besides these few fairly simple and clear generalities, there are many uncertainties of detail—for example, the function of syllabic length, the effect of some of the alliterative variations, and so on—which should not distract our attention from the common principles and practice or obscure our conception of the general verse movement. Without these ambiguities and uncertainties, Anglo-Saxon versification would be different from that of all living languages (and we are no longer so confident as we once were about the regularity of classical prosody); and without its ambiguities and uncertainties Anglo-Saxon verse would be monotonous, mechanical, and uninteresting.

Lastly, the main difference between this interpretation and that of, say, Sievers, is one of attitude: a disbelief in laws and rules as the nineteenth century understood such things and a conviction that prosody is to be approached in a less rigorous and dogmatic spirit. The chief merit of this interpretation is thus its freedom from overformalism and its allowance for just the same kind of variety and "irregularity" as that which we recognize in our study of meter in the modern Germanic languages.

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THE LOGIC AND RHETORIC OF PETER RAMUS

PIERRE ALBERT DUHAMEL

PIERRE DE LA RAMÉE (1515-72), or, to give him the approximate Latin equivalent which he later adopted and by which he is better known, Peter Ramus, seems to be best remembered for his famous thesis, "Whatever is to be found in Aristotle is false," and for his revisions of the arts of logic and rhetoric. Ramus was never the complete radical which tradition and certain biographers have fabricated by exaggerating the importance of his thesis and the intention of his criticism of Aristotle.¹ Although he admits borrowing from Plato, Agricola, and Sturm, he looked upon himself as a conservative reviser and adapter of the Aristotelian work on logic and rhetoric,² removing the accumulated errors of centuries and restating more briefly and practically what others had previously developed.³ Indeed, he was so considered by Roger Ascham and John Sturm, who were not stampeded by the popular outcry against his thesis and his later criticisms of Aristotle.⁴ It would be better to approach him, in the spirit suggested by Mr. Hardin Craig, as one who thought of himself as a friend of Aristotle, simplifying and clarifying the logic and rhetoric which

had become obscured by layers of useless rules and mechanical applications.⁵

To make rhetoric and logic practical, logically consistent, and natural, Ramus proposed to limit logic to a treatment of the discovery and disposition of arguments, the *inventio* and *dispositio* of classical rhetoric. Rhetoric itself was to be concerned with the ornamentation and delivery of the material produced by logic, thus corresponding roughly to the *elocutio* and *pronuntiatio* of classical rhetoric. The two arts, rhetoric and logic, were to work together like the heart and the head to give expression to the thoughts of man.⁶ Thus we have a system of the arts which corresponds to the

two universal and general gifts given to man by nature, reason and speech. The first is the concern of dialectic, the latter of grammar and rhetoric. Dialectic seeks to establish the all-round strength of the human reason in the discovering and disposing of matter. Grammar seeks the purity of speech in words and syntax to speak or write well. Rhetoric demonstrates how to ornament an oration with tropes and figures and the dignity of proper delivery.⁷

⁵ Hardin Craig, *The enchanted glass* (New York, 1936), pp. 143-44, 150-51.

⁶ Peter Ramus, *Aristotelicae animadversiones* (Paris: Iacobus Bogardus, 1543), p. 78r: "Quamvis enim dialecticae ratio, rhetoricae oratio propria sit: nec corde sedes posita sit, tamen ut cordis, & linguae officia fidelissima societate natura coniunxit: sic rhetoricae & dialecticae munera usus & exercitatio copulare debebit."

⁷ Peter Ramus, *Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum* (Paris: Andreas Wechel, 1559), p. 18: "Duae sunt universae & generales homini dotes a natura tributae, Ratio & Oratio: illius doctrina dialectica est, hujus grammatica & rhetorica. Dialectica igitur generales humanae rationes vires in cogitandis & disponendis rebus persequatur, grammatica orationis puritatem in etymologia & syntaxi ad recte loquendum vel scribendum interpretetur. Rhetorica orationis ornatum tum in tropis & figuris, tum in actionis dignitate demonstrat: ab his deinde generalibus & universis velut instrumentis aliae artes sunt effectae." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

¹ Charles Waddington, *Ramus, sa vie, ses écrits, et ses opinions* (Paris, 1855).

² Peter Ramus, *Scholae in liberales artes* (Basle: E. Episcopus & Nicolai F., 1569), pp. 157-58: "... leges denique Aristoteles & principia, praecipueque excolamus: salutem artis & dignitatem totam ab his repetamus: Libros veterum conservemus, & ad eos, cum fuerit opus, recurramus: philosophiamque ex eorum libris collectam puram veramque doceamus." Cf. also *Dialecticae institutiones* (Paris: Iacobus Bogardus, 1543), p. 5r.

³ *Dialectica institutiones*, p. 4r: "Denique dialecticae imaginem breviter & succenti generum formarumque perpetuis quasi lineamentis adumbrare laboravi." Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 3v.

⁴ Giles (ed.), *The whole works of Roger Ascham* (London, 1865), I, Part II, 319. Letter to Sturm of August, 1551.

Although this division of logic into the invention and disposition of arguments is the most commonly known characteristic of the Ramistic system, Ramus himself considered it to have been the original intention of Aristotle as well as the natural and necessary sequence of the art.⁸ Aristotle's original intention had miscarried, and the resulting confusion had been increased by Cicero and Quintilian. Quintilian, in particular, had increased the scope of the art beyond its proper limits by including in it everything he had ever read about.⁹ Further, he had introduced the concept of morality by defining the orator as "vir bonus bene dicendi peritus." Morality has no place in rhetoric, and here Quintilian was probably led astray by the Stoics. An orator was to be concerned with tropes and figures, with the delivery of the speech; the rest was superfluous.¹⁰ Moral and intellectual virtues are the do-

main of ethics.¹¹ Though Ramus feels that he is not primarily a rhetorician, he considers that the system of Quintilian has perpetuated many errors.¹² The system of invention has been particularly contaminated by the rhetoricians, for they first investigated the use of the topics in forensic oratory and the use of these commonplaces has since become associated with them. Later the grammarians also discussed them and increased the confusion, which has resulted in an improper number of topics and an incorrect use of them.¹³ Ramus hoped to correct this confusion between the arts of rhetoric and logic by making the changes which are currently taken as the hallmark of his system. Since Ramus is not the originator of the distinction which he promoted between the arts of logic and rhetoric, one might be led to suspect that there is only a historical rea-

⁸ Peter Ramus, *Scholae in liberales artes*, p. 53: "... legitima partitione Dialecticae in inventionem & iudicium... essentialiter esse Dialecticae arti usus, quia naturaliter cogitamus primum quae disserenda sunt, deinde dispositis iudicamus." *Ibid.*, pp. 54-56: "Doceat igitur rhetorica partes ornandae dictionis—elocutionem & actionem. Quamobrem qui partitur logicam in inventionem & dispositionem Aristoteli auctore partitur."

⁹ *Rhetoricae distinctiones apud Quintilianum*, p. 6: "Eis autem Aristotelis & Ciceronis dialecticam & rhetoricam perturbationem Quintilianus sequitur, omnisque omnium artium, de quibus aliquid legerat, vel audierat, scholas grammaticas, mathematicas, philosophicas, hystronicas, palaestricas, rhetoricas in suas institutiones amplexit." *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16: "Artificis definitio vitiosa est, quae plus complectitur quam est artis finibus inclusum. At artificis oratoris definitio nobis a Quintiliano tradita plus amplectitur quam est artis finibus inclusum." The definition with which he quarrels is "Oratorem institutus illum perfectum qui esse nisi vir bonus non potest." *Ibid.*, p. 19: "Non est autem moralis virtus Rhetorica... ut qui ea praeditus sit, non bonus esse non possit: quamvis id Quintiliano philosophi quidam Stoici... hisce consectoris acute colligere videantur." *Ibid.*, p. 23: "Duae autem sunt illae partes, elocutio et actio, rhetoricae artis partes solae veraeque sunt, ut antea demonstravi, atque sic est docendum artium ordo, ut prima cum sit grammatica, sive reliquis intelligi & exerceri possit; secunda rhetorica sine grammatica non possit, sine caeteris omnibus possit."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14: "Rhetorica enim ars non est quae omnis animi virtutes explicet. De virtutibus moralibus, & de virtutibus intelligentiae ac mentis proprie permulta & eleganter Ethici philosophantur." *Ibid.*, p. 18: "Moralis philosophus non est pars rhetorica ut putavit Quintilianus."

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 6: "Lucem quae elocutioni & actioni deerat, frater meus Audomarus Talaus definitis & distributis & illustratis rerum generibus adiecit & exposuit." It must be remembered that the rhetorical part of the Ramistic system was first written by Omer Talon and that it was only after his death in 1562 that Ramus began to publish material on that art. *Ibid.*, p. 43: "Postremo capite valde occupatus est Quintilianus in investiganda Rhetoricae materia: & varia dissidentium hac de re opinionum sententia, tandem concludit materiam Rhetorices esse, res omnes quae ei dicendum subjectae sunt. Tertio capite dividitur rhetorica in quinque partes, inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam, & actionem. In qua partitione nihil jam miror Quintilianum dialectica tam nudum esse, qui dialecticam ipsam cum rhetorica hic confusum non potuerit agnoscere, cum dialecticae sunt inventio, dispositio, memoria: Rhetoricae tantum elocutio & actio."

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 54: "Summa inquam confusionis rhetoricae in inventionem tota versatur: cuius causam possumus ex ratione & progressionem temporum percipere." *Ibid.*, pp. 55 and 57: "Primi enim rhetores, forensium controversiarum causa locutos, quosdam prima de ambigua, scripto & sententia, contrariis legibus, tum definitionibus & coniecturis, tandem consilii in suadendo & dissuadendo, demonstrationis in laudando & vituperando repererunt. Primos rhetores secuti locos omnium generum commune in primis orationis etiam notaverunt." Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 58.

son for the treatment which he gives to these arts, but this is not so. There are quasi-metaphysical and logical reasons for the organization of the Ramistic system, and the knowledge of these reasons can give us a more fundamental insight into his thought.

Peter Ramus divided the arts into the "exoteric": grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; and the "esoteric" or "acromatic": mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. It is quite clear from a brief study of his life that he was mainly interested in the exoteric, for his attempt to reform them was not only first in time but also accounted for the major part of his writings. Indeed, he seems to have turned to a study of the esoteric only when the exoteric were forbidden him by a royal decree. Of the esoteric he was primarily interested in mathematics, though he did publish a *Scholarum physicarum* and a *Scholarum metaphysicarum*.¹⁴

It is in the *Scholarum metaphysicarum* that Ramus reveals some of the principles which guided him in distinguishing between the arts. Although it is quite possible that the norms of distinction stated in the *Metaphysics* to distinguish between what is proper matter for one art and proper matter for another may have been *post facto* rationalizations of what had already been done, this is beside the point, for there is a consistency in the division which he maintained throughout his works. In the *Scholarum metaphysicarum* Ramus believes that nothing should be included in an art unless it is universally and necessarily true, unless it is homogeneous with all of the art, unless it is proper to that art only, and unless it is primarily and naturally located in this

art.¹⁵ Or, to state it in other terms, there should be nothing in an art which is merely accidental or false, nothing heterogeneous, and nothing out of keeping with the generality of the remainder of the art. These principles are admittedly obscure, although he claims to have derived them from Aristotle. Since it is his criticism of Aristotle in the *Scholarum metaphysicarum* which gives rise to a discussion of these principles, they can perhaps be clarified by illustration from practice.

Ramus accuses Aristotle of forgetting his own principles that nothing pertaining to logic be taught in physics, or anything of logic be taught in metaphysics and that the general be taught in its proper manner in its proper place. Thus he seems to be saying, in his own terms, that Aristotle has failed to keep metaphysics homogeneous and proper, for he has included something in it which is properly discussed in another art and which is not naturally to be found in the art of metaphysics. In particular, Aristotle has treated the logic of causes in both physics and metaphysics, which causes are properly discussed in logic and, in so far as Aristotle has introduced them again into metaphysics, he has been guilty of repetition and misplacement of concepts.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Scholae in liberales artes*, p. 827. All the material quoted from the *Scholarum metaphysicarum* can be found in a separate volume entitled, *P. Ramus, scholarum metaphysicarum* (Paris: Andrew Wechel, 1566) (p. 3 here), but I shall make my references to the more easily available work. "In arte nihil esto (ait Aristoteles) nisi *κατὰ παντός* omnino necessarioque verum, nisi *καθ' αὐτό* homogeneous, totiusque artis naturale & essentiale documentum: nisi *καθ' ὅλους πρώτων* proprium & reciprocatum, nisi denique naturae prius, loco priore collocatum. . . . nihil falsum fortitumve, nihil heterogeneum, nihil inaequabile doceant."

¹⁶ *Scholae in liberales artes*, p. 830: "Imperat nobis imperio vestro, ne quicquam logicum sit in Physico, ne quicquam Logicum sit in Metaphysica: Imperat ut generalia generaliter, & semel & suo loco doceantur: attamen, vos, vestraque iussa mandataque oblitus aut aspernatus, causarum Logicam in Physicis, causarum Logicam in Metaphysicis repetit etiam atque etiam. Tautologia igitur istas tam molestas & odiosas coerecet."

¹⁴ *Scholae in liberales artes, Scholarum physicarum*. Theophilus Banosius (*Petri Rami de religione Christiana* [Frankfurt: Andrew Wechel, 1577], p. 36) also mentions a work on physics which was lost when Ramus was murdered during the massacre of St. Bartholomew's.

Ramus disagrees with Alexander of Aphrodisias' division of Aristotelian logic into apodictic, dialectic, and sophistic. Alexander had maintained that the logic was apodictic in the *Posterior analytics*, dialectic in the *Topics*, and sophistic in the *Sophistices elenches*. Ramus first points out that the *Categories*, as well as the *Prior analytics*, is omitted from the classification. Second, he will not grant that the affirmations of Aristotle in these selections are universally valid. Third, Alexander has not kept the arts homogeneous, for sophistry is no more a part of logic than the doctrine of the vices is a part of the doctrine of the virtues. Fourth, it is not homogeneous, for there is one method of invention and disposition which is common to both apodictic and dialectic. Fifth, the same manner of discovering arguments is reiterated in apodictic and in dialectic, which is thus not primary in both places.¹⁷ Ramus thus insisted that every art include among its principles only those axioms which are necessary and universally true. Also the art must have a homogeneous content, with all its parts in keeping with one another. Finally, whatever is treated in an art must be basic to the art and must belong to it because of a natural priority. The rule of homogeneity seems to be the one which he saw most frequently violated. It demanded the exclusion from an art of what was not in

keeping with its over-all character. He expressed it again by saying that there should be nothing in arithmetic which is not arithmetical, nothing in geometry which is not geometrical, nothing in theology which is not theological.¹⁸

When Ramus applied these principles to logic, he discovered that there was much included in that art which was repeated in the teaching of rhetoric. He found that this was particularly true of the discussion of sources of arguments and their disposition in the form of axioms, judgments, or syllogisms.¹⁹ This material was naturally basic to logic, and, further, its repetition in rhetoric destroyed the homogeneity of that art, for it was not rhetorical material. Then there was much in the contemporary teaching of logic which was either not necessary or not universally true.²⁰ A large part of what he omits from his own *Dialectica* but which is to be found in the *Prior analytics* he demonstrates as false in his *Aristotelicae animadversiones*. Consequently, he abbreviated the material of logic, took away from rhetoric what he considered proper to logic, and limited rhetoric to what had no place in logic, thus making both arts valid,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 956: "Verumtamen legem χαθ' αυτο huc appellemus quae iubet in arithmetica nihil esse nisi arithmeticum; in geometria nihil esse nisi geometrum; in theologica nihil esse nisi theologicum."

¹⁹ Petri Rami, *Ciceronianus & Brutinae quaestiones* (Basle: Peter Perna, 1577), p. 329: "Summae confusionis est in una artis parte alias partes antecedentes confundere, partis ipsius etiam artem nullam tradere: At Aristoteles in una artis parte alias partes antecedentes confundit: eius ipsius partis nullam artem docuit. Summae igitur confusionis author fuit. Inventionem Rhetoricae partem primam facit Aristoteles, falso ut antea docui, quia Dialectica propria est: sed tamen Rhetoricae partem facit, & eius multiplices artes primo artis universae loco conturbat in probationibus."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 350: "Aristoteles error hic fuit, sunt antea iam tam multi, qui quicquid necessarium vel utile putavit, in Dialecticis & aliis artibus temere confudit, non consideravit proprium esset an alienum Categorias ad eam rem putatur a quibusdam suis scripsisse. Denique Dialectica, ut dixi, tota ratio est, sermonis & orationis in suis praeceptis nihil habere debet."

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 883-84: "Qui enim sic partiendo affirmat, totam logicam Aristoteles esse apodicticam, dialecticam, sophisticam: & apodicticam in posterioribus analyticis, dialecticam in topicis, sophisticam in elenchis instituit: falsum dicit etiam de Aristotele logica. Sunt enim praeterea categoriae, εμμετρεα analytica priora neque affirmatio illa est κατὰ παντος. Sophistica autem non est pars logicae: necque enim doctrina vitii, pars est in virtutis doctrina. Quare illud non est χαθ' αυτο una autem est, doctrina & inventionis & iudicii communis apodicticae & dialecticae, & in utraque, eadem inveniendi argumenti doctrina iteratur, ut in scholis logicis disputatem, non est χαθ' αυτο παντος. Quamobrem partitio logicae in apodicticam, dialecticam, sophisticam, contra omnes leges confecta est. Atque ex illa tam fallaci partitione, tota deinde logicae artis confusio nata est."

homogeneous, and composed of principles in their natural places.

If the extent of any of the exoteric arts was in part determined by laws of a fundamental nature which defined an integrated art, the scope of the art was also determined by a quality of the end which the art was to achieve. Every art had its proper end, such as speaking well or arguing well, which it was to reach in a practical manner. By "practical" Ramus seems to have meant the opposite of "theoretical." The art should be theoretical neither in end, formulation, nor development. It must be founded on experience, for "experience produces art; inexperience gives rise to temerity."²¹ These words he has often desired to see inscribed in golden letters in the vestibule of every school of philosophy, so that those attending would realize that nothing is to be accepted which is not induced from one's own observation of true examples. This would prevent thousands of dreams and deliriums from breaking forth in the liberal arts. In the *Aristotelicae animadversiones* he gives a history of the corruption of logic, wherein he praises Plato for establishing a dialectic which was simple, unadorned, and practical and which was later corrupted and marred.²² This conception of practicality thus implied a wide revision in the content and form of logic and rhetoric as they were then constituted. It meant a greater use of inductive pedagogic procedures directed to an effective daily use of the weapons of logic as against a theoretical consideration of technicalities limited to schools of philosophy.

²¹ *Scholae in liberales artes*, p. 830: "Experientia quidem artem genuit, inexperientia autem temeritatem."

²² *Aristotelicae animadversiones*, p. 2v: "... sed plus debet dialectica Platoni quam superioribus: quod eam artium omnium regnam, deamque statuit: perpetuoque novis laudibus, & magnificis afficit: hactenus veritas dialectica, veritatisque utilitas simplex, & nuda fuit: quae deinceps turbatis, & corrumpi coepit."

Centuries of error and stupidity followed Plato's work in logic, as a result of accepting the authority of Aristotle. Again and again Ramus reiterates throughout the work how impracticable the Aristotelian logic was. He begs the reader to consider the terms of the system of invention to see how confused they are. When he finally turns to the predicables, he cannot refrain from joking about them. He asks the reader to suppose what would happen if an Aristotelian, returning to his home town after studying logic, should call the people together and address them: "I know that the people have eight ways of being beautiful, such as quality, quantity, . . . who would be able to stop from laughing?"²³ The chaos of terminology in the Aristotelian logic is his best example or proof of the impracticability of the system. The predicables were the occasion of his first revolt against the contemporary logic, as he explains at great length in the *Scholae dialecticae*, and then, as well as during his later life, it was their uselessness which alienated him. No one ever thought in those terms.²⁴ Thus, if the logical considerations stated in the *Scholarum metaphysicarum* provided him with norms for distinguishing between the arts, the practical manner in which every art was to achieve its end also contributed to his framing of the arts and furnished the emotional drive to accomplish his revision of logic.²⁵

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14r, 16r and v, 18r: "Si quis Aristoteleorum in patria reversus popularis convocarit, ut in publico conventu Aristotelicae sapientiae specimen exhiberet, tum diceret: scio populares octo pulchros habendi modos, ut qualitatem, quantitatem, . . . quis risum teneret?"

²⁴ *Scholae in liberales artes*, pp. 154 ff.

²⁵ *Aristotelicae animadversiones*, pp. 21r, 29r, 77v, and 78r. "Chaos illud terminorum praedicabilium, praedicamentorum, *epurpuras* analyticorum, topicorum, elenchorum & infinitarum introductionum in quibus non imaginem dialecticae naturalis, sed confusionem ingeniorum, perniciosas insidias publicorum studiorum, impedimenta doctrinarum omnium cum viderunt, impliam superstitionem vindicabunt, ulsciscuntur reipublicae incurias."

Ramus had a third principle which guided him in his reform of the arts and which, if followed, guaranteed the practicability and logical consistency of the art. His basic rule seems to have been that every art should imitate nature, and therefore he describes his logic as *imago naturalis dialecticae*. Criticism of the impracticability of Aristotle is frequently linked to the criticism that Aristotle did not imitate nature. There is nothing in Aristotle which is not confused, disturbed, contaminated, or blurred because he failed to adhere to the norm of careful construction, simplicity, and integrity, which is truth to nature.²⁶ He, on the other hand, bases his dialectic on nature, for "the art of dialectic should proceed from the imitation and observation of the dialectic of nature." A large part of Ramus' rhetorical and logical examples are taken from "nature," from the orators and poets, instead of being manufactured to illustrate theoretical principles. This was why he was accused of confusing the arts in his teaching, for he would point out a logical construction if it occurred in a poet or a figure of speech if it occurred in a philosophical text. Thus he taught logic from Cicero and Virgil, the logic which was practical and proper, uncontaminated by theoretical or speculative verbiage. Consequently, Ramistic pedagogy and texts frequently presented the students with a minimum of theory and a maximum of example. The examples afforded an opportunity for the student to learn the art by experience from natural sources. Ramus carried the principle further by insisting that every art first flourished in nature and that it was not created by pre-

cepts. Thus nothing should be contained or taught as the principles of an art which was not truly derived from nature.²⁷

This conception of the natural origin of all arts is carried back a step further in the *Dialecticae institutiones*, where Ramus describes dialectic as the gift of God to man. The art can be discovered by searching three books: the characters imprinted in the individual soul by God, nature, and the natural functions of the hand and the tongue.²⁸ The natural power to reason, the image of the parent of all things, God, is born with man.²⁹ It is here that he is in closest agreement with several of the affirmations of Puritan scholasticism, and one can easily understand how his thought became closely tied to theirs. Like the Puritans, Ramus assumed an intimate concurrence of God in nature and with them indicated that the power of reason was the image of God in men. The use of the syllogism was proper to the regenerate for the Puritans,³⁰ whereas for Ramus it was common to all men. Ramus differed further, for he encouraged a discussion of probable things as the proper subject matter of logic, whereas the Puritans ap-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3v: "Tamen ab eo principio nobis est ordiendum: ut ex veritate naturae mendacium capitosae confusionis arguatur: ars enim dialecticae debet ab imitatione & ab observatione naturalis dialecticae proficisci." *Ibid.*, p. 4r: "... grammatica, rhetoricae praeceptiones tradunt: quarum vis, atque usus in naturalis sermonis puritate, atque exornationeprehenditur: omniumque artium veritas prius in naturae viguit, quam ulla praecepta cogitarentur nec quicquam in artis ullius accurata descriptione situm, collocatumque esse debet, cuius imitatio non e rei ipsius natura, usu, veritate duci, derivarique debeat."

²⁷ *Dialecticae institutiones*, pp. 5v and 6r: "His sunt tres libri ad omnes disciplinae fructum, laudemque necessari: quorum primum aeterni characteribus in animis nostris Dei optimus, maximis imprimit."

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6r: "Naturalis autem dialectica, id est, ingenium, ratio, mens, imago parentis omnium rerum Dei, lux denique beatae illius, & aeternae lucis aemula, hominis propria est, cum eo que nascitur."

²⁹ This point is developed with great thoroughness by Perry Miller, *The New England mind* (New York, 1939), particularly in chaps. v and vii, where he cites many Puritan preachers to show that logic is a natural ability given by God primarily to the regenerate.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 6v, 7r, and 4v: "In commentariis autem Aristoteles nihil est ad naturae monitionem propositum: nihil (si naturae veritatem spectes) non confusum, non perturbatum, non contaminatum, non foedatum: ars igitur dialectica in commentariis Aristoteleis nulla est."

plied logic to the deducing of truths from theologically certain premises.³¹

One of the more or less explicit assumptions of the Ramistic dialectic was the inevitability of the mind's assent to a true proposition, once it was presented to the mind. This had the effect of making all true propositions postulates, i.e., a proposition whose truth is so patent that the mind cannot refuse assent. Investigation by means of the syllogism became almost superfluous, for, if ideas were brought into the proper relationship in a judgment, the truth was obvious.³² The syllogism helped to throw the truthfulness of a proposition into higher relief but did not make it more or less true.³³ Ramistic omissions from the logic thus become more intelligible. The square of opposition disappears from the textbooks on logic because it is necessary only as a preliminary to the treatment of the syllogism and the forms of the syllogism treated are only the most elementary. Consequently, the core of the Ramistic texts discussed the sources of arguments and their arrangement into "axioms" or judgments and gave a cursory treatment of the more apparent syllogisms. The topics or commonplaces of argument were the first and essential part of logic.³⁴

One hallmark of the Ramistic thought which attracted much criticism and inspired the same amount of imitation was the use of dichotomous division in the

textbook presentation of logic and rhetoric. Bacon defined "men of this sort" as torturing "things with their laws of method, and whatever does not conveniently fall in these dichotomies, they either omit or pervert beyond nature, so that, so to speak, when the seeds and kernels of science are springing forth, they gather so many dry and empty husks."³⁵ Ramus attributed the method to Plato, and it is his most obvious borrowing from Plato.³⁶ This division, it will be remembered, is based upon a note and its negation: men are divided into smokers and nonsmokers. Dialectic, for example, consists of invention and judgment. Invention discusses arguments which are either artificial or inartificial. The artificial arguments are either simple or comparative. This could be carried to extremes, such as dividing quantity into equal or unequal, and unequal into greater or less. The Ramistic texts had a table at the rear which set forth the dichotomies by means of which an experienced student could trace an argument back to its source and evaluate its validity.³⁷ The method of procedure had its effect on later authors such as Milton who were followers of the Ramistic method.³⁸ In the *De doctrina christiana* Milton divides (Book I, chap. 5) God's knowledge into two sources: his nature and his efficiency. His efficiency is further divided into external and internal; internal efficiency is divided into general and special. Providence is divided (I, 8) into ordinary and extraordinary; temptations are either for good or for evil. In Book I, chapter 26, the law of God is either writ-

³¹ *Dialecticae institutiones*, p. 8r: "Nulla enim disputatio esse debet, nec potest de re perspicua, atque aperta: nec dubia res ulla nisi disserenda probari potest."

³² Miller, pp. 134, 146, 149; cf. also p. 135.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 135: "The whole Ramist system assumed, in short, that most axioms will show on their face whether they are true or false; when there is no doubt, then 'an axiom will serve us' but when there is doubt, 'we must have a candle to make it clear.' This candle, the syllogism, merely makes 'truth, or falsehood more manifest unto us: so that clear *per se* belongs to an axiom; but perspicuity in regard of us belongs to a syllogism.'"

³⁴ Miller, p. 122.

³⁵ James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (eds.), *The works of Francis Bacon* (London, 1879), I, 63, and III, 530.

³⁶ Plato *Sophist* 219a and *Politicus* 258b ff.

³⁷ See Miller, p. 126, for a standardized table of the dialectic which appeared with few modifications in most Ramistic texts.

³⁸ John Milton, *Artis logicae plenior institutio* (1672), was Milton's version of Ramus' dialectic.

ten or unwritten. Milton, like Ramus, always explains the positive term and then goes on to divide the negative term further and to explain the positive term of that division.

Aristotle considers such a dichotomy as a fallacious begging of the question; it is a weak syllogism with the third term omitted. The division of men into smokers and nonsmokers is a thesis, a proposition to be proved. Ramus considered such a proposition apparent and as not requiring any proof. Aristotle demonstrates that it is impossible to refute a proposition by this method or to make an inference about either accidents or properties of a being, for simple denial provides no notes from which it is possible to infer.³⁹ Thus the use of dichotomous division is in keeping with Ramus' belief in the assent-compelling force of properly constructed judgments and with his distrust of the syllogism.

If the foregoing discussion can be considered as philosophical or logical causes of the revision which Ramus promoted in the arts of rhetoric and logic, there is a further historical cause which must be considered. In all probability it came first in time and gave Ramus the essential outlines of his reform, which he improved by the addition of logical concepts. John Sturm gave courses at Paris between 1529 and 1536, wherein he made the division of labor between rhetoric and logic which Ramus later adopted. Further, he seems to have taught in the practical manner by employing the orators and poets as examples of logic.⁴⁰ Sturm had derived his method from Rudolphus Agricola, who

had died in 1485, leaving his three volumes of *De inventione dialectica* as a small epitome of logic. Agricola's book was really a Ciceronian-Quintilian topical system for the finding of materials of arguments. The entire work seems to have been almost completely rhetorical in content, touching only briefly on a discussion of universals and handling definition and division in purely rhetorical fashion.⁴¹ It was this simplicity and practicality of Agricola and Sturm which first attracted Ramus; and, though much has been made of his rediscovery of Plato through Galen, Agricola alone among all these writers considered the usefulness of the art to mankind.⁴²

Thus there are at least four reasons why the Ramistic arts of rhetoric and logic are what they are: a logical cause, determining the scope of the matter; a practical end, further limiting the material; a formal principle of the imitation of nature, determining the way in which the material is to be presented; and an immediate historical cause, which motivated the conception and execution of the reform. Logic became the art of *bene disserandi*, with the topics and disposition as its subject matter; and rhetoric was left with the tropes and figures as its subject matter. In effect, Ramus thus came to deny the existence of a separate art of oratory. Since logic and the principles of logic were all that were necessary for the procuring of material for effective speaking and the disposition of this material in proper form,⁴³ rhetoric was left as an art of ornamentation. It decorated the argu-

³⁹ Prior analytics I. 31.

⁴⁰ *Scholae in liberales artes*, p. a2v: "Rodolphus Agricola primus omnium post beatae Graeciae Italiaeque tempora eximium illum logicae facultatis revocavit, ut juvenis a poetis & oratoribus discret non solum pure loqui & ornate dicere, sed de propositis rebus acute cogitare prudenterque judicare. Hos dialecticos tam insignes tamque amabiles fructus Joannes Sturm ex Agricolae schola Lutetiam Parisiorum primus attulit."

⁴¹ Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, 1870), IV, 167 ff.

⁴² *Scholae in liberales artes*, pp. 153-54: "Unus Agricola inter tot scriptores usum humanitatis illum perspexit. . . in eundem tandem in Galeni librum de Decretis Hippocrates & Platonis excitatus ad omnes Platonis dialogos, qui de Dialectica aliquid praeciperant perlegendum."

⁴³ Miller, p. 317.

ments discovered by logic with tropes and figures. The content of the oration became the object of reason and method; the function of rhetoric was to gild the furnished material.⁴⁴ The end of rhetoric was achieved in the parts of elocution and pronunciation.⁴⁵ Although the definition of orator may have remained nominally similar to the classical definition of "vir bonus dicendi peritus," it is quite clear that by *bene* is meant "ornate" and that the old adage of Cato, "Rem tene, verba sequuntur," has been eclipsed in favor of a search for words. But, by following his principles, Ramus had succeeded in distinguishing the matter of rhetoric and dividing it from the matter of the other arts, so that it was accorded what was proper to it and so that all confusion was removed from the other arts. What was taught among the precepts of grammar was not mingled with the principles of rhetoric; what was set forth in rhetoric was not touched upon by logic; briefly, the ends and teachings of all the arts were kept separate, although joined in use.⁴⁶

In composition, as in the order of the teaching of the subjects, logic always preceded rhetoric. An intellectual operation, based upon the rules of logic, always preceded a second act of the imagination and the intellect which sought to clothe the constructs of the first act in a decorative form. The veneration of the first act, which

had produced something like a lawyer's brief, might not be carried, as it was not in Puritanism, to the point where it concealed or obscured the main theme of the discourse. Among secular writers, however, there was a tendency to borrow a brief from Cicero and to spend a lot of labor on the ornamentation. The results are to be seen in a work of John Rainolds, *Oratio in laudem artis poeticae*.⁴⁷ Composition performed under such principles lacked the unity of conception and execution which is necessary to the highest art. The thought was not expressed in its natural form; matter and form were separate in origin and expression. The brief corresponded to the closed fist, which Varro used to describe the matter before it had been subjected to rhetoric, or to the naked reason of Thomas Wilson in his *Arte of rhetorike*. The ornamented discourse corresponded to the extended palm of Varro, the matter amplified by rhetoric, or to the "reason clad in purple" of Wilson.⁴⁸

Ramus' contribution was not to the theory of rhetoric or of logic. He was not a philosopher who sought to explore the principles laid down in the *Organon*. If he conceived of his work as returning logic to a theoretically original practicality and wide use, he certainly accomplished his purpose. By his translations and use of the vernacular, plus his reduction of the arts to a few principles, he made logic readily available to, and employed by, a large group of people and filled the world with logic-choppers.

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⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁴⁵ Ciceronianus & Brutinae quaestiones, p. 282: "Rhetoricae fines elocutionis & actionis partibus concludantur, orator nobis definiendus est bene dicendi peritus: bene autem & ornate dici & elocutionis & actionis virtutes." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 52-54, 227.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 280: "Distinguiamus Rhetoricae artes materiam & a caeterarum artium materia dividamus, ut constet quod eius proprium sit, ut omnis omnino confusio tollatur: quod Grammaticus praeceptis doceatur, id rursus in Rhetoricis non misceatur: quod in Rhetoricis instituatur, a dialecticis non attingatur: breviter artium omnium fines & Institutiones separentur: usum tamen coniungatur."

⁴⁷ W. Ringler and W. Allen (eds.), *John Rainold's "Oratio in laudem artis poeticae"* (Princeton, 1940), Introd.

⁴⁸ Miller, p. 327. Cf. also Karl R. Wallace, *Francis Bacon on communication and rhetoric* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1943), pp. 196 ff.

GOETHE'S VIEW OF CHRIST¹

ARNOLD BERGSTRÄSSER

GOETHE's religion of humanity forms a part of Christian history, although it reinterprets or even denies some of the tenets of orthodox Christian theology. Supporting the principle of religious freedom, Goethe considered the Reformation an important step toward such freedom. But he kept himself free from the dogma, including that of Protestantism.² In so far as he believed in the critical and creative mission of human reason to work out philosophic insight and human conduct, his attitude was humanistic; but it is distinguished from a rationalist or positivist approach by Goethe's understanding of reason (*Vernunft*), which is different from intellect (*Verstand*) and includes both poetical and religious experience and evaluation.³ His religious poetry and prose is in harmony with the motives

and results of his research in nature. It is the testimony of a personal faith and yet is related to the tradition of spiritualism which, as a "third religion," pervades the development of occidental Christian thought.

On the basis of these concepts, Goethe was consistent in his view of Christ throughout his life and work. Goethe held that, in contrast to communal activity, true religion remains something inward and even individual.⁴ Thus his image of Christ early took on a personal form, according to his own genuine experience.⁵ Goethe's judgment on Christianity and the Christian churches, however, varied from antagonism against hierarchy and dogma to praise of the "miraculous phenomenon of the Christian religion."⁶ Goethe considered faith as the power and the task of inward experience rather than of outward obedience, and conduct or action rather than pious devotion its test. He maintained a sharp distinction between Christ and Christianity. In defense of his growing convictions against Lavater's effort to convert him to his own view of Christianity, he once stated that he was a decided non-Christian.⁷ But he also

¹ Goethe's works are cited according to the *Jubiläumsausgabe* (JA), with the exception of *Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung und Ephemeriden*, which are cited according to the *Insel Ausgabe* (Grossh. Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe). The *Maximen und Reflexionen*, the *Xenien*, and the exchange of letters with Lavater are cited according to the respective volumes of the *Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft*. Other letters are cited according to date and addressee; conversations according to Biedermann, *Goethes Gespräche* (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1910-11).

² Goethe's view of Luther as the originator of our capacity "to return to the source and to conceive Christianity in its purity" (to Eckermann, March 11, 1832 [Biedermann, IV, 441]) is paralleled and modified by a view of Renaissance humanism expressed in *Maximen und Reflexionen* (XXI [1907], 148, No. 668): "It cannot be denied that the church tried to liberate itself through the Reformation; the enlightenment about Greek and Roman antiquity brought forth the wish, the longing, for a more free, decent, and tasteful living. It was, however, not a little favored by the tendency of the heart to return to a certain simple state of nature and by that of creative imagination to gain in concentration."

³ "Die Vernunft ist auf das Werdende, der Verstand auf das Gewordene angewiesen" (*Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 120, No. 555; cf. also p. 192, No. 922; letter to Riemer, September 26, 1807 [Biedermann, IV, 69]). "Aller Verstandesunterricht führt zur Anarchie." *Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre* (JA, XL, 157).

⁴ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, I, 7 (JA, XIX, 94). Cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, II, 8 (JA, XXIII, 163 f.): "Bildung meiner eigenen Religion." "Neuer Platonismus." More reticently Goethe expresses himself about the same subject in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (JA, XXIV, 201).

⁵ JA, XXIV, 201.

⁶ To St. Schütze (1813) (Biedermann, II, 186).

⁷ Cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (JA, Vol. XXIV). For passage quoted see Goethe's letter to Lavater of July 29, 1782 (XVI [1901], 209). The relationship and antagonism between Goethe and Lavater are clearly characterized, for example, in Goethe's letters of April 26, 1774, and August 9, 1782. Goethe felt that Lavater and he were "close to each other with their existence, but moved far away from each other with their thoughts and imaginations" (July 24, 1780).

called himself such a Christian as Christ wanted men to be,⁸ and after his death Otilie von Goethe remarked that nobody could have acted in a manner more Christian than he.⁹ It was in the aesthetic analogy of Greek art that Goethe found the strongest support for his concept of the balance of human faculties, the classic ideal of harmony and totality.¹⁰ And yet he built the educational institution described in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* upon a doctrine of man and of history which corresponds to, and explicitly refers to, an image of Christ.¹¹

Even among orthodox critics there is no doubt as to Goethe's awareness of and respect before the holy, the *numinosum*.¹² But he is also interpreted as a pagan because of the pantheistic elements in his philosophy. His concept of man is considered as that of a self-sufficient being.¹³ His educational aim of civilizing man and society is seen as part of the cultural tra-

ditionalism which, for instance, a radically supra-naturalist theology in the following of Kierkegaard judges fallacious. In Reinhold Niebuhr's terms, also, Goethe and his work are a part of the survival of the "Renaissance" and therefore stand in necessary opposition to the challenge of the Reformation.¹⁴ The problem of Goethe's religion raises the question of the relation between religion and civilization in general. Because it includes a view of Christ, it involves both the kinship and the antagonism between literary humanism and Christianity and constitutes a modern and actual question.

It will be necessary to touch upon the spiritual background of Goethe's religious

¹⁴ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The nature and destiny of man* (New York, 1941). The literature about Goethe's religion and about his relation to Christianity in particular is extended and of a rather varying quality. Calvin Thomas in his *Goethe* (new ed. by R. H. Fife [New York, 1929]) gives an introduction to the problem. H. A. Korff in *Der Geist der Goethezeit* (Leipzig, 1923-30), Vol. I, Book I, chap. II, and Vol. II, Book I, chap. I, gives a thorough analysis of Goethe's religion of humanity within the larger frame of German philosophical idealism, which he distinguishes as "idealism of reason" from Goethe's and Herder's "idealism of nature."

A controversy about the subject, in which dialectic theologians, orthodox Lutherans, and philosophers took part, produced an extensive literature, in which the work of W. Luetgert, *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende* (2d ed.; Gütersloh, 1923-30), was the leading representative of the older orthodox viewpoint. Eduard Spranger's remarkable criticism of the orthodox and the existentialist negation of Goethe as well as of philosophical idealism is in *Der Kampf gegen den deutschen Idealismus* (Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. Akad. Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl., Vol. XVII [1931]). For further literature see Franz, p. 280. Cf. also Werner Richter's review of Erich Franz's *Deutsche Klassik und Reformation* (Halle, 1937) in *JEGP*, XL (1941), 403 ff. The work of Kurt Leese, *Die Krisis und Wende des christlichen Geistes* (Berlin, 1932), chap. II, sec. 2, sets forth Goethe's relation to the theological problem of ontology. He impressively questions Korff's exaggerated attempt to present Goethe as a "perfect heathen" in view of his refusal to accept the dogma (p. 137). This essay refers, in connection with specific problems, to other pertinent contributions.

Christoph Schrempf's articles on Goethe's relation to Christianity in *Goethe-Handbuch*, ed. Julius Zeitler (Stuttgart, 1916-18), are built on misleading doctrinary prejudices. The claim (I, 318) that "Goethe never took Christianity seriously enough to think about its nature" speaks for itself.

⁸ To F. von Müller, April 7, 1830 (Biedermann, IV, 261).

⁹ To Abeken (Biedermann, IV, 461).

¹⁰ Its connection with religion: "Die Kunst ruht auf einer Art religiösem Sinn, auf einem tiefen unerschütterlichen Ernst; deswegen sie sich auch so gern mit der Religion vereinigt" (*Mazimen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 230, No. 1107).

¹¹ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 2 (JA, XXIX, 187-92).

¹² Cf. Erich Franz, *Goethe als religiöser Denker* (Tübingen, 1932), pp. 279-80; about Otto's comment on Goethe's concept of the demonic, which Franz discusses, cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, IV, 20 (JA, XXV, 123 ff.).

¹³ Emil Brunner, *Der Mittler* (Tübingen, 1927), p. 83: "Darum gibt es vielleicht keine schärferen Gegensätze als das Goethesche und das christliche Existenzverständnis, weil wohl kein moderner Geist diese tiefste Tendenz des Modernen, das in sich Ruhende des Menschen, tiefer erfasst und bejaht hat als er." To refute this interpretation Erich Franz (p. 244) develops the connection between Goethe and the Christian conception of existence in the sense of Kierkegaard. See also Horst Oppel, "Goethe und Kierkegaard," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, XVI (1938), 126 ff. (This journal will be cited hereafter as "DVJ/LuG.") Numerous passages of Goethe's works, as well as the structure of *Faust* and *Pandora*, prove that Brunner's contention about Goethe's concept of man is untenable.

thought and to discuss the symbolist mode of his thinking, before we try to adumbrate the contours of his view of Christ and its position within Goethe's philosophy, which conceives spirit and nature as divine manifestations. Restricted to this purpose, this literary analysis may also, it is hoped, contribute to the religious problem which its subject involves.

I. THE RETURNING CHRIST

Faust and Prometheus remained in Goethe's mind as central figures of his poetical production. The image of Christ stayed with him as a lasting figure of his religious concepts. It formed a part of the basic structure of his thought, the plan of which was early laid out. Our attention should not be deflected too far from the unity of its design by insight into the development of Goethe's style and his increasing consciousness of the poet's responsible position in society. In the light of his basic concepts, the period of Goethe's classicism, which comprises the age of his manhood between the *Sturm und Drang* poetry and the wisdom of his last decades, takes the aspect of growth and implementation rather than of rupture. If one applies Goethe's conception of *Gestalt* to his own development, the lasting and the changing determinants of his personality can be distinguished.¹⁵ Then, Goethe's view of Christ turns out to be close to the lasting foundations of his attitude toward man and life. On the other hand, Goethe considers organized religion a part of predominantly secular history. His judgment about it is more susceptible to considerations of pedagogy or to reactive impulses of the moment.

Certainly, Goethe said that man, as a

¹⁵ Franz, *Goethe*, p. 163. Heinz Kindermann, in his survey of literature on Goethe, "Mehr Goethe?" in *DVfLuG*, VIII (1930), 558 ff., overemphasizes the need of genetic interpretation in view of a "permanently changing personality such as Goethe was" (p. 582).

boy, is a realist; as an adolescent, an idealist; as an adult, a skeptic; and in old age he becomes a mystic. Hinting thereby at tendencies prevailing on the various age-levels, he did not contradict his fundamental conviction that there exists a core of the personality which lasts throughout the course of life. The development of Goethe's religious beliefs proceeded by an inner logic. The religious ideas of Goethe's classicism bear traits which are characteristic also of the young and the old Goethe. In *Iphigenie auf Tauris* guilt is expiated and a seemingly insuperable antagonism is reconciled by the interference of the divine through the mediation of the humane Iphigenie. The soul is freed from pain and despair by an act of grace through which the divine becomes immanent. Conversely, *Faust* and Epimetheus in *Pandora* make evident the transcendental relationship to higher spheres to which man is subject. Whether Goethe concentrated upon the search in nature or upon the classical image of man in art, he remained aware of life as a fragment and was concerned about the divine as a living force. Within the whole of his philosophy, immanence and transcendence are rhythmically co-ordinated rather than mutually exclusive.¹⁶

The old Goethe expressed his concern about the Christian religion when he said: "To me Christ always remains a highly significant but problematic being."¹⁷ And he immediately continued: "Mankind finds itself now in a religious crisis." This crisis is related to the modern critical and

¹⁶ Cf. Oppel, p. 157.

¹⁷ To F. von Müller, June 16, 1830 (Biedermann, IV, 283). The part of the conversation which concerns our problem started out with the discussion of the anonymous "Glaubensbekenntnisse eines Denkgläubigen Christen" (1830). Referring to it as a weak compromise between rationalism and religion, Goethe said: "It is necessary either to uphold the belief in the tradition without engaging in the criticism of it, or else, if one pursues the criticism, to abandon this belief, a third alternative not being thinkable."

historical view of apostles and saints which makes "fellows such as Klopstock, Lessing, and ourselves" comparable to them. Goethe hints at the tension between orthodoxy and enlightenment which he had solved for himself by extending the domain of inspiration far beyond the Bible and the Christian witnesses. He had pursued the principle of religious freedom to the point of separating himself entirely from the clerical tradition.¹⁸ On the other hand, he characterizes the significance of the personality of Christ by a statement made a few months later: "Each appearance of Christ, each of his utterances, tends to render evident the sublime."¹⁹

Goethe's concept of Christ had a twofold problematic aspect. Seen as the manifestation of a higher sphere toward which to draw man is His mission, Christ is related to the central tenet of Christology, the incarnation of God in human flesh. The doctrine of incarnation was, as we shall see, compatible with Goethe's concept of the spirit. But this same connection of Christ with the sublime also causes His tension with the temporal nature and conduct of man. The doctrine of the church considers Him the unique mediator between man and God, and His crucifixion the proof of man's sinful insufficiency. Goethe, while recognizing this tension, could not, on account of his concept of the spirit, accept Christ's position as the unique mediator or the nature of man as unilaterally sinful.

Goethe invokes this problematic personality of Christ in his fragment "Des ewigen Juden erster Fetzen"²⁰ in order to

¹⁸ Karl Löwith (*Von Hegel bis Nietzsche* [Zürich, 1941], p. 42) quotes our passage with reference to the crisis in the history of Christianity but interprets Goethe's view of it in terms of post-Goethean pessimism because he relates it to Goethe's expectation of an impending social crisis. Thereby, he overemphasizes the social determinants of Goethe's thought.

¹⁹ Letter to Zelter, November 9, 1830.

²⁰ "Des ewigen Juden erster Fetzen" (*JA*, III, 232-41). Cf. also *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 15 (*JA*,

demonstrate the antagonism between Him and the institutions bearing His name. He presents Christ as returning to earth where He comes into contact with the churches and with pastors. The fragment itself, its description in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, and the notes of the *Italienische Reise* about it make it probable that Goethe intended to end this ironical view of historical Christianity by a second crucifixion of the founder.²¹ When, on his journey, he was approaching the center of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, this "venio iterum crucifigi" came to his mind again.²² The fragment was intended to connect its indictment equally with the misunderstanding of Christ and the abuse of power in which Goethe saw the Protestant churches involved. Not merely tolerant but, in his own way, believing, Goethe kept separated from the doctrines and practices of churches and sects the pure gospel and the pure image of Christ. If in later years the critical side of this distinction sometimes softened, it was so because Goethe gave preference to every fruitful effort over mere critical antagonism. Moreover, he felt the need to protect his deep religious seriousness against pedantry and conceit by the mask of his "ostensible liberalistic indifferentism."²³

The affirmative meaning of Goethe's image of the pure Christ, however, is equally strong from his earliest poem on "Christi Höllenfahrt" to his last conversation with Eckermann.²⁴ Before his con-

XXIV, 228 ff.); Jakob Minor, *Goethes Fragmente vom ewigen Juden und vom wiederkehrenden Heiland* (Stuttgart, 1904); and Erich Franz's criticism in *Goethe*, pp. 269-71.

²¹ Cf. Minor, pp. 184 ff., 204; Goethe to Eckermann, March 12, 1828 (*Biedermann*, III, 504).

²² *Italienische Reise* (Terni, October 27, 1786).

²³ Characterizing his relations to Reinhard in *Annalen* (*JA*, XXX, 221).

²⁴ "Poetische Gedanken über die Höllenfahrt Jesu Christi" (*JA*, III, 220-25). To Eckermann, March 11, 1832 (*Biedermann*, IV, 440).

tact with Herder, this image was already conceived in a style close to the religious thought of spiritualism.²⁵ In his letters to Langer, Goethe speaks of "the unevangelical trash of our present-day pulpits"²⁶ and hopes to see "the Church of the Cross becoming the church of the spirit."²⁷ Comparing himself to Peter, he contrasts his and Peter's weakness in faith with Christ's power to walk on the sea.²⁸ Goethe's participation in the pietist community and his close relationship to Susanna von Klettenberg, the Cordata of *Wilhelm Meister und Dichtung und Wahrheit*, supported him in moving away from the more orthodox leanings of his father, even before Herder encouraged his widening understanding of divinity. His relations to Lavater and Jacobi, the Stolbergs, and Jung-Stilling meant as many stages in the articulation of his individual religious consciousness. His reading of Giordano Bruno and Plotinus, of Gottfried Arnold's *Unabhängige Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte* and of Mme Guyon's *Torrents spiri-tuels*²⁹ indicates his interest in the thoughts of spiritualism, whereas the works of Theophrastus Paracelsus and Charles Bonnet's *Palingénésie*³⁰ supported the union of his feeling for nature and his in-

tellectual concern about it with his religious impulse.

Thus the way to liberating the irrationalist concept of the world from Christian dogmatism—the step which Herder took beyond Hamann³¹—was prepared for Goethe by his acquaintance with spiritualism. On account of the impact which the spiritualist tradition made upon Goethe, his relationship to Spinoza was characterized, with good reason, as a reinterpretation of the latter's philosophy in the manner of mysticism.³² The differentiation between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion³³ is basic to Gottfried Arnold's concepts in general and to his criticism of the church in particular, which he charges with the persecution as heretics of "the dearest witnesses and messengers of Jesus Christ."³⁴ In Goethe's evangelical community of "those good and wise to the highest degree," we recognize another version of the invisible church, more secular

²⁵ Korff, I, 103 ff.

²⁶ Cf. Koch, p. 220; Franz, *Goethe* (pp. 16 ff.), explains Goethe's encouragement through Spinoza by the philosophical justification of spiritualist views, which before had been formulated in too anthropomorphic a fashion (p. 19). Wilhelm Dilthey, "Aus der Zeit der Spinozastudien Goethes," in *Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 391 ff., designates the difference between Goethe and Spinoza as a contrast between a rational approach and an irrationalism which retains a respect of the unknowable "outside the capacity of a limited mind" (p. 411). Thereby Spinoza's concept of *cognitio adaequata* is contradicted. With regard to Dilthey's term "aesthetical pantheism" and to his thesis that Goethe "ends up with the complete elimination of every metaphysics and theology," see nn. 59, 192.

²⁷ The formulation of Lessing, "Die Religion Christi!" (1780 [pub. 1784]), *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Lachmann-Muncker (3d ed., [1902]), XVI, 518 f., par. 3: "Jene, die Religion Christi, ist diejenige Religion, die er als Mensch selbst anerkannte und übte; die jeder Mensch mit ihm gemein haben kann . . ."; (par. 4): "Diese, die christliche Religion, ist diejenige Religion, die es für wahr annimmt, dass er mehr als Mensch gewesen, und ihn selbst als solchen zu einem Gegenstand ihrer Verehrung macht." In contrast to Lessing, Gottfried Arnold identified Christ with Sophia or Eternal Wisdom. Likewise, to Arnold man is closer to Christ as God-Man, because man potentially shares in divine wisdom also.

³⁴ Gottfried Arnold ("Auswahl hg. von Erich Seeberg" [Munich, 1934]), p. 37.

²⁵ Cf. Hans von Schubert, *Goethes religiöse Jugendentwicklung* (Leipzig, 1925).

²⁶ To Langer, November 24, 1768.

²⁷ To Langer, January 17, 1769.

²⁸ For this repeatedly occurring parable cf. nn. 137 f. below.

²⁹ Konrad Burdach, *Faust und Moses (Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. Akad. Wissenschaften* [1912]), refers to Goethe's connections with Neo-Platonism, which have been thoroughly investigated by Franz Koch in *Goethe und Plotin* (Leipzig, 1925). To the quietism of Mme Guyon the latter refers on p. 36. About Goethe's knowledge of her autobiography, cf. *Jahrbuch der Goethe-Gesellschaft*, IX (1922), 261-63.

³⁰ Charles Bonnet, *Philosophische Palingénésie, oder Gedanken über den vergangenen und zukünftigen Zustand lebender Wesen. Als ein Anhang zu den letzteren Schriften des Verfassers, und welcher insonderheit das Wesentliche seiner Untersuchungen über das Christentum enthält*, trans. and ed. Johann Caspar Lavater (Zürich, 1770).

but no less religious than the *ecclesia spiritualis*.³⁵ From it Goethe retained the belief in the dynamic aliveness of the divinity whose ultimate basis is rationally not conceivable because it is beyond all reasoning.

The principal concern of the defenders of religious awakening among Goethe's friends was not limited by confessional boundaries.³⁶ With them Goethe shared the confidence in inward inspiration and personal religious growth and the tendency toward an immediate understanding of the pure gospel and the pure Christ without the mediation of dogma, clergy, or ministry. Correspondingly, the young Goethe was averse not only to the supernaturalist theology but also to the philosophical rationalism which tends to substitute a product of the intellect for the unacceptable supra-natural revelation.

³⁵ Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (Tübingen, 1912), Part III, sec. 4, pp. 848-940, gave a comprehensive analysis of Protestant mysticism and spiritualism. The term "spiritualism," as it is used in this essay, comprises those Christian tendencies within German Protestantism whose worship and philosophy are built upon man's sharing in the Holy Spirit rather than on the justification by faith, in the sense of the reformers. The spiritualists, consequently, presupposed and emphasized the immediate relation of man to God through the spirit; they supported a dogmatically free exegesis; they disposed of sacramental forms and tended toward "original Christianity" in their conception of the religious community. Both different from and akin to later movements, such as Zinzendorf's and Lavater's pietism, they continued the Neo-Platonic tradition of medieval mysticism. Paracelsus, Valentin Weigel, and Jacob Boehme are among their leading figures. They are related to Schwenckfeld and to the Rosicrucians. Gottfried Arnold found the positive basis for his historical criticism of the church and the persecution of heretics in the doctrine of the emanation of the divine Logos and the concept of the *ecclesia spiritualis*.

About Arnold cf. Erich Seeberg, *Gottfried Arnold: Die Wissenschaft und die Mystik seiner Zeit* (Meerane, 1923). About Arnold's relation to Goethe cf. Burdach, chaps. vii-x, pp. 736-89 *passim*.

³⁶ Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert*, IV (Freiburg, 1937), 562, describes the tendency of later movements of religious awakening toward interconfessionality. Although their members sometimes developed missionary intolerance, the aim of interconfessionality also came to be another source of tolerance.

Both types of doctrine established from without the divinity which, Goethe felt, spoke to him from within and through nature.³⁷ Yet an extraordinary realism³⁸ of observation caused him to be on guard against the "noblest delusions and the most tender confusions of the subjective and the objective"³⁹ in religious feeling as much as against a misleading self-reliance of the intellect.

Withdrawing in the years of inner crisis and growth into his increasingly reliable creative energies,⁴⁰ he experienced in himself the power of genius granted to the "particularly favored" among men. It was then that he conceived, by analogy to his own poetical experience, the figures of men of genius who, on the border line between the divine and the human, are to mediate between mankind and the universe. They are like members of one family, although Prometheus and Caesar lay the emphasis on the titanic energy of man, Faust on his insatiable searching mind, Mahomet and Christ upon their original unity with the divine origin.⁴¹ All have a "redeeming, dominating, transforming mission."⁴² All have to bear the solitude which never entirely dissolves in their relation to others because it is an indispensable function of their quality. With all these individuals, their author tried to formulate not only the problem of genius but that of the situation of man and his kind. They are heading toward a tragic

³⁷ For Goethe's conception of spirit as related to life, see "An Schwager Kronos" (*JA*, II, 51): "der ewige Geist, ewigen Lebens ahndevoll."

³⁸ "Angeborener und ausgebildeter Realismus," cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (*JA*, XXIV, 197), describing the first meeting with Lavater.

³⁹ To Schiller, March 18, 1795, with reference to Cordata and Book VI of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*.

⁴⁰ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 15 (*JA*, XXIV, 231).

⁴¹ "Mahomets Gesang" (*JA*, II, 42 ff.); "Mahomet: Ein Fragment" (*JA*, XV, 10); "Erlöse Du, mein Herr, das Menschengeschlecht von seinen Banden, ihre innerste Empfindung sehnt sich nach Dir."

⁴² Friedrich Gundolf, *Goethe* (Berlin, 1920), p. 112.

end. Mahomet, who, like Christ, knows himself the son of an all-loving father, is to meet tragedy because of his own inevitable unfaithfulness toward his origin,⁴³ Christ because of the failure of man to grasp and to heed the significance of His first appearance on earth.

Goethe's pure Christ is in loving conflict with the world. The ironical tone of the poem does not decrease Goethe's reverence for the returning Lord. It is, on the contrary, the basis of his attack upon any false certainty in which men indulge when they rely upon themselves while abusing Christ's name. Irony meant to Goethe a means of liberating one's self from the bonds of human insufficiency.⁴⁴ As a power of doubt and negation, it depends upon the correlated existence of a power of affirmation. Mephistopheles is in need of Faust because only against Faust's affirmative energies can he "develop his dogmatic nihilism."⁴⁵ This dialectic tension serves to clarify the order of values. Goethe's returning Christ is a living criticism of an inadequate Christianity.⁴⁶

With Goethe's interpretation of Christ,

⁴³ Cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (JA, XXIV, 222-23), about Mahomet: "Das Irdische wächst und breitet sich aus, das Göttliche tritt zurück und wird getrübt."

⁴⁴ For an analysis of Goethe's irony see Franz, *Goethe*, pp. 98-108.

⁴⁵ Georg Friedrich Jünger, *Über das Komische* (Hamburg, 1936), p. 70.

⁴⁶ Goethe's plan anticipated Dostoevski's theme of the returning Christ visiting the Grand Inquisitor in *The brothers Karamazov*. With respect to the latter, Ernst Benz wrote on "Der wiederkehrende Christus" in *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, XI (1934), 277-98. He contends that "the problem of the returning Christ and his rejection by the church bearing his name always and necessarily emerges in such historical periods in which a spiritualistic devotion and theology elevates itself against a clericalism, which, in its turn, has completely bound and captured the pneumatic element by juridical institutions, theological systems, and liturgical rituals" (p. 277). He refers to the myth of St. Francis as "the second Christ," deals with the spiritualism of Sebastian Franck and Valentin Weigel, and refers to the spiritualist theory of decay, particularly in Gottfried Arnold.

Lavater, who himself considered Him the highest genius, could not agree.⁴⁷ He could not consent to a view of Christ as one among others who also bear witness to divine revelation, or to a recognition of the Bible as inspired but sharing this quality with other documents of revealed wisdom.⁴⁸ In the end this opinion even caused him to suspect Goethe's understanding of revelation as such. Finally, the consideration of nature as a divine manifestation antagonized Lavater as well as Jacobi, who, each in his fashion, remained within the bounds of introspection and otherworldliness.⁴⁹

The step which Goethe took went far beyond spiritualism. It was possible, however, exactly from such a basic experience which was neither rationalistic nor exclusively supra-naturalist. In the "child of the world," who later confessed to have also had, fortunately, a heavenly dimension,⁵⁰ a religious philosophy of his own came to grow. Within it Christ could no longer be the unique mediator. The story of the Savior became a myth of the situation and destiny of man and his relation to the Creator. As Goethe's understanding of the Bible, so his concept of Christ, became mythological.

⁴⁷ About Lavater's conception of Christ as the "highest man" and the necessity of the mediator which arises because it "is blasphemy to dare pray to Him (i.e., to the universal spirit of the universe) without mediation," see Lavater to Goethe, July 28, 1782, pp. 206-7. Cf. Luetgert, I, 192-95.

⁴⁸ "Du findest nichts schöner als das Evangelium, ich finde tausend geschriebene Blätter alter und neuer von Gott begnadeter Menschen ebenso schön und der Menschheit nützlich und unentbehrlich" (to Lavater, August 9, 1782, p. 212).

⁴⁹ Concerning Goethe's urge "to open up the depths of nature" as a cause of his declining Lavater's, Jacobi's, and Claudius' insistence upon subjective anthropomorphism, see *Italienische Reise* (October 23, 1787). About Jacobi cf. "Parallomena zu den Annalen" (JA, XXX, 403): "Wer das Höchste will muss das Ganze wollen; wer vom Geiste handelt, muss die Natur, wer von der Natur spricht, muss den Geist voraussetzen oder im stillen mitverstehen."

⁵⁰ "Rheinreise" (1774) (JA, II, 159); *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (JA, XXIV, 211).

II. THE SYMBOL AS A MEANS OF UNDERSTANDING

To evaluate the bearing of such mythological thinking upon cognition and conduct, some understanding is needed for the ways in which Goethe operated with symbols. When he calls the story of Jesus "das Märchen von Christus,"⁵¹ he does not give to the term *Märchen* the connotation of "fiction." He was by no means doubtful of the historicity of Christ or of His irrevocable significance within the process of history.⁵² The mythical form, however, conveys truth in a distinctive fashion, in that it opens a view upon its subject instead of attempting an abstract analysis. "The myth is a symbol clad in the form of an event, substantive in verbal form."⁵³ Keeping united content and form, literal foreground and transparent significance, the symbol creates a relationship between the mind and its object⁵⁴ which is of a dynamic character. Dynamic is the relationship of the faithful to the object of his faith, of the poet to the object of his creative imagination. Thinking in terms of symbols is a part of that learning which Goethe regards as an inner growth of man's self. "Each new object releases a new faculty in man."⁵⁵ With the accuracy of a mystic observer Goethe described the

inner condition of *Gelassenheit* ("serenity") under which such growth can occur. It is the free and therefore impressionable state of the soul intent upon perceiving without disturbance the action of "inner and outer nature."⁵⁶ This way of self-education through life puts to work both feeling and intellect.⁵⁷ A human being unprejudiced by one-sidedness and therefore free is able to master the totality of man's capacity, as if he were, in Schiller's sense, playing. He will be able to observe with love, to gain in understanding, and to live well. All knowledge, however, remains limited, and to its higher part not many bear witness. Imitating the gods, "we are sure of what we are doing but we do not know what we imitate."⁵⁸

This inevitable anthropomorphism, however, which is inherent in metaphysical thought and religious worship, causes man's unlimited striving and cautious self-control rather than agnosticism or the denial of metaphysics.⁵⁹ Goethe is aware

⁵¹ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 12 (JA, XXIV, 112-13): "Ich suchte mich innerlich von allem Fremden zu entbinden, das Äussere liebevoll zu betrachten, und alle Wesen, vom menschlichen an, so tief hinab, als sie nur fasslich sein mochten, auf mich wirken zu lassen. Dadurch entstand eine wundersame Verwandtschaft mit den einzelnen Gegenständen der Natur, und ein inniges Anklagen, ein Mitstimmen ins Ganze." Cf. Eckhart's concept of "Gelassenheit," e.g., in *Reden der Unterweisung* (Leipzig, n.d.), p. 3.

⁵² "Aber der Mensch ist nicht bloss ein denkendes, er ist zugleich ein empfindendes Wesen. Er ist ein Ganzes, eine Einheit vielfacher, innig verbundener Kräfte, und zu diesem Ganzen muss das Kunstwerk reden, es muss dieser reichen Einheit, dieser einigen Mannigfaltigkeit in ihm entsprechen" ("Der Sammler und die Seinigen," 6. Brief [JA, XXXIII, 175]).

⁵³ From "Makariens Archiv" (JA, IV, 234); translated from Hippocrates *De victus ratione*: "Denn die Götter lehren uns ihr eigenes Werk nachahmen; doch wissen wir nur was wir tun, erkennen aber nicht was wir nachahmen."

⁵⁴ Calvin Thomas calls Goethe "an out-and-out pantheist who is at the same time an agnostic" (p. 227). As a result of the postulate of unity as basic to mysticism and Renaissance philosophy of nature, there seems to be a difficulty in distinguishing "between God and non-God." With regard to Goethe, this difficulty exists for discursive thinking only (*Verstand*). Goethe was neither an out-and-out pantheist nor an agnostic. The term "pantheism" tends to eliminate the distinction between the divinity

⁵¹ To Herder, September 4, 1788.

⁵² The human mind "will never get beyond the sublimity and moral culture of Christianity, as it shines in the Gospels" (to Eckermann, March 11, 1832 [Biedermann, IV, 443]).

⁵³ Brunner, p. 329, n. 1.

⁵⁴ Koch, chap. iv ("Der schaffende Spiegel"), relates Goethe's concept of polarity to his understanding of the human mind as a creative mirror of the universe and discusses the bearing of this concept upon Goethe's epistemology and upon the theory of art of Goethe himself and of Karl Philipp Moritz. Cf. also Ferdinand Weinhandl, *Über das aufschliessende Symbol* (Berlin, 1929), chap. viii.

⁵⁵ "Der Mensch kennt nur sich selbst, insofern er die Welt erkennt, die er nur in sich und sich nur in ihr gewahr wird. Jeder neue Gegenstand, wohl beschaut, schliesst ein neues Organ in uns auf" ("Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort" [JA, XXXIX, 48]).

of "the danger of asking too much from knowledge."⁶⁰ A direct access to the absolute is impossible. Any attempt toward it is bound to be an anthropomorphism in itself. Goethe compared "his own inner working to a living heuristic."⁶¹ The symbolical expression in matters metaphysical is affirmative and synthetic and, at the same time, sufficiently delicate and indirect.⁶² The restriction of human certainty on which Goethe insists corresponds to his respect for the secret of the unknowable.

and the sphere of its creation, a distinction which Goethe upheld. On the other hand, the term "pantheism" tends to de-emphasize the difference between creator and creation upon which supra-naturalism insists as a basic antagonism. Both these terms are unsatisfactory in an analysis of Goethe's position, which equally maintains the polarity between the opposites of the temporal and the eternal and their concordance in view of the universe as a whole.

Polarity (cf. Thomas, chap. ix) is a concept basic even to spiritualist thinking, which, in spite of its emanationist tendencies, makes a definite distinction between better and worse, a distinction acknowledged by Thomas in Goethe's "Metamorphosis of plants" (p. 187). Dilthey uses the term "aesthetic pantheism" (cf. n. 32) when, in connection with Goethe's reinterpretation of Spinoza, he explains Goethe's formulations as the translation in philosophical terms of a basically poetical disposition. The ontological interpretation, which, in criticism of Dilthey, Kurt Leese (pp. 121-22) proposes, leads beyond Dilthey, although precisely in the direction which Dilthey had intended with his studies of "Irrationalism."

However, Goethe's views are built upon a metaphysics, albeit heuristic or hypothetical and albeit formulated in a technically unsystematic fashion. In this point, Leese's criticism of Dilthey leads further also. To Goethe human knowledge is limited, but not to material phenomena, as the term "agnostic" suggests. On the contrary, his *Vernunft* is the agency of the mind by which man reaches beyond. If his metaphysics, like his Christianity, was intended "for private use" only (i.e., without the claim of scientific validity), this was a consequence not of agnosticism but of epistemological insight.

On Goethe's concept of metamorphosis as a device reconciling rationalism and irrationalism, the "lawfulness of lasting forms and the creative freedom of life," cf. Korff, II, 54 ff.

⁶⁰ To Boisserée, February 25, 1832.

⁶¹ "Mein ganzes inneres Wirken erwies sich als eine lebendige Heuristik, welche eine unbekannte Regel anerkennend, solche in der Aussenwelt zu finden und in die Aussenwelt einzuführen trachtet" (*Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 61, No. 328).

⁶² Erich Franz (*Goethe*, pp. 243-44) discusses this hypothetical element of Goethe's philosophy of religion in connection with Nietzsche and Valhinger and (p. 250) with Kant's postulate of the moral law.

In both an ontological and a logological sense the Creator is higher than all reason. But myth to Goethe is no less valid because it is symbolical. It is not a "mere" symbol. Goethe does not reduce the body of valid knowledge to analytical rationalism.⁶³ Beyond it, man's creative daring is strengthened by the inspiration of genius, through a fellowship of wisdom which extends over three thousand years.⁶⁴ Therefore, Goethe continues to recognize the temporal as a parable of the eternal and to strive toward formulating and representing its meaning. Symbolical experience and knowledge give a clue to truth, although at the same time they keep it concealed. The symbol, even though it is not the truth itself, reflects the truth. It is from truth that the poet receives the veil of poetry.⁶⁵

The symbol, then, as a means of cognition and expression transcends the rhetorical as well as the aesthetic. Whether its motifs are of Greek origin, as in *Pandora*, or of Christian origin, as in *Faust*, Goethe's symbolism tends toward the religious. To his mind human culture is a creative and dynamic solution by which man tries to solve the riddle of his existence. It is therefore transcendental both in origin and in significance. Goethe's leading figures of genius are religious person-

⁶³ Cf. the defense of Schelling in *Xenien* 778 (VIII [1893], 91 and n. on 202): "Ist denn die Wahrheit ein Zwiebel, von dem man die Häute nur abschält? Was ihr hinein nicht gelegt, ziehet ihr nimmer heraus." Cf. also *Italienische Reise* (October 23, 1787); Goethe, comparing Herder's book, *God*, to a bowl, says: "Who has nothing to put into it, finds it empty."

⁶⁴ *West-östlicher Divan*, "Buch des Unmuts": "Und wer franzet oder brite?" (*JA*, V, 50-51). Without a consciousness of the history of culture we must remain in the dark and live from day to day.

⁶⁵ "Zueignung," "Der Morgen kam" (*JA*, I, 1). Concerning "das offenbare Geheimnis," the relation of the patent secret to Goethe's philosophy of life and nature, the particular contribution of art and its symbols to making transparent the significance and interconnection of phenomena, see Karl Vieter, "Goethe's Gedicht auf Schiller's Schädel," *PMLA*, LIX (1944), 148-54.

alities. Mahomet and Iphigenie, Makarie and Epimetheus, indicate that man's existence is relative to a living order, natural but beyond man, which the highest reason (*Vernunft*), tending toward the divine, can approach.⁶⁶ The end of Faust and the elevation of Epimetheus in the scheme for the continuation of Pandora present this transcendental relationship through the mediation of love. Limited as man's knowledge is bound to be, the basic truth is conveyed to him "by his heart."⁶⁷ The religion of the individual is inward. Its symbolical expression is a testimony for the "pure source of life" which is accessible to every child of God.

Goethe conceives of knowledge as a dynamic element of the process of life in the individual and in the history of mankind. This is possible by virtue of an underlying, though hypothetical, metaphysics. If learning as a responsive action unfolds the creative personality at the same time as it draws it closely toward the inner significance of the object, the latter must be akin to the responding mind. In fact, Goethe presupposes a kinship within the universe, between its parts and between each of them and the whole. In his poem, "Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe,"⁶⁸ he describes in a precise and condensed form a conception of the universe as a unity which is composed of parts antagonistic and dynamically striving within the infinite. In God the Lord they are harmonious calmness.

But this universe is differentiated. Like the God of the mystics, Goethe's God

speaks out of everything. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between ugly and beautiful, lower and higher, evil and good. Man finds himself in the midst of the tension that is the result of the polarity of creation. The dualism basic to Christianity is not wholly eliminated by the certainty about "the one," the universal unity. But it is regarded with the intention of translating the higher element into the concreteness of the lower spheres, as well as that of saving the higher from the clutches of evil. The power of discerning values is given to man. If man lives in original sin, he is also given original virtue.⁶⁹ These basic principles of the spiritualist religion, transformed by his reticent language and his full acceptance of nature, Goethe incorporates into his philosophy of life.⁷⁰

The closest approach to the creative ground which is granted to man consists

⁶⁶ Goethe's review of Salvandy's *Don Alonzo ou de l'Espagne* (JA, XXXVII, 283-89) is included among Goethe's unreserved religious confessions by Erich Franz (Goethe, p. 55) in his valuable appraisal of the sources for our knowledge of Goethe's religious philosophy. In connection with the term *Pietät*, Goethe says in his essay on Salvandy (p. 288): "Wenn gewisse Erscheinungen an der menschlichen Natur, betrachtet von seiten der Sittlichkeit, uns nötigen, ihr eine Art von radikalem Bösen, eine *Erbsünde* zuzuschreiben, so fordern andere Manifestationen derselben, ihr gleichfalls eine *Erbtugend*, eine angeborene Güte, Rechtlichkeit und besonders eine Neigung zur Ehrfurcht zuzugestehen. Diesen Quellpunkt, wenn er im Menschen kultiviert, zur Tätigkeit, ins Leben, zur Öffentlichkeit gelangt, nenne wir Pietät, wie die Alten."

Pietät "würde, wenn sie wie durch ein Wunder augenblicklich in allen Menschen hervorträte, die Erde von allen den Übeln hellen, an denen sie gegenwärtig und vielleicht unheilbar krank liegt" (p. 289).

Note the relation of *Pietät* to love, charity, agape, to "eternal love" (cf. n. 163, below), to *Ehrfurcht* in the *Pedagogic Province*; cf. also Franz, Goethe, chap. iv, sec. 2, "Religion und Eros."

⁷⁰ Kurt Leese (chap. ii, sec. 2, p. 135) considers Goethe "a cardinal witness of theological ontology understood as a symbolical metaphysics of the living original Being [*des lebendigen Ur-Seins*]." He regards Herder's and Goethe's dynamic categories as particularly fit for stating that "the Being of God transcends and breaks through everything empirical, but at the same time replenishes it" (p. 131). In this sense he sees Goethe as one of the foremost representatives of the "philosophy of life."

⁶⁶ To Eckermann, February 13, 1829 (Biedermann, IV, 69).

⁶⁷ Cf. to F. von Müller (Biedermann, II, 434) about a higher moral order of the world; also *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (V, 3) on the voice of truth and humanity:

"es hört sie jeder
Geboren unter jedem Himmel, dem
Des Lebens Quelle durch den Busen rein
Und ungehindert fließt."

⁶⁸ "Zahme Xenien," VI (JA, IV, 97).

in his ability to lift up his reason (*Vernunft*) to "the primary phenomena, physical and moral, through which the divinity reveals itself, behind which it keeps itself, and which emanate from it."⁷¹ Through the process of life the original form unfolds: *Gestalt*, the morphological unity, which as an active entelechy underlies the concrete metamorphosis. From the mineral world⁷² to the human sphere the divine becomes manifest through both spirit and nature. Observing reason comes close to the divine by viewing the unity of developing forms, *Gestalt*. In each of the parts of the universe, as well as in the whole, such totality expresses itself as unity within the manifold. Man's capacity to recognize, at least heuristically, totality in the multitude of phenomena constitutes the supreme possibility of his mind. The principle of totality is basic to Goethe's investigation of nature,⁷³ to his doctrine of man,⁷⁴ and to his philosophy of art. Since macrocosm and microcosm are akin to each other and knowledge is understood as the re-creative response of an analogous being, Goethe's interpretation of the unity within the manifold is more than a method of thinking. It is the common ground of his "physics" and his "metaphysics." "The poetical power of his [Goethe's] creative imagination, his religious energy, his scientific thinking and research—they are one."⁷⁵

⁷¹ To Eckermann, February 13, 1829 (Biedermann, IV, 69).

⁷² To Jacobi, June 9, 1785: "Das Dasein ist Gott. . . Das Göttliche . . . in herbis et lapidibus."

⁷³ Cf. Ferdinand Bulle, "Zur Struktur des Pantheismus: Die Kategorie der Totalität in Goethe's naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften," *Euphorion*, XXI (1914), 156 ff.

⁷⁴ Cf. Eduard Spranger, "Goethe und die Metamorphose des Menschen," *Jahrbuch der Goethe-Gesellschaft*, X (1924), 219 ff. Spranger examines Goethe's understanding of the development of man in connection with his principles of metamorphosis, of polar and of spiral tendencies.

⁷⁵ Konrad Burdach, "Goethes Gesang der Geister," *Vorspiel*, II (Halle, 1926), 90.

Goethe absorbed and maintained fundamental structures of spiritualist religious thought and a Renaissance philosophy of nature. He even adopted some of their typical formulations.⁷⁶ Among their representatives, Paracelsus and also Jacob Boehme, who was probably not known to Goethe *in extenso*, are comprehensive in their attempt to embrace the universe, from cosmology to individual sickness and its medicine. Arnold, whose mind was closer to pietism, is primarily concerned with the inward relation of man to divine wisdom and through it to God. Consequently, he tends more exclusively toward introspection than does Boehme. Goethe, on the other hand, developed a strong realism, a self-resigning accuracy of observation, and a keen interest in the concrete phenomena and their differentiated multitude. His method reconciles the empirical and the speculative. Where Paracelsus and Boehme make unqualified metaphysical statements, he sets forth his symbolical, hypothetical metaphysics. It is the concrete and the individual that to Goethe open the view upon the primary phenomena and, through them, permit him to approach the higher spheres in a symbolical fashion and by approximation. In a moral sense Goethe felt man to be responsible for a fruitful life, and therefore he emphasized, in contrast to the otherworldliness of Pietists⁷⁷ and the emotional introspection of spiritualists,⁷⁸ the state of health indispensable to man's bearing fruit.⁷⁹ It is fundamental for the translat-

⁷⁶ Cf. Julius Richter, "Jakob Böhme und Goethe," *Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts*, 1934-35, pp. 3-55.

⁷⁷ Cf. n. 38, above, and *Italienische Reise* (October 23, 1787).

⁷⁸ About Saint-Martin, to Lavater, April 9 [?], 1781, p. 170; cf. also *Xenion*, 295 (VIII, 33).

⁷⁹ On *Geistige Gesundheit* see *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, VI, 12 (*JA*, XXIV, 67); on health in general, compare Wilhelm Meister's educational way; on health in art, see "Zahne Xenien," I, III (*JA*, IV, 38, 60): "Das Klassische nenne ich das Gesunde und

ing into the concreteness of life of whatever comes to man from the higher spheres in which he shares. Culture, then, is the manifestation of religious responsibility.⁸⁰ Religious devotion, conversely, is "not an end in itself, but a means toward arriving at the highest culture through the purest calm of the soul."⁸¹ A strong affinity joins Goethe's classicism to his religious experience.

Goethe's postulate of a divinity infinite and absolute, yet setting forth the living totality of creation; his concept of polarity as the basic form of God's manifestation through spirit and nature; the kinship of microcosm and macrocosm; love as a dynamic bond between man and divinity—each of these conceptions is related to the spiritualist tradition. Goethe's evangelical community corresponds to the *ecclesia spiritualis*; his awareness of grace as reaching within human insight, to inspiration; the source of life audible and present within the individual, to the fortress of the soul, the inner light, the living spark of the mystics.⁸² The spiritualists had been antagonistic to the churches or, at best, had kept apart from them. Goethe, more than they, is averse in principle to theological disputes, on account both of his fundamental position and of his epistemological skepticism. His "Let-

ters of a Pastor"⁸³ plead for tolerance. The Pastor recognizes the danger of man's reliance upon his limited insight. Therefore, he concentrates in his ministry on religious life in the spirit of Christ's command of love. "No doctrine clears us of prejudices except that which first knows how to break our pride . . . the realm of God is also found there where I did not seek it. . . . Our beloved Lord did not want it to cost an ear to extend his realm."⁸⁴ Goethe's passionate antipathy against misleading and narrow doctrines⁸⁵ is directed against theological dogmatism as well as against concealed skepticism.⁸⁶ The element of Voltairian power of clarity inherent in his mind served his apology of a healthy and harmoniously balanced conduct. Man is primarily called to production, and his task, even in relation to truth, consists in bearing fruit.⁸⁷ Characterizing himself, Goethe says that "a poetical urge to form was always active and at work and constituted the core and the foundation of his existence."⁸⁸ By the rhythm of inward and outward action, of thinking and doing, of immanence and transcendence, man mirrors the universe as a dialectic totality.

Deeply inherent in Goethe's character, some of these conceptions early became

das Romantische das Kranke." "Das Alte ist nicht klassisch weil es alt sondern weil es stark, frisch, froh und gesund ist" (to Eckermann, April 2, 1829 [Biedermann, IV, 81]). Cf. also *Euphorion*, XII (1900), 197 f.

⁸⁰ To Riemer, September 26, 1807: "Vernunftkultur haben am Ende einzig nur die Frommen." Cf. n. 3, above: *Kultur* means to Goethe not a sum of finished products but the active care of standards to be maintained and developed through conduct of life and productive responsibility.

⁸¹ *Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 112, No. 519.

⁸² The inner light. Cf. also Rufus M. Jones, *Spiritual reformers in the 16th and 17th centuries* (London, 1914), particularly pp. 128 ff. on "The light on the candle-stick" and the relations between the Collegiants and Spinoza.

⁸³ "Brief des Pastors zu *** an den neuen Pastor zu ***, 1772" (JA, XXXVI, 83 ff.); cf. also Hans Barner, *Zwei "Theologische Schriften" Goethes* (Heidelberg diss., 1930).

⁸⁴ "Brief des Pastors" (JA, XXXVI, 90). In contrast to theological disputes, "die lebendige Lehre, die keinen Streit erregt," see *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II (JA, XIX, 189). Against the unceasing controversy about "Das Märchen von Christus" as the cause of confusion, cf. letter to Herder, September 4, 1788.

⁸⁵ "Tag- und Jahreshefte" (1769-75) (JA, XXX, 2).

⁸⁶ "Eine tätige Skepsis: welche unablässig bemüht ist, sich selbst zu überwinden, um durch geregelte Erfahrung zu einer Art von bedingter Zuverlässigkeit zu gelangen" (*Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 250, No. 1203).

⁸⁷ "Was fruchtbar ist, allein ist wahr" ("Ver-mächtis" [JA, II, 246]).

⁸⁸ "Selbstschilderung, 1797" (JA, XXV, 277).

articulate.⁸⁹ His own reactions to religious and literary suggestions foreshadow the harmony and totality of his classicism and his love for Winckelmann's idea of Greek art. Goethe's Hellenism itself, however, is as much a function of this creative devotion to the concreteness of life⁹⁰ and to man's task of translating into it his entelechy. This Hellenism has been aptly called "an effort to establish the basis of values upon which European civilization has been built."⁹¹ It grew out of a religious foundation to which it does not stand in contradiction. Both man and his culture are sharing in nature and spirit as in divine manifestations. Man's never ending striving for perfection is therefore not in opposition to his need of salvation.⁹² Not the basic scheme of spiritualism but its ascetic and speculative tendencies Goethe left behind when he formulated his own religious concepts, which make understandable his image of Christ.

⁸⁹ Examples of the early rise of Goethe's basic inclinations: balance of judgment and conduct, cf. the defense of Bruno against Bayle (*Ephemerides*, 1770 [*Insel*, XII, 7]); Spinoza as "homo temperatissimus," therefore valuable to him (to Lavater, June 28, 1774 [Biedermann, I, 35]); God and Nature (*Ephemerides* [*Insel*, XII, 13]), "Separatim de Deo, et natura rerum disserere difficile et periculosum est, eodem modo quam si de corpore et anima se junctum cogitamus." About this passage and its anticipation of the concept of God-Nature, cf. K. Burdach, "Das religiöse Problem in Goethes Faust," *Euphorion*, XXXIII (1932), 82.

⁹⁰ History as a process of "embodying the spiritual, spiritualizing the bodily, pulsing always among prophets, religious men, poets, orators, artists and friends of art," cf. letter to Eichstädt, March 10, 1815. About the importance of this responsibility for "concreteness" in contrast to romantic tendencies and with regard to the community, cf. Carl Jantke, *Preussen, Friedrich der Grosse und Goethe* ("Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft," Geistesw. Klasse, 17. Jahr, Heft 3 [Halle, 1941]), chap. v.

⁹¹ Humphry Trevelyan, *Goethe and the Greeks* (Cambridge, 1941), p. 297.

⁹² The continuation of metamorphosis after Faust's death adumbrated in the last scene of *Faust II*, cf. Burdach, "Das religiöse Problem," *Euphorion*, XXXIII (1932), 71 ff. The contention that Faust represents the ideal type of modern man "is contrary to the ethical-religious philosophy of Goethe" (*ibid.*, pp. 74 f.).

III. GOETHE'S VIEW OF CHRIST

Undogmatic both in the sense of unclericalness and unexclusiveness, Goethe maintained firmly these convictions. His "liberal open-mindedness toward the world"⁹³ had been strengthened in the time of his tension with Lavater, the more so since he observed how even devout Christians transformed the same faith according to the inclinations of each personality.⁹⁴ With his social intercourse and his orbit of experience and activity extending from poetry to natural science, from government to literary and artistic criticism, the reality upon which Goethe was intent came to form an integral part of his intellectual world. Its weight and richness reflected upon his religious thinking, into which it was integrated as into an inseparable whole.

In Leonardo's design, Christ appears to this free and urbane mind as a "man of personal nobility bearing a painful suffering of his soul."⁹⁵ He sees him also as a manifestation of the divine as it radiates "from all noble figures of man."⁹⁶ But this God-Man, the "magnificent crystal-clear vessel,"⁹⁷ is, as we saw, not the only bearer of revelation. In a firm tone of faith Goethe defends his view of "an aristocracy ordained by God" against Lavater's "monarchy of Christ."⁹⁸ Such pluralism, rather than excluding the divinity of Christ, qualifies it. Goethe's term "divine" is in harmony with the spiritualist aspect of his God and permits him also to understand Christ, again by analogy to spiritualism, as a manifestation of the

⁹³ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (*JA*, XXIV, 193).

⁹⁴ *JA*, XXIV, 200 f.

⁹⁵ "Über Leonard de Vincis Abendmahl," *Schriften zur Kunst*, III (*JA*, XXXV, 59).

⁹⁶ To Jacobi, December 26, 1784.

⁹⁷ To Lavater, June 22, 1781 (*XVI*, 182).

⁹⁸ To Lavater, August 9, 1782 (*XVI*, 212).

highest.⁹⁹ As such, Faust invokes Him in spiritualist terms when he forces Mephistopheles to appear as his real self.¹⁰⁰

Goethe believed in the indestructible nature of the spirit, and, in consequence of his principle of unity, he postulated palingenesis and the migration of the soul.¹⁰¹ Ganymede's flight to the gods symbolizes such union between man and the divine sphere.¹⁰² Man's soul is like the cyclical movement of the water, which descends from heaven, returns to it, and has to enter a new cycle.¹⁰³ Faust's immortal part, after its salvation and transformation, grows into another life in higher spheres.¹⁰⁴ As God reveals himself through nature and spirit, so man partakes of nature and spirit.¹⁰⁵ In the *Divan*, spirit is "the life of living." It is also defined there as the "predominance of the superior guiding power." An upward urge is inherent in it, and it does not dissolve into "the dust."¹⁰⁶ This spirit still shows traits of the pneumatic energy of the spirit in John's Gospel. When Faust translates its opening words,¹⁰⁷ he interprets

logos as Word, Meaning, Power, and, finally, Action. Trying to render justice to this fundamental concept, he feels dissatisfied with the term "the word," because it can be taken as distinct from "meaning." Yet the term "meaning" does not convey the active element essential to creation, and therefore he replaces it by "power." Again it proves insufficient, since it carries the connotation of a potential divorced from the act by which it gains reality; and so, in the end, he chooses the term "action," to which the previous attempts render a qualifying service. Thus, accompanying the development of Faust's thought, we arrive at a definition of the creator as an active spirit, and this emphasis laid upon action relates Goethe's concept of creation to the "Fiat" in Paracelsus' and Jacob Boehme's cosmology.¹⁰⁸

Goethe's God as an active spirit manifesting Himself through spirit and nature is a God of life but also of a spiritual law.¹⁰⁹ As *Gestalt* combines the elements of becoming and lawfulness through the con-

⁹⁹ To Eckermann, March 11, 1832 (Biedermann, IV, 443).

¹⁰⁰ *Faust I* (JA, XIII, 53, vs. 1308).

¹⁰¹ Franz Koch, *Goethes Stellung zu Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft, Vol. XLV (1932)), pp. 247 ff.; about *Seelenwanderung* in connection with Herder's essay (*ibid.*, pp. 267-72); Goethe regards immortality not as a certainty but as a postulate (*ibid.*, p. 289).

¹⁰² JA, II, 61, vss. 24, 29.

¹⁰³ "Gesang der Geister über den Wassern" (JA, II, 44 f.). Burdach (*Vorspiel*, II, 82-90) relates it to seventeenth-century mysticism but not to palingenesis (p. 89).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Konrad Burdach, "Die Schlusszene in Goethes *Faust*," *Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. Akad. Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl.*, XVII (1931), 603-4.

¹⁰⁵ "Spirit and matter, soul and body . . . the necessary double ingredients of the universe . . . both together therefore may well be considered the representatives of God" (to Knebel, April 8, 1812).

¹⁰⁶ *West-östlicher Divan*, "Buch Suleika" (JA, V, 80); "Allgemeinstes" (*ibid.*, p. 192); "Talismane" (*ibid.*, p. 6).

¹⁰⁷ *Faust I*, "Studierzimmer" (JA, XIII, 50 and note on 290, which compares the passage with Herder's "Johannes").

¹⁰⁸ "The painful fiat." Cf. *West-östlicher Divan*, "Suleika" (JA, V, 88):

"Und er sprach das Wort: Es werde!
Da erklang ein schmerzlich Ach!
Als das All mit Machtgebärde
In die Wirklichkeiten brach."

The act of creation is also the beginning of individuation and distance from the origin, a painful birth and the first pain. Both Paracelsus and Boehme characterize by the term "flat" the creative action by which the "ens" unfolds. A comparison between their detailed interest in the stages of this process and Goethe's resignation to adumbrate it through symbolical language illustrates both his relationship to, and his distance from, Renaissance spiritualism. To Boehme's theosophy, the ternary step from God's hidden existence through the polarity of the multitude of created life to its reconciliation in the unity of eternal life is the fundamental process. He explains the meaning of death "out of which free life is born"; if pain and anxiety did not exist, "the realm of joy" could not be (cf. Ernst Benz, *Der vollkommene Mensch nach Jacob Boehme* [Stuttgart, 1937], chap. xii).

¹⁰⁹ Becoming and life are governed by Being and "law," in Leese (*Die Krisis*, pp. 13 f.), where the author touches upon the difference of "Goethe's god from that of Boehme and Schelling" with reference to the union of life and law (*geprägte Form*).

cept of an original phenomenon unfolding itself, the universe as a whole is lawful to the last manifestation of its original creative power. The cosmology of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*¹¹⁰ considered the creation and its destiny as nothing but "an apostasy and return to the original"—a dialectic process in which the fall of Lucifer is the first, that of man the second, case of separation. Man, ordained to restore the original connection with the divinity, "found himself in the same situation as Lucifer, to be at the same time absolute and restricted"; and it was to be foreseen that "he had to become at the same time the most perfect and the most imperfect, the happiest and the unhappiest creature."¹¹¹ Related to the divinity and yet distant or even opposed to it, he is in need of salvation. It follows from the spiritualist foundation of Goethe's thought, and it corresponds to the conceptions of Plotinus and Arnold, to whom Goethe here explicitly refers,¹¹² that such salvation "must renew itself again and again through the whole time of becoming and being."¹¹³ The significance of Christ within this universe is intrinsic and paradigmatic. The appearance of the divinity in human form which conveys "an indispensable truth" is an intrinsic natural miracle, in that spirit and nature are parts of the universal oneness.¹¹⁴ Christ's appearance is paradigmatic, in that He stands for the union of spirit and nature as the epitome of man's destiny. Consequently, the ironical Goethe deals with the Crucifixion as a consequence of man's insufficiency. Fol-

lowing the spirit of John's Gospel,¹¹⁵ he is even inclined to doubt the historicity of the Crucifixion. He is repelled by its image and considers fallacious the support which orthodox interpreters draw from it for the doctrine of the hopelessly sinful nature of man. The affirmative Goethe, on the other hand, is drawn to Christ as the wise teacher and the victor over earthly suffering. Such supreme union of spirit and nature Goethe can conceive only in the image of ultimate beauty, and therefore he turns to the victorious glory of the resurging Christ. The symbolical form of this affirmation, however, excludes an exclusively supra-natural understanding of Christ as well as a magical relationship to Him. Salvation becomes an inner process extending beyond temporal life. The Savior is its supreme example.

Goethe's conception of God caused him to have no difficulty in accepting the double character of Christ as a divine and a human being.¹¹⁶ It corresponds to Goethe's own conviction when Cordata's uncle concludes from the union of the Creator with Christ, His creature, that "the idea of man is not in contradiction with the idea of divinity" and when he then understands man's feeling of distance from

¹¹⁰ Cf. n. 150.

¹¹⁰ II, 8 (JA, XXIII, 164 ff.). In contrast, the reaction upon Holbach's *système de la nature*: "Wie hohl und leer ward uns in dieser tristen atheistischen Halbnacht zu Mute" (*ibid.*, p. 11 [JA, XXIV, 54]).

¹¹¹ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, II, 8 (JA, XXIII, 166).

¹¹² *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (JA, XXIII, 163).

¹¹³ *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (JA, XXIII, 166).

¹¹⁴ The separating factor within polarity is outweighed by the factor of concordance.

¹¹⁵ Within Goethe's concept of divinity the double nature of Christ as divine and human corresponds to the manifestation of God in spirit and nature. Whereas Korff (I, 275-76) insists on Goethe's paganism, K. J. Obenauer (*Goethe in seinem Verhältnis zur Religion* [2d ed.; Jena, 1923], p. 135) stresses this double nature and its correspondence to "Gott-Natur," without realizing that the meaning which Goethe connects with the term "divine man" is equally inherent in pagan religions, e.g., in the Greek concept of divinity. It is also related to the phenomenon of genius. Franz (*Goethe*, p. 268) greatly clarified the controversy about Goethe's relation to Christianity by stating that Korff's sharp formulation can be accepted as referring "to the Christian dogmatics, the system of ecclesiastical metaphysics only, whereas Goethe, on the other hand, not only faced without prejudice the spiritual values of Christianity but was deeply influenced by them in essential points of his whole work." In this understanding the present essay considers Goethe's religion of humanity a part of Christian history.

the divine as a challenge to strive for all possible perfection of man who is created in the image of God.¹¹⁷ It is the creative power within man upon which the uncle lays the accent. Christ in this conversation appears as a challenge to man's activity, which is to be devoted to confirming "the claims of our similarity to God." On the other hand, Goethe's Christ is definitely not the center of human history in relation to time, as Augustine saw Him. It also follows from Goethe's understanding of the Bible as wisdom that to him the quasi-juridical conception of the new pact which the New Testament constitutes has lost its meaning. Christ is a supreme witness to the divine and to the reality of spirit and love and their relation to mankind rather than the one and only mediator between man and God. Goethe approaches Christology in the spirit of John's Gospel and his symbolism permits him to conceive of Christ as the purest and highest spirit, as the spiritualists conceived the supra-natural character of Christ by identifying Him with eternal wisdom.¹¹⁸

When, on the other hand, Goethe contends that the decision of the church to consider Christ as God supported despotism;¹¹⁹ and, when he says that "Jesus' own holy will was offended by those who deified Him,"¹²⁰ he attacks the outward divinity, the relation to which is of a magical rather than a mystical character. Such outward divinity had been, it seems, the object even of Prometheus' rebel-

lion.¹²¹ The basic conceptions of the Credo, however, Goethe interprets in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* as the active creator, His human incarnation, and the community of "those good and wise in the highest degree," the *ecclesia spiritualis*. Transformed in this fashion, the Trinity is inherent in his religious thought as much as the double nature of Christ as

¹¹⁷ Julius Richter ("Zur Deutung der Goetheschen Prometheusdichtung," *Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts* [1928], pp. 65-104) discusses the whole fragment and its interpretation by F. L. Saran (*Goethes Mahomet und Prometheus* [Halle, 1914]), O. F. Walzel (*Das Prometheus-Symbol von Shaftesbury zu Goethe* [Munich, 1923]), and Korff (I, 281-87). Richter recognizes that the Prometheus of the "Fragment" anticipates the self-resigning and realistic Prometheus of *Pandora*. He objects to Korff's contention that the rebellion of Prometheus has to be interpreted as a denial of God as the "world despot" and therefore a denial of Christian theism in favor of pantheism. If one excludes, with Korff, the spiritualist theology, the various forms of Christian Platonism, and their combination with the philosophy of nature from the orbit of Christianity, one consequently has to adopt supra-naturalism and the ensuing devaluation of natural life as the exclusive Christian doctrine (Korff, I, 9-12). Then the antagonistic position of Goethe and the eighteenth-century irrationalists against both Protestant orthodoxy and enlightened atheism (Korff, I, 13) gains in conciseness and sharpness. Goethe's religious development can be seen as "the breakthrough of a new feeling of God" (Korff, I, 281), if the term "new" is confined to the era of German literary revival in the eighteenth century without regard to the old history of this recurring religious impulse. It cannot be maintained, however, that this new feeling destroys "the belief in a metaphysical good and evil, that moral order of the world, to which the individual inescapably is subjected, be it voluntarily in this world [*Diesseits*] or involuntarily in the other world [*Jenseits*]" (Korff, I, 287). About the ethical implications of Goethe's views, cf. n. 205 below.

The rigidity of Korff's terms forces him also to deny the quality of metaphysics to Goethe's philosophy. As Korff himself states, freedom means to Goethe no longer merely the freedom of human reason, which it meant to the Enlightenment philosopher, but the divine necessity which originates deep below our reason and works within us. Should this view, which could be called "spiritualistic," be excluded from Christianity, in spite of its comprising the moral law, a considerable part of Christian tradition, and not only that of mysticism, must be excluded with it (cf. Franz, p. 268; Leese, p. 137). Historically, it is hardly tenable that, as Korff says, the new faith as a "way to God leading through the world" is opposed to the Christian faith (I, 289). About the extent to which Faust can be considered representative of Goethe's own religious views, see Burdach (*Euphorion*, pp. 74 f.), who admits this only for *Faust II*, 5. The latter problem was taken up again by Ernst Beutler, *Besinnung* (Frankfurt, 1946).

¹¹⁷ *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, II (JA, XVIII, 149-50).

¹¹⁸ Gottfried Arnold's symbolism: "The hidden meaning of the spirit must never be eliminated, condemned, or set back by the literal meaning of the word" (Seeberg, p. 412). His identification of Jesus with wisdom: "The spirit of Jesus and the spirit of wisdom (*sophia*) are not two different spirits but one inseparable being" (*ibid.*, p. 342).

¹¹⁹ To F. von Müller, October 19, 1823 (Beidermann, III, 26).

¹²⁰ *West-östlicher Divan*, "Nachlass" (JA, V, 137).

God and man necessarily follows from his conception of divinity as a will toward creative manifestation. If he then calls the human being "a creature of two worlds,"¹²² he sees him between good and evil, as a riddle to be worked out through man himself, who is placed in the midst of the tension inherent to the universe. A "Xenion" makes a fine distinction between man as created in the image of God and Christ as God's incarnation.¹²³

The Christ who forms the center of reverence in the Pedagogic Province is the man of wisdom whose life is even more fruitful for the noble part of humanity than is his death. "While he exalts the lower to himself; while he makes the ignorant, the poor, the sick, partakers of his wisdom, of his riches, of his strength, he on the other hand in no wise conceals his divine origin; he dares to equal himself with God—nay, to declare that he himself is God."¹²⁴ He speaks the eternal gospel, the divine word. It is active and strikes.¹²⁵ In Cranach's painting, Goethe sees the Samaritan woman as "she, moved by the weighty words, for the first time turns inward her eye."¹²⁶ Mankind feels an unlimited need for "the same light, the same warmth, such as this first one cherished and enjoyed with deep feeling and firmest conviction."¹²⁷

This light shines into life. The "divine man" on his temporal way teaches a religion of wisdom, the philosophical religion. In its name he addresses himself to the in-

dividual, draws him toward the respect of his equals, and calls forth his awareness of an inner life.¹²⁸ Even death is a challenge to living. "Gedenke zu leben," inscribed on the sarcophagus in the hall of the past where Mignon's exequies are held,¹²⁹ is, as Schiller remarked, triumphant over the *memento mori*.¹³⁰ In this eighth book of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, in which Goethe intended to present the Christian religion in its purest significance,¹³¹ the Chorus ends the burial service with the words: "Travel, travel back into life! Take along with you this holy earnestness, for earnestness alone makes life eternity."¹³²

This "pure Christ" as the divine revelation of the ethical command¹³³ stands in contrast to the entire church history, which is "a mixture of error and violence."¹³⁴ It meets with Goethe's own thought¹³⁵ when Schiller characterizes the distinctive trait of Christianity, because of which it is different from all other monotheistic religions, as "the abrogation of the law, or of the Kantian imperative, for which Christianity wants a free inclination [*freie Neigung*] to be substituted."¹³⁶

¹²² *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 1-2 (JA, XIX, 182, II, 21-31, and 188, II, 7-14).

¹²³ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, VIII, 5 (JA, XVII, 312).

¹²⁴ To Goethe, July 3, 1796. On Goethe's concept of death cf. Walther Rehm, *Der Todesgedanke in der deutschen Dichtung vom Mittelalter zur Romantik* (Halle, 1928), pp. 328-48.

¹²⁵ To Schiller, August 18, 1795.

¹²⁶ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, VIII, 8 (JA, XVIII, 357), trans. Carlyle (1882), p. 72.

¹²⁷ To Eckermann, March 11, 1832 (Biedermann, IV, 442). Goethe stated that it was also his nature to revere the sun because it is "equally a manifestation of the Highest": "I revere in it the light and the creative power of God" (cf. *Mahomet: Ein Fragment*, Act I; *Faust I* [JA, XIII, 44, vss. 1070 ff., 1084 ff.]).

¹²⁸ "Zahme Xenien," II (JA, IV, 44, vss. 308-11).

¹²⁹ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 2 (JA, XIX, 190).

¹³⁰ "Ein göttlich Wort, es wirkt und trifft" (*West-östlicher Divan*, "Buch der Parabeln" [JA, V, 110]).

¹³¹ "Altdeutsche Gemälde," *Bilder des alteren Cranach* (JA, XXXV, 10).

¹³² Visiting Mariä Einsiedeln, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, IV, 18 (JA, XXV, 83). About the Protestant, to whom the rituals of the Roman church are significant because he approves of their human core, see *ibid.*

¹³³ Concerning the equation of "freedom from the law" and "evangelical community," cf. Goethe to Herder, October, 1793; concerning the teaching of the third article of the Credo and its interpretation, see *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 1 (JA, XIX, 184): "Eine begeisterte Gemeinschaft der Heiligen, welches heisst: der im höchsten Grad Guten und Weisen."

¹³⁴ Schiller to Goethe, August 17, 1795.

Christ's power of believing, "the supra-natural which comes to the aid of the natural in a supra-natural-natural fashion,"¹³⁷ find its highest expression in the Christ, who comes to the aid of the sinking Peter, He Himself easily walking on the sea. Here faith and courage conquer doubt and despair.¹³⁸ The *Amor Dei* of which Faust despaired re-emerges in him with the love of man after his return from the Easter promenade.¹³⁹ They are one in Goethe's Christ. Longing and love for His kind bring Him back to earth after God had called Him.¹⁴⁰ His call had reached Him when he helped a woman to give birth to her child.¹⁴¹ The power of faith and of love, of wisdom and action, in their spirit are the foremost qualities of this Christ of whom Goethe said "God visibly was with Him and His first disciples."¹⁴²

To the pupils of Goethe's Pedagogic Province the pictures of the living Christ alone are disclosed during the education. Only on the day when they are released into adult life are they shown the paintings which present Christ's suffering and crucifixion. "The image of misery on the cross" to which the *Divan* refers,¹⁴³ the

crucifix which Mignon fervently kisses in her last moments,¹⁴⁴ the representation of Christ's suffering and death—in the Province it is concealed in "the sanctuary of suffering." The Eldest of the Province explains to Wilhelm that it is a high respect "which does not allow one to play with these deep secrets in which the divine depth of suffering is hidden."¹⁴⁵ In the Pedagogic Province the term "Christian" is particularly connected with the core of Christianity as the religion of "those who fight sufferingly and are glorified in suffering."¹⁴⁶ It corresponds to reverence for the things below us, which, together with reverence for the things around us and reverence for those above us, constitutes the basis of education and develops the reverence of man for himself.

Not the suffering itself but the victory over it Goethe considers the decisive moment of Christ's existence. It brings to the fore the heavenly, the eternal, which "is implanted in the body of earthly purposes and is carried along into finite destinies."¹⁴⁷ Goethe intended to show in his "Mahomet" how in the course of his career the secular grows and expands and the divine recedes and is troubled until, near his death, he returns to the original higher significance of his message, purifies his doctrine, and dies.¹⁴⁸ Within the dialectic dualism inherent in the universal, the divine is ultimately triumphant. On the cloth with which the loving Veronica covers the Savior's face, Ahasuerus sees "the face of the Lord—not of the Lord who is suffering in this moment but of Him gloriously transfigured and radiating

¹³⁷ "Zu malende Gegenstände," *Schriften zur Kunst*, III (JA, XXXV, 302).

¹³⁸ Cf. also to Eckermann, February 12–13, 1831 (Biedermann, IV, 321, 323). Particularly, Goethe said, you find the categorical imperative of faith.

¹³⁹ *Faust I* (JA, XIII, 49, vss. 1184–85).

¹⁴⁰ "Des ewigen Juden erster Fetzen" (JA, III, 236, vss. 131–40).

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 235, vss. 103 ff. As helper at the birth of a child in folklore customs, Christ dates back to the fourteenth century (cf. Hovolka-Kornfeld, *Vergleichende Volksmedizin*, I [1908], 94 ff.).

¹⁴² To Eckermann, January 4, 1824 (Biedermann, III, 62).

¹⁴³ "Solch ein Jammerbild am Holze," *West-bälischer Divan*, "Nachlass" (JA, V, 136–38); the crucifix which is so frequent that one forgets Christ and his cross ("Des ewigen Juden erster Fetzen" [JA, III, 238, vss. 194 ff.]); against the devaluation of nature ("Zahme Xenien," VII [JA, IV, 109]):

"Der Gotteserde lichten Saal
Verdüstern sie zum Jammertal
Daran entdecken wir geschwind
Wie jämmerlich sie selber sind."

¹⁴⁴ *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, VIII, 8 (JA, XVIII, 356).

¹⁴⁵ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 2 (JA, XIX, 192).

¹⁴⁶ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, II, 1 (JA, XIX, 184).

¹⁴⁷ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 14 (JA, XXIV, 221).

¹⁴⁸ JA, XXIV, 221–23.

heavenly life."¹⁴⁹ Goethe retained his definite aversion to the presentation of the suffering Christ, although he seemed to agree with Manzoni, "the Roman Catholic without bigotry," when he described his presentation of the Passion as the "night and darkness of all earthly suffering into which, for a moment, the beneficent divinity decided to enter, to our salvation."¹⁵⁰

It is the Resurrection which Goethe considers "the basic result of the Christian religion, the core of the gospel."¹⁵¹ The poem on Christ's descent to hell shows the glorious God-Man as an inexorable judge. A poem of 1827 interprets the descent to hell as announcing the Resurrection. Both poems present a glorious Christ; the shorter and later one uses the opposition of descent and ascension, besides other symbols of the universal polarity—the falling and the rising water, the flame to be kindled in the abyss.¹⁵² The image of Christ symbolizes to Goethe an experience inherent in the "heroic" quality of his religious convictions. "It is characteristic of the human soul that it elevates itself the quickest when it is most heavily weighted

down."¹⁵³ In the image of resurrection Goethe wanted the artist to present Christ "emerging from the tomb . . . divinely revived, in glorified virile form and decent nakedness."¹⁵⁴ The unbelieving Faust is saved from self-destruction by the Easter message, which announces the hope granted to men through the Master who met the test of pain.¹⁵⁵

The "transfiguration was the pledge of eternal life," says Goethe with a historical view of Christianity.¹⁵⁶ Christ "stood before a background where the Creator had unfolded the universe, from Him emanated a spiritual influence, His sufferings were understood as an example." These remarks from *Makariens Archiv* disclose once more the relationship of Goethe's view of the risen Christ to his understanding and use of spiritualist concepts and, ultimately, of Plotinus' intelligible world of the pure spirits.¹⁵⁷ If spirit is indestructible—and here is meant the spiritual part of man—¹⁵⁸ then earthly life is a preparatory test. Goethe believes that the eternally living God, upon the return to the ether of the active entelechy, "will not deny it new activities, analogous to those in which we already have proved ourselves."¹⁵⁹ The

¹⁴⁹ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 15 (JA, XXIV, 230). Cf. *West-östlicher Divan*, "Buch Hafis, Belname" (JA, V, 18), and Burdach (introd. to the *Divan*).

¹⁵⁰ "Klassiker und Romantiker in Italien" (JA, XXXVII, 125).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* Riemer, August 2, 1809 (Biedermann, II, 47), refers to Goethe's hypothesis that the Passion of Jesus was written by poetical narrators according to the model of ordinary executions of common criminals. In connection with this apparent reluctance to accept the story of the Synoptics and with his particular relation to John's Gospel, cf. E. C. Colwell, *John defends the Gospel* (Chicago, 1936), chap. v, "Jesus was not a criminal," esp. p. 77; with reference to the Crucifixion as a triumph, pp. 89 f.

¹⁵² "An Personen" (JA, III, 163, No. 211):

"Wasserstrahlen reichsten Falles
Drohn den Himmel zu erreichen
Sammelquellen raschen Falles
Nur vermögen so zu steigen.

Also muss die Feuerquelle
Sich im Abgrund erst entzünden
Und die Niederfahrt zur Hölle
Soll die Himmelfahrt verkünden."

¹⁵³ *Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung*, chap. xiv (Goethes Romane und Novellen, I, 455).

¹⁵⁴ "Christus nebst zwölf Figuren" (JA, XXXV, 271 ff.); cf. to Eckermann, March 16, 1830 (Biedermann, IV, 241 f.).

¹⁵⁵ *Faust I* (JA, XIII, 33, vss. 757–61 ["Chor der Engel"]).

¹⁵⁶ *Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 148, No. 670.

¹⁵⁷ The scale of purification basic to *Faust II*, iv, connects Faust's immortal part to eternal duration and presents its return to the origin through stages of transformation. Burdach ("Das religiöse Problem," pp. 63, 70) refers to Öttinger's emanationist spiritualism; Koch (pp. 220 f.) to Öttinger's intellectual forebear, Plotinus, and his *Kosmos noëtos*.

¹⁵⁸ To Eckermann, May 2, 1824 (Biedermann, III, 104 f.): "Unser Geist ist ein Wesen ganz unzerstörbarer Natur; er ist ein fortwirkendes von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit, er ist der Sonne ähnlich, die bloss unseren irdischen Augen unterzugehen scheint, die aber eigentlich nie untergeht, sondern unaufhörlich fortleuchtet."

¹⁵⁹ To Zelter, March 19, 1827; in the same letter Goethe qualifies such speculations as hypothetical.

Johannine concept of Christ as the incarnate Logos¹⁶⁰ was a principal foundation of spiritualist theology. Its understanding of "the Christ or Logos in ourselves who is diffused through all creatures"¹⁶¹ is basic to its freedom of exegesis and—in principle—from organization. Transfiguration is an event of metamorphosis which forms an integral part of Goethe's symbolism of the spiritual world. Mahomet and Faust in the end experience salvation. We leave Faust when his immortal part moves upward. Epimetheus is rejuvenated and elevated, together with the returned Pandora.¹⁶² In the Paradise of the *Divan* the eternal cycles are described, "which are penetrated by the pure and lively tone of God's word, through which the souls prompted by ardent desire lose themselves in the intuition of eternal love."¹⁶³ Although this Dantesque image of love as the spirit victorious over matter, of love as the prime mover and the ultimate end, could not have the medieval poet's dogmatic power,¹⁶⁴ it translates into terms of a spiritual concept an experience underlying even the most classical creation of Goethe's poetry—the experience of love as the uniting bond between lower and higher, between the human and the divine.

When at the end of *Faust* a view opens

toward the infinite, the figures of *una poenitentium*, formerly called "Gretchen," and of Faust himself are shown in an upward movement of which love is the determinant force. Faust's ascension is indeed akin to Dante's ascension in the *Paradiso*.¹⁶⁵ In this universe the *Amor Dei* is an inherent element of human existence. The responding grace is inherent in the divine order. Love is a supreme quality of the Prime Mover, the "all-loving Father."¹⁶⁶ Christ is its manifestation. Even the ironical tone of the fragment, "The eternal Jew," changes into that of sincere affection when "the friend of man" returns to earth.¹⁶⁷ The command of love is the core of Christ's indispensable truth.

Christ, ennobling everything he touches,¹⁶⁸ left on the Four Gospels the reflection of a sublimity which is of "so divine a character as ever on earth the divine became manifest."¹⁶⁹ *Der nie entsprossene*,¹⁷⁰ called identical with the Creator in Faust's magic formula, is inherent in the sphere where the reconciliation of the antagonistic parts of the world drama occurs, where, after the apostasy,

¹⁶⁰ A comparison of *Faust* and *The divine comedy* is presented by Karl Vossler in *Die göttliche Komödie* (Heidelberg, 1907), I, 11–19. Romano Guardini (*Der Engel in Dante's göttlicher Komödie* [Leipzig, 1937], p. 129) speaks about the image of man's face in the second cycle of the Trinity (*Paradiso*, XXXIII, 124–32) and qualifies it as a "factum, a not derivable necessity, which is willed freely and put into reality, a deed, history: The incarnation of God in the human flesh" (cf. *Faust II*, vss. 12108–9: "Das Unbeschreibliche, hier ists getan"). Any such comparison, however, depends upon the recognition of Act V of *Faust* as an integral part of the whole drama, which Guardini, unfortunately, denies. Cf., to the contrary, Burdach, "Das religiöse Problem," cf. n. 89, and "Die Schluss-scene in Goethes *Faust*," cf. n. 104.

¹⁶⁶ "Mahomets Gesang" (*JA*, II, 43, vss. 38–41); "Ganymed" (*JA*, II, 61, vs. 31).

¹⁶⁷ "Des ewigen Juden erster Fetzen" (*JA*, III, 236, vss. 131–40).

¹⁶⁸ To Zelter, November 9, 1839: "Schillern war eben diese echte Christustendenz eingeboren; er berührte nichts Gemeines, ohne es zu veredeln."

¹⁶⁹ To Eckermann, March 11, 1832 (Biedermann, IV, 442).

¹⁷⁰ *Faust I* (*JA*, XIII, 53, vs. 1306).

¹⁶⁰ Concerning Goethe and John's Gospel cf. letter to Herder, February 20, 1786: "I recommend you John's Gospel again and again, whose content comprises Moses and the prophets, evangelists and apostles: Children love each other. And so me also." Colwell (chap. viii) discusses the allegorical character of John's work and emphasizes that "knowing God through Christ" was of prime importance to John rather than the facts of Jesus' career. This symbolical way of religious experience is essential to spiritualism and makes itself felt also in Goethe's symbolism.

¹⁶¹ In connection with Sebastian Franck cf. Ernst Troeltsch. Cf. also nn. 118 above and 172 below.

¹⁶² "Pandora," scheme of the continuation (*JA*, XV, 381, vss. 61–62).

¹⁶³ *West-bätlicher Divan*, "Buch des Paradieses, Höheres und Höchstes" (*JA*, IV, 126 f.).

¹⁶⁴ G. A. Borgese, *Saggio sul Faust* (Milan, 1933), p. 204: "Goethe rimane dietro il suo poema, come dietro una sfinge."

the "return to the original" happens. Christ, *der durch alle Himmel gegossene*,¹⁷¹ hereby called identical with the Holy Spirit, is the guarantor of the union which is hinted at when Faust's striving endeavor meets with the grace from above. Thus, within the whole of Goethe's view of spirit and nature, Christ as a historical reality represents the manifestation of the purest spirit in the human world and his resurrection symbolizes the spirit's indestructible existence. As a mystical reality, he is called *Der Unausgesprochene*.¹⁷² He is ineffable and close to the joy of creation. He represents, mild and loving Himself, the same holiness of the spirit which mildly leads "to Him who created and creates everything."¹⁷³ Mildness is a characteristic quality often recurring when Goethe touches upon the reconciliation of antagonisms which only through the mediation of a higher element we can hope to be satisfactory.¹⁷⁴ And we hear a similar tone when Goethe speaks of hope: *Elpore thraseia*, "courageous hope," is Pandora's and Epimetheus' child. Hope elevates us beyond necessity,¹⁷⁵ and for those active in applying the forces of the good, the crowns are made in eternal calmness, wherefrom the voices of the masters call: "We ask you to have hope."¹⁷⁶ The faith by which the poet of the *Divan* feels

refreshed¹⁷⁷ is an image serene as the Lord's image on Veronica's cloth.¹⁷⁸ As Christ's victory is here translated into beauty, so Goethe held that religious devotion was possible only if directed either to the "formless holy in us and around us" or else to the incarnation of the highest beauty.¹⁷⁹

Such a relation of religious worship to the aesthetic discloses more than does the inclination of the artist toward the beautiful. It indicates that Goethe's spiritualist mysticism and his classical concept of art have a common basis. Goethe conceives of man as sharing in both spirit and nature. He understands his mortality, at least hypothetically, as a metamorphosis inherent in the character of the universe.¹⁸⁰ He understands the Creator Himself as continuously at work.¹⁸¹ The totality of these views converges in his praise of the serenity of man's action to the honor of the divinity. "Joy and participation in things is the only thing real and again produces reality."¹⁸² Untouched by the storm of the theological dispute, the old artist of Ephesus in Goethe's poem¹⁸³ reads "the full breadth of divinity" and continues with his work of adorning the image of his goddess.

Goethe's urge also to translate into concreteness his impulses and concepts limits his adoption of mystical forms. As Burdach remarks,¹⁸⁴ he transformed Hafis'

¹⁷¹ *JA*, vs. 1308.

¹⁷² *JA*, vs. 1307.

¹⁷³ "Eins und Alles" (*JA*, II, 244, vss. 10-12). Two ways of religious worship: "the one which acknowledges and adores the holy dwelling in us and around us without any form, the other which does it in the most beautiful form" (*Mazimen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 147, No. 667).

¹⁷⁴ "Die drei Paria," *Schriften zur Literatur*, II (*JA*, XXXVII, 272), where Goethe refers also to the poems "Der Gott und die Bajadere" (*JA*, I, 150 ff.) and "Paria" (*JA*, II, 199 ff.).

¹⁷⁵ "Urworte. Orphisch" (*JA*, II, 153 f.). The order which Goethe gave to the "Primeval Orphic sayings" is not without significance. It is destroyed in *The permanent Goethe*, ed. Thomas Mann (New York, 1948), p. 651.

¹⁷⁶ "Symbolum," last stanza (*JA*, II, 232).

¹⁷⁷ "Ein heitres Bild des Glaubens," *West-östlicher Divan*, "Hafis, Beiname" (*JA*, V, 18, vs. 25).

¹⁷⁸ *JA*, V, 18, vss. 21-22; see n. 149 above.

¹⁷⁹ Concerning mystical or aesthetic religious worship, see n. 173 above.

¹⁸⁰ "Selige Sehnsucht," *West-östlicher Divan* (*JA*, V, 16).

¹⁸¹ *Faust I* (*Erdgeist*) (*JA*, XIII, 24); "eternal calmness" ("Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe") refers to the totality of the universal process; "Erdgeist" to the process of emanation and return (cf. Jacob Boehme's *principia* [see n. 108 above]).

¹⁸² To Schiller, June 14, 1796.

¹⁸³ "Gross ist die Diana der Epheser" (*JA*, II, 109 f.).

¹⁸⁴ Introduction to Goethe's *West-östlicher Divan* (*JA*, V, xlix).

mysticism into "a firm body out of the imaginative power of the Greek mind."¹⁸⁵ If truth was of importance to him only when it bore fruit, the fruitful itself signifies the dynamic union of spirit and nature, God and world. He sees men such as Bruno and Spinoza persecuted because they thought of the reunion of the separated poles.¹⁸⁶ Held against the background of Goethe's *Stirb und Werde*, his classicism loses the touch of perfectionism and human self-sufficiency which misunderstanding interpreters read into it. Its aim is rather disclosed as a call to the active and devoted conduct of the Ephesian goldsmith.

The image of the returning Christ who comes to be crucified a second time corresponds to Goethe's conception of life, his fate to the dualism of the human situation as a riddle, such as Faust's tragedy demonstrates it to be. Goethe's religion is realistic and therefore indeed "heroic."¹⁸⁷ He faces the gulf which crosses right through man's existence and, in spite of it, resumes the ever renewed task of active reconciliation. In the light of Goethe's belief in the freedom of a truly evangelical community,¹⁸⁸ his image of the returning Christ gives a particular significance to a sentence in his last conversation with Eckermann: "All of us will proceed more

and more from a Christianity of the word and the faith to a Christianity of inward disposition and action."¹⁸⁹ If salvation is an eternally necessary process,¹⁹⁰ then there are human beings whose personalities exemplify the reconciliation of spirit and nature. It was in this sense that Schiller understood the figure of Natalie in *Wilhelm Meister* as holy and human at the same time.¹⁹¹

IV. THE PURELY HUMAN

A religious seriousness of the kind that Goethe described in *Wilhelm Meister* formed the ground common to his poetical production, his conception of the artist, and his philosophy of nature. It is expressed in his metaphysical poems, as well as through the figures and the contemplative statements in his novels and critical writings. The abbé in his letter to Wilhelm calls this attitude *Weltfrömmigkeit*. He uses this term when explaining the ultimate aim of the utopian settlement which the society of Wilhelm's friends expects to establish. The abbé wishes Wilhelm to prepare himself to become "an indispensable link in our chain." *Weltfrömmigkeit* is requested beyond *Hausfrömmigkeit*, because it does more than establish that inner certainty of the in-

¹⁸⁹ March 11, 1832 (Biedermann, IV, 443).

¹⁹⁰ *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, II, 8 (JA, XXIII, 166), and Franz, p. 189. About inequality between individual entelechies, cf. Eckermann, September 1, 1829 (Biedermann, IV, 163), where Goethe's philosophical skepticism is reported, together with the affirmative but heuristic nature of his belief in the immortal entelechy.

¹⁹¹ Schiller to Goethe, July 3, 1796. Conversely, he calls Cordata only a saint, Therese only a perfect human being. That he calls Natalie also "the only aesthetic personality" illustrates his and Goethe's understanding of the term "aesthetic" as the concrete appearance of the union between reason and emotion and, on a higher level, spirit and nature. Cf. Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 4th letter ("totality"), 11th letter ("personality"): "Die Anlage zu der Gottheit trägt der Mensch unwidersprechlich in seiner Persönlichkeit in sich; der Weg zu der Gottheit, wenn man einen Weg nennen kann was niemals zum Ziele führt, ist ihm aufgetan in den Sinnen" (*Insel*, V, 405).

¹⁸⁵ It is this responsibility for concreteness and classical form and the corresponding denial of "romantic darkness" in thinking which separates Goethe from a symbolism and a mythology like that of F. I. Görrer. To the defender of such "Dionysian" cosmogony Goethe's tempered "Apollinian" conception looks pale (cf. Leese, III, 4, and Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 109, No. 504: "Alles, was unseren Geist befreit, ohne uns die Herrschaft über uns selbst zu geben, ist verderblich").

¹⁸⁶ *Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre*, "Robert Boyle" (JA, XL, 221).

¹⁸⁷ The continuous effort to unite the "higher" and the "lower" in the process of life is the core of this heroism. Cf. Korff (II, 422 f.) about the "Faustian religion as an unmistakable creation of its own kind" with Goethe's conception of individual religion. "Heroism," cf. letter to Rauch, October 21, 1827.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. nn. 135-36 above.

dividual upon which the firmness and dignity of the whole is ultimately built. Beyond this, *Weltfrömmigkeit* means a resolution "to correlate our honest human convictions practically with a wide field of action, and to further not only those next to us, but at the same time to take with us mankind as a whole."¹⁹² The citizen of the world feels responsible for orienting his activities toward the whole, even when, in practice, they are confined to a comparatively small realm. The piety underlying the opinions and actions of the citizen of the world is equally devoted to the whole. It comprises all aspects of man's relation to God-Nature. Without such piety the action of Wilhelm's friends could not have a relation to the concept of mankind. Without including the love of the world, of nature, and of art, their faith would remain unconnected with their activity.

In terms of Christianity, *Weltfrömmigkeit* is an active and social, almost socialistic, fulfilment of the command of love. It is nourished by the conviction that the individual forms a part within a living whole, that he is akin to other parts and capable of mirroring the structure of the whole. Therefore, he is also in a position to lend structure and meaning to the domain allotted to him and his community, to decide in freedom about the best way of action, and to take it. Goethe's utopia proceeds from the psychological insight into man to the collective undertakings of a community of men thinking and acting in a spirit of fellowship, which is guided by *Weltfrömmigkeit*. This piety is inner-worldly. In it there survives the classical mystic teaching that God speaks through everything. Although even Eckhart could be understood as calling for otherworldliness, Goethe places man in the midst of the concrete conditions under which he is supposed to live.

As in mystic wisdom, joy and pain are

responsibilities to be faced with equal obedience; but the mind is challenged by the knowable and the unknowable, by the task of action and the problem of contemplation, with an equally urgent call. Search and action, calmness and respect, each in its proper place, are of equal value. The freedom which *Weltfrömmigkeit* conveys excludes an oriental rejection of nature or a pessimistic contempt of the body. Whoever lives according to it accepts and even loves the "garment of divinity" which the *Erdegeist* is weaving. Yet, in spite of all devotion to the concreteness of life, the mind is independent of it. The mind reaches into a stratum beyond the phenomenal world and is therefore able to sustain the rhythm of thinking and doing,¹⁹³ the systole and diastole of living, which, as a basic and simple task, is inherent in the nature of man. Thus knowledge forms a step toward wisdom. The cause of Adam's fall is also the chance of man's elevation. *Weltfrömmigkeit* turns the individual toward the art of living rather than toward the art of dying. Such orientation of piety toward positive living results from a spiritualist view of unity, of God in nature, when it is actively translated into the concrete conditions and tasks, both individual and social, of man's life in a given time and a given place.

To this *Weltfrömmigkeit* Goethe gave allegorical expression through his "Cross in Roses."¹⁹⁴ The pilgrim Markus in Goethe's poem "Die Geheimnisse," descending with the sinking sun to a peaceful valley, arrives at a monastery. On its

¹⁹² Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, II, 7 (JA, XIX, 285).

¹⁹³ Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, II, 9 (JA, XX, 25).

¹⁹⁴ "Die Geheimnisse. Ein Fragment" (JA, I, 287). Burdach, "Die Schlusszene in Goethes Faust," p. 586, relates the cross in roses to the end of *Faust* and explains both as "a humanisation of the ecclesiastical dogma resulting from an infinite love for mankind."

door he sees a cross adorned with roses. It reminds him of its message of consolation and hope, of the significance which the Christian cross has had to thousands of minds and hearts for whom it has destroyed the power of death. But the cross which he sees here presents to him an "entirely new meaning":

Es steht das Kreuz mit Rosen dicht umschlungen,
Wer hat dem Kreuze Rosen zugesellt?
Es schwillt der Kranz, um recht von allen Seiten
Das schroffe Holz mit Weichheit zu begleiten.

Out of this image "a holy life of threefold rays emerges from one point." The cross in roses bears the sign of the Trinity. Erected on the entrance door of the monastery and reappearing in the assembly hall, it is of central significance to this community of men, which reminds one of Goethe's "wise and good to the highest degree." Their fellowship stands for his translation into terms of *Weltfrömmigkeit* of the *ecclesia spiritualis*. The elder, Humanus, is the holy man, in whose breast the "Peace of God" is dwelling. His miraculous life is related to the visitor as being a chain of difficult tests which he withstood victoriously. He does not owe the wisdom and freedom which are his to the gifts of nature alone but also to the way in which he made use of them. Resignation, his victory over himself, was the decisive means toward his freedom.¹⁹⁶ Humanus is at the end of his journey and about to leave the world. Already he is elsewhere in spirit, having conveyed what was his to his companions.

Their lives, like his, had been lives of action, suffering, and victory, leading to wisdom and serenity. It is in harmony with this polarity that on the cross of the community the roses do not cover the roughness of the wood but accompany it

by their softness. The two elements are reconciled, neither becoming predominant. Goethe had the event which was to elevate Markus to the succession of Humanus happen in the week of Easter. He definitely related it thereby to Christianity, whose cross, as he said with reference to these stanzas, "he honored and adorned as man and poet."¹⁹⁶

Humanus is the leading figure of a human and humane religion. Without engaging in argumentation, Goethe symbolically expresses the heroic character of its piety, its beauty, and its wisdom through the figures of the poem and through the sign in whose name they live together. One may interpret the poem as a translation of Christianity into terms of religious humanism.¹⁹⁷ It should rather be taken, however, as the symbol of an "individual" religious conviction arising from the responsible acceptance of both the pain and the beauty of man's and nature's creativeness. As a primary and genuine religious experience, it is a testimonial of its originator to the "power and courage pertaining to this attitude"¹⁹⁸ of creating religious symbols in individual freedom. The poem once more testifies to Goethe's faith in the reconciliation of the poles of life through the concrete process of living itself. Its problem, however—that of the possibility of such reconciliation between roughness and mildness, between this-worldly and otherworldly elements of life—inevitably occurs wherever salvation is contemplated as an inward and mystical, rather than a transcendental and magical, act.

¹⁹⁶ Victory over himself is requested from Tasso; resignation, emphasized by the subtitle of *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, is the basis of the community whose life and activities the novel develops.

¹⁹⁷ Löwith, p. 32: "Goethe hebt das Christentum in der Humanität auf und die Geheimnisse offenbaren, was das 'Rein-Menschliche' ist."

¹⁹⁸ Franz, p. 228. Cf. the analysis of the relations between primary religion and mediation in the same chapter.

¹⁹⁶ To Zelter, June 1, 1831.

Toward the end of a Promethean life, Humanus attains wisdom and serenity. Like Natalie he is neither a merely secular nor a merely holy person but the integration of both. In Humanus' realm, Markus observes beautiful youths, coming back from nocturnal dances with torches in their hands. Under the sign of the cross in roses, the Greek and the Christian heritage seem to unite. The contrast to Luther's coat-of-arms could not be greater. On a black cross, white roses hold the human heart.¹⁹⁹ To the faithful disciple of Christ, Luther's cross indicates transcendental joy, promising consolation for suffering and already making itself felt on earth through the strength of faith. The contrast between the two crosses corresponds to the difference between the two religious concepts. In Humanus' domain man is exposed to the polarity of life as an agent of independent experience, although not without the guidance of inspired and tested wisdom or without the community of others. There the significance of Christ is both paradigmatic and historical. The supra-naturalist theologian, on the other hand, can attach primary significance neither to the historical nor to the paradigmatic Christ. "No personality of world history is of interest to him."²⁰⁰ Reconciliation itself is transcendental, as is grace, which alone fulfils man's relation to God. Not the community but its antithesis between the divine and the human should be emphasized. Culture is part of the realm of sin, and even Goethe's interpretation of cultural activity means losing one's self to the world. Measuring his own faith by such supra-naturalist standards, Goethe is right when he calls himself "an

old pagan."²⁰¹ Christ could not be Goethe's Lord in the sense of the First Commandment, nor his one and only mediator to God. Not Christ alone made him recognize the situation of man as much as His image illustrated it. Not Christ alone made Goethe aware of divine love and of the love of mankind or granted to him "an ethical attitude toward historical reality."²⁰²

Wherever Goethe met with such transcendental radicalism, he refused to follow. Man to him remains a fragmentary and restricted being, destined to live through apostasy to reconciliation. In view of his journey of life, man is endowed, as a child of God, with potential "original virtue." Man's pride should not be broken. But man should set it on the right object. This is reverence for himself, resulting from an active development of reverence in the three directions corresponding to those of the Credo. Man is not free from guilt, but his answer to it is a renewed effort. It is not a pure flame that emerges when the matter of human life is kindled by "the pure fire taken from the altar."²⁰³ Through his inner and outer fate *Werther* demonstrates the ethical failure and the religious problem of the autonomous self.²⁰⁴ The novel *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* culminates in the ac-

¹⁹⁹ To Jacobi, February 1, 1808.

²⁰⁰ Cf. the exposition of these tenets by Brunner, pp. 538 ff.; also "Das Einmalige, der Glaube an den Mittler, ist die einzig ernsthafte Entscheidung" (p. 560).

²⁰¹ "Ilmenau" (JA, I, 276 ff.).

²⁰² Herbert Schöffler, *Die Leiden des Jungen Werther: Ihr geistesgeschichtlicher Hintergrund* (1938), made an important contribution to the religious interpretation of the novel and compared the end of the novel with corresponding passages of John's Gospel. The metaphysical problem of Werther's character found a noteworthy interpretation also by Wilhelm Flitner, *Goethe im Spätwerk* (Hamburg, 1947), pp. 52-56, where the author contends that Goethe conceived the reason of Werther's suffering as guilt from the composition of the novel onward. Consequently, his later statement, "Sei ein Mann und folge mir nicht nach," appears as an explanation rather than a retraction (p. 55).

¹⁹⁹ Löwith, pp. 33 f.

²⁰⁰ Brunner, p. 51. Brunner adds: "The synthesis found by mysticism is too cheap, as is the synthesis of rationalistic systems. . . . Behind all of them we find the self-confidence of men, divorced from God, in the power remaining to him."

ceptance of guilt and demonstrates the ethical law as a reality. Error and guilt are inherent in man's striving.²⁰⁵ Goethe's *Faust* has been called the "epitome of an existential tragedy."²⁰⁶ The infinite urge and the interminable longing of this Faust are signs of the divine part of his nature. Recurring failure, renewed effort, and repeated guilt accompany him to his end, and yet he is saved—not because of his achievements but because of his striving is it possible that grace may come to him. Goethe denied neither that man was sin-bound and egoistic nor that man's efforts were fragmentary and temporal. But he considered him capable of doing good and held the renewed attempt to develop his original virtue the proper answer to failure and guilt.

Goethe's human being is susceptible and akin to the mildness of higher forces. But these forces are not only the objects of his hope. Man is held responsible for incorporating them into the concreteness of his life in spite of failure, and he can do so because he is not radically evil. He is not an autonomous and unbroken entity by himself, but he is engaged in a continuous trial, destined to reconcile the poles inherent in life. Christ's crucifixion gives evidence of the tragic nature of this polarity; his resurrection symbolizes its meaning as the ultimate triumph of higher forces. Interpreted as "the manifestation of the ethical law," Goethe's Christ is paradigmatic for the reconciliation and its problematical character. Christ, whom he once wished to present to man as his friend instead of his tyrant,²⁰⁷ is conceived as the "pure Christ" in the sense of the "purely human."

²⁰⁵ *Wahleerwandschaften*, cf. Lilli Simon, *Verantwortung und Schuld in Goethes Roman* (Erlangen diss., 1934), p. 60; *Faust I*, "Prolog im Himmel" (JA, XIII, 15): "Es irrt der Mensch, solange er strebt."

²⁰⁶ Spranger, p. 31.

²⁰⁷ "Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1772," review of Münter, No. 24 (JA, XXXVI, 55).

"Das rein menschliche," then, as expressed by Humanus' religious way of life, is not identical with the "merely" human. The purity in man is related in the structure of Goethe's thought to the purity of the gospel and to the pure Christ. The method of interpretation used by the spiritualists in the following of John's Gospel consisted, as we saw, in eliminating from his image the social and historical accidentals. Thereby, they arrived, at first, at conceiving a timeless picture of Christ's wisdom and self-sacrificing love, and from there they proceeded toward their symbolical view of Christ as identical with eternal wisdom. Through his realism in observation Goethe modified the method of their hermeneutics.²⁰⁸ But its principle is upheld by the symbolical nature of his thinking, which applies a means of presentation intrinsic to art upon both natural science and religion. Thus the figures of Goethe's poetical work are intended to make transparent this "purely human" core of man's existence. The personality of man is related to a lasting truth, which, however, is accessible only through the obscure medium of the phenomenal world. In terms of Goethe's hypothetical metaphysics, his poetical figures stand in the midst of the process through which the parallelism of immanence and transcendence operates: Spirit is embodied and body is spiritualized. The "purely human" shall gain concreteness, the lower shall be "ennobled."

This process of reconciliation constitutes the meaning of man's life and determines man's ethical task. Personality may be the highest happiness of the children of the earth,²⁰⁹ yet man achieves his personality not simply by working out his entelechy but by reconciling it to the

²⁰⁸ Cf. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, III, 12 (JA, XXIV, 74 ff.), about his reading the Bible. Cf. Gertrud Janzer, *Goethe und die Bibel* (Heidelberg diss., 1929).

²⁰⁹ JA, XXXIV, 11.

whole in which he finds himself included. Goethe's conception of freedom is determined by man's voluntary recognition of, and his obedience to, the universal law. Without such capacity for transcending himself, man will not obtain personality.²¹⁰ Goethe's utopia of the human community is likewise conceived in view of man's active effort toward reconciliation. The monastery of Humanus, the two societies of Wilhelm Meister, or the original community adumbrated in *Pandora's return* are images of social bodies whose education and government is formed according to such a conception of man.

The community which, in *Pandora's return*, emerges out of the new union between Pandora and Epimetheus gives their proper places to art and science. They are at work in front of a curtain which conceals the patent secret—the sphere of truth itself. To divine it is granted to man through the symbolical image.²¹¹ To this essential factor of the situation of man the mission of art and science corresponds. It is one of mediation between the one and the manifold, the temporal and the eternal. Their products are historical and subject to revision, change, and oblivion. Their concrete content will never exhaust the truth. They will be of active significance only as long as their symbolical forms share in the language and understanding of human soci-

ety. Nevertheless, by approximation the products of art and science disclose lasting truth. But the written word is always oscillating toward a Platonic idea never to be adequately expressed. The original phenomenon forms the closest approach to it. Man's intellectual existence is bound to be one of continuous daring. His imperfection and imperfectibility are the counterpart of his creative capacities. Art and science are historical, that is, they are part of the process of living. Yet they transcend the "merely" secular realm. The "purely human" is the element inherent in man himself which leads beyond the "merely human."

The difficulty which Goethe's position creates, in view of any attempt to establish rationally firm and reliably seizable principles of faith and conduct, is well illustrated by the history of the devaluation and misunderstanding of his religious humanism.²¹² Goethe's own antagonism against the ideologies rising toward the end of his lifetime, particularly his aversion to political experimentation on the ground of such ideologies, is a reflection of this difficulty. The basic structure of this tension is no different from the relation between the religious spiritualists and the church. In the light of the free evangelical community or, in secularized terms, the voluntarily chosen freedom of self-resigning men, formal organization is a matter of emergency and a tribute to insufficiency. The principal aspects of this tension, however, illustrate the significance of Goethe's concept of the "purely human."

The indispensable consequence of Goethe's humanity is the freedom of the individual within the limits of a social order

²¹⁰ Cf. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, "Aufzeichnungen zu Reden in Skandinavien," *Corona*, II (1932), 387 ff., about freedom and law. Hofmannsthal sees Goethe's concept of law develop from the titanic period of independence in the *Sturm und Drang* era through a second phase, culminating in the victory of the idea of law in *Tasso*. In the *Wahlverwandtschaften* this concept of law forms the center of the tragic plot. It is the purified personality in which law and freedom attain harmonious concordance. "Goethes Idee des Werdens schloss eine Idee des Müßens ein, und seine Idee der Form schloss eine Idee des Gesetzes ein. Seine Sittlichkeit ist aus religiös erfasstem Natursinn abgeleitet" (p. 390).

²¹¹ Arnold Bergstraesser, "Mensch und Staat im Wirken Goethes—*Pandora*," *Corona*, VI (1935–36), 119 ff.

²¹² Karl Löwith greatly contributed to the discussion of this problem. A. Hübotter, *Das Schicksal der Humanität im 19. Jahrhundert* ("Göttinger Studien zur Pädagogik," ed. H. Nohl, Vol. IX [1929]), reviews the devaluation of the concept of humanity and its impact upon educational ideas.

which serves the individual personality by its ethical organization. This postulate of freedom becomes the less acceptable, the more the collectives of state and nation are conceived as values in themselves. It is denied as soon as the conduct of man in the service of these collectives is justifiable by an ethics separate from, or even antagonistic to, the ethical law valid for the individual. Goethe was sufficiently experienced in public life not to confuse his utopia of human community with the goals attainable under the concrete conditions of public affairs. His inclination toward concreteness, together with this personal experience, may have caused him to choose for his utopian image in *Wilhelm Meister* a society of men of good will like that of Freemasons rather than a state. The concrete state itself was to him, at best, an occasion for the work of such men of good will. Not only the omnipotent political community but even the overemphasis on the values connected with a lawful public organization seemed to him contrary to the balance between community and individual which he held conducive to the realization of the "purely human."²¹³

In the domain of religious organization this tension becomes even more evident. Simmel held that all church-building religions would have to exclude Goethe's God-Nature, according to its formal principle.²¹⁴ Like Goethe himself, as we saw, the intellectual ancestors of this conception were as much averse to organized religion as the representatives of the latter often proved hostile to them. The conflict between the returning Christ and the church is necessarily inherent in a religious attitude which emerges from a spiritualist background. Every doctrinary ecclesiastical tendency, not merely that of mid-nineteenth-century Germany, must dis-

play opposition against Goethe's humanism. For responsible and creative minds his "free evangelical community" claims the privilege of living outside church organization. He pursued the principle of religious freedom so far as to consider religion a matter of individual growth and responsibility and thereby doubted the clerical *raison d'être* even of the Protestant church. By giving a religious meaning to the realm of the beautiful, the cross in roses subordinates the aesthetic to the religious. No human concern is without religious significance. On the other hand, the principal tenet of Continental Protestantism—the emphasis on the radical sinfulness of the temporal sphere—is not acceptable. Man is called to *live* to the honor of God. The church represents religion within society. It is therefore tempted to devalue man's secular concern in order to balance it with his eternal concern. What the church may separate, the spiritualist keeps united. Goethe conceived as the lived religion the mutual permeation of the secular and the eternal.²¹⁵

Goethe's distance from organized religion is less exclusive, however, than his conception of the balance of human faculties is incompatible with any doctrine built upon a one-sided reliance on rational analysis. Goethe's concepts of *Gestalt* and metamorphosis were related to his principle of totality. His view of society included the polarity inherent in the situation of man. A concept of evolution in terms of a materialistic biology may present a partial truth, but any doctrine built upon it which pretends to be of general importance stands in opposition to Goethe's views. The nineteenth-century ways

²¹³ A German Catholic, known for his interest in and interpretation of Goethe, recently renewed, by keeping within the church, such a conception of the lived Christian religion (Ernst Michel, *Renovatio: Zur Zwiesprache zwischen Kirche und Welt* [Stuttgart: Klett, 1947], cf. n. 228).

²¹⁴ Cf. letter to Koschelew (Biedermann, IV, 394): "literature and art are killed by politics and realism."

²¹⁵ Georg Simmel, *Goethe* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 168.

of arriving at a system of thought by reducing the phenomena of society to one predominant principle, be it based upon an economic or upon a biological hypothesis, exclude Goethe's symbolical metaphysics as "mere" poetry from their realm of valid truth. They relegate it, therefore, entirely to an aesthetic domain which has no further bearing on man's life than, at best, a mere illustration would have. The history of the interpretation and biography of Goethe reflects the tendency, particularly strong in the middle of the nineteenth century, toward losing sight of the religious foundation of his personality and his work. When understood purely as a matter of intellectual education, of *Bildung* in a degenerate meaning of the term, Goethe's thought does not yield its significance.²¹⁶

In the light of Goethe's conception of harmony and totality, each of these antagonistic attitudes is eccentric. Each of them pretends to master more certainty than Goethe believes to have been granted to man. None of them faces the polarity inherent in the situation of man in Goethe's own balancing fashion. The deification of state and nation or the invalidation of the ethical principle within their domain is an apostasy from humanity. The exclusive confidence in the intellect (*Verstand*) deposes reason (*Vernunft*) from its function and denies to man the responsible use of those faculties of his mind which, in Goethe's opinion, are its higher and nobler parts. The certainty of supra-naturalism not only exceeds the limits of human knowledge but claims possession of a revealed wisdom without acknowledging the inevitably anthropo-

²¹⁶ A foremost representative of such tendencies was David Friedrich Strauss. In his *Der alte und der neue Glaube* not only does he propose to substitute the literary classics for the gospel, but he is unable even to recognize the religious foundation of this literature. In view of such misinterpretations, Kierkegaard's criticism of Goethe is not surprising.

morphic character inherent in the expression of every revelation and of the inferences drawn from it.

To Goethe the temporal remains a parable. The only way of coming closer to the patent secret which it holds is the symbol which the creative mirror of man's mind is capable of producing. "Man in his discourse with God can only use his own words."²¹⁷ The philosopher and the theologian no less than the poet build upon vision.²¹⁸ Measured by the modest but firm self-resignation of Goethe's religious views,²¹⁹ the impassioned claim of extra-human certainty on the part of supra-naturalists lacks in humility and respect. It may even lack in faith, if such certainty is expressed, "as if it were spoken immediately in the name of God."²²⁰ The human being, as Goethe sees him, is subject to becoming and passing away, that is, to the metamorphosis, the *Stirb und Werde*, of the universe. Although man's reason is inferior to divine reason, his fragmentary mind is capable of mirroring the whole of which he is a part. Yet the divine ground itself is concealed from him.

But man is not therefore abandoned to a blind fate, never to be mastered. That he has to rediscover his standards again and again, that he has to reformulate his faith in every phase of his civilization, does not mean that they are denied him. Faith as a power is a potential inherent in man. Faith as a formulated expression of his relation to the unknown and of the meaning which it gives to his life is a part

²¹⁷ Erich Frank, *Philosophical understanding and religious truth* (New York, 1945), p. 97.

²¹⁸ *Xenien*, p. 91, No. 789:

"Wird der Poet nur geboren? Der Philosoph wirds nicht minder,
Alle Wahrheit zuletzt wird nur gebildet, geschaut."

²¹⁹ "Das schönste Glück des denkenden Menschen ist, das Erforschliche erforscht zu haben und das Unerforschliche ruhig zu verehren" (*Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 250, No. 1207).

²²⁰ Spranger, p. 33.

of culture.²²¹ The Promethean element in Goethe's philosophy of life, urging toward the active responsibility of reason, is balanced by the Epimethean element, which calls for a contemplative but equally important daring. Whoever maintains "the modern dualism between religious thinking and cultural philosophy"²²² is in danger of forfeiting the significance of Goethe's conceptions. Both the Epimethean and the Promethean elements are constitutive for the utopia of a good life and a healthy education, in the midst of which Goethe put his image of Christ.

From the Renaissance philosophy of nature Goethe had proceeded to a devoted observation of nature's phenomena. Yet he conceived them as manifestations of the universal unity. Likewise, the religious impulse of spiritualism supported his inclination against both a magical and a rationalistic relation to the divine. The step he took beyond the mystical implication of the spiritualist religious attitude was determined by the same intention toward

clarity of form which is characteristic of his studies in nature. Such clarity was available to him in the myth. He proceeded from the mystical to the mythical.²²³

In his *Novelle*²²⁴ he tells a myth which is significant for the religious character of his "pure humanity." The myth of the lion and his taming is another symbol of the higher forces which are triumphant in the midst of life, of the strength of mildness against the threat of the wild element. These forces are at work through man, anonymous and without social status, through the purely human. The leading figure among them is a child. Step by step the reader is led forward to the surprising conflict and its unforeseeable solution. Only in the end does the world experience and the anticipating foresight of the uncle prove to result from his awareness of the human situation. He holds it fundamentally uncertain: he sees government as subject to change in spite of all wisdom and care; he knows the unbridled elements which are always ready to invade the zone of order, calm, and happiness. The landscape meaningfully laid out, the past harmoniously united to the present, the people of the mountains co-operating by a useful exchange with those on the plains—this whole picture of peace and reason conveys the expectation of future happiness. Suddenly and with irresistible violence, the wild element of fire bursts into this realm, and a second catastrophe immediately threatens to follow the first one. The wild animals break out. Honorio's this-worldly virtue, his knightly courage and devotion, seem to equal the princess' spirited beauty, when he saves her life

²²¹ Paul Tillich in *Hegel und Goethe* (Tübingen, 1932), p. 47, characterized the religious view of German classicism as related to one particular historical moment or *kairos*. Beyond it he denies it a paradigmatic significance. On the one hand, he relates it to the social structure in which it emerged and which, it is correct, irrevocably belongs to the past. On the other hand, he contrasts Goethe's thought to the prophetic spirit, his image of man and culture to the religious *pneuma*. The latter, however, as soon as it comes to action and takes form, inevitably expresses itself through the medium of culture; the former will not be understood unless conceived as transcending the merely temporal sphere. An approach to the cultural heritage which considers it as a social phenomenon exclusively pertaining to one particular period of history comes close to historical relativism and denies the works of man a significance independent of time and place. Then, the humanities as a field of learning have merely an antiquarian function and lose their meaning as a living and dynamic part of civilization. Historical and sociological interpretations, pursued within their proper limits, make it evident, on the other hand, that this cultural heritage cannot be wholly understood in their terms, because the creativity of the past through its products may attain timeless significance.

²²² Martin Doerne ("Religion und Kultur bei Herder," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Bildung*, V [1929], 298) calls this dualism "abnormal" and "untenable."

²²³ *Maximen und Reflexionen*, XXI, 114, No. 535; 240, No. 1150.

²²⁴ Kurt May ("Goethes 'Novelle,'" *Euphorion*, XXXIII [1932], 277-99) gives an extensive interpretation of the *Novelle* on the basis of its linguistic structure. Cf. also Ernst Beutler, "Ursprung und Gehalt von Goethes 'Novelle,'" *DVLuG*, XVI (1938), 324-52; in our connection, e.g., 332-33.

from the tiger. But what he did was in vain. The tiger was tame for those who knew how to handle him. In front of the woman who, fearing for the lion, appeals to his humanity, Honorio's heroism dissolves into fancy. The hero of the *Novelle* is the child. With his song, like another Daniel, he tames the lion, the tyrant of the forests, the despot of the animal kingdom. He proves to be his friend, pulling a sharp thorn out of his paw. "Truly the child in his transfiguration looked like a powerful victor, the lion not like the defeated one, because his strength remained hidden within him, but like the tamed one, entrusted to his own powerful will."²²⁵ So Goethe describes his Daniel with the lion, hinting at the religious meaning of this myth by the words: "Faith and hope are fulfilled; love, revealed in prayer, is miraculously active."

Love and wisdom are united in this Daniel with the simplicity of a child's heart. If the ironical Goethe saw the strength even of Christ's love and wisdom fail before man's resistance, the affirmative Goethe shows this Daniel succeeding in his act of reconciliation. Pure humanity brings higher powers into the play of life. Though Goethe did not care "through which door you entered the city of God,"²²⁶ reconciliation—the lasting aim of his constructive religion—may be furthered by a basic but simple faculty in-

herent in man. As the text underlying his religious convictions, Goethe once designated "John's Gospel: Little children, love one another."²²⁷ It is the wisdom of a child with which Wilhelm Meister, in Makarie's house, exclaims: "Great thoughts and a pure heart, this it is that we should beg from God."²²⁸

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²²⁷ To Zelter, November 7, 1816. Goethe added: "Und wenn das nicht gehen will: Lasst wenigstens einander gelten." Cf. to Carlyle, January 1, 1828.

²²⁸ *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, I, 10 (JA, XIX, 136).

After the completion of this essay some writings became accessible which are related to our subject. Among them W. Flitner's book deserves particular recognition for the analysis of the work of the old Goethe as a comprehensive expression of his ethical and religious views (n. 204). He also re-examined the religious development of the young Goethe. Grete Schaefer dealt with Goethe's religious thought in her comprehensive work, *Gott und Welt: Drei Kapitel Goethescher Weltanschauung* (Hameln: Seifert, 1947). Although leaning toward Protestant orthodoxy, she left far behind the radicalism of Luetgert by the depth and the refinement of her interpretation. Paul Hankamer took issue with our problem in his beautiful and penetrating study, *Das Spiel der Mächte* (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1943). Dealing with Goethe's life and work during the years 1807 to 1812, he investigated Goethe's concept of the demonic and his attitude toward it. He characterized impressively Goethe's intention as that of building images of order and right against the ever threatening chaos and explained Goethe's distance from orthodoxy as the result of his aversion to the religious insanity "which overcomes men once in a while in modern times, so that they have to push humanity into the dust" (p. 333). The religious significance of Goethe's studies in nature is presented by Ernst Michel in *Goethes Naturanschauung im Lichte seines Schöpfungsglaubens* (Wiesbaden: Dieterich, 1946). To conclude from his address, *Unsere Zukunft und Goethe* (Zürich: Artemis, 1948), Karl Jaspers has not noticed the decisive changes in reading and interpretation which the research in Goethe has brought about during the last two decades. Eduard Spranger has published a collection of his studies of Goethe's philosophic thought: *Goethes Weltanschauung* (Inselverlag, 1946).

²²⁵ *Novelle* (JA, Vol. XVI).

²²⁶ *West-östlicher Divan*, "Buch der Betrachtungen" (JA, V, 37):

"Frage nicht, durch welche Pforte
Du in Gottes Stadt gekommen."

BOOK REVIEWS

Syre Gawene and the Carle of Carelyle: an edition. By ROBERT W. ACKERMAN. ("University of Michigan contributions in modern philology," No. 8.) Ann Arbor, 1947. Pp. 44.

Foreign influences on Middle English. By H. T. PRICE ("University of Michigan contributions in modern philology," No. 10.) Ann Arbor, 1947. Pp. 45.

A new and dependable edition of the Porington version of the *Carl of Carlisle*, available hitherto only in Madden's *Syr Gawayne*, is heartily welcome. This edition comprises an introduction treating the manuscript, language, and date and a careful, unemended print of the text. The treatment of scribal abbreviations and symbols seems entirely sound. Footnotes provide needed information on the knights mentioned, the identification of rare words, etc. There is one strange reading which Mr. Ackerman does not explain. It is "syreweyn' vytt yan" (l. 40) rhyming with "laud-yan'" meaning Lothian. Mr. Ackerman's note interprets this as "Ewein White Hand," which is paralleled elsewhere. But "vytt yan" certainly does not look like "white hand." Moreover, Mr. Ackerman adds this note: "A mark, possibly an *r* appears between *vytt* and *yan* in the photostat." Nowhere in the text as far as I have observed is *v* used for *w* or *wh*; and the rhyme does not justify the assumption that "*yan*" is an error for "hand." Ivain is called *Vryn son* in G. G. K. (l. 113) and *fytz-Vryene* in the *Awntyrs of Arthure* (Thornton, l. 654). Hence it is just possible that the scribe by "vyttryan" faultily represented "fitzvryan."

Professor Price treats a subject more limited than his title indicates: foreign influences on the use in Middle English of prepositions beginning with *A*. His material, which is astonishingly rich, is derived from his work on the *Middle English dictionary* and the edited text of *A* therein. The evidence presented is of the highest interest and significance, and doubtless there will be little hesitation in accepting Pro-

fessor Price's conclusion that Middle English suffered extensive influence from Norse, French, and Latin in the use of prepositions. But some scholars will feel that, when an idiom actually is found in Old English, he is prone to underestimate the importance of that fact. It is true that "in 1400 Old English was as dead as mutton" (p. 35) in so far as it was no longer spoken in Alfred's form, but Middle English is unquestionably Old English in a modernized form, just as American English is Elizabethan English with some losses, additions, etc. In view of the small body of Old English extant and its restricted range, it seems reasonable to judge, when a usage is recorded in Old English, that it accounts for a similar Middle English use. Moreover, in dealing with written materials only, it is proper to discount expressions derived from translations; they may be combinations never or rarely used in speech. When there is no evidence in Old English, however, as is usually the case with these combinations, Professor Price's conclusions cannot be gainsaid, and he shows an extent of foreign influence which will surprise many scholars.

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Chaucer and the fifteenth century. By H. S. BENNETT. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947. Pp. vi+326.

This work, which is Volume II*, Part 2, of the *Oxford history of English literature*, contains only 217 pages of text, supplemented by chronological tables (20 pages), a classified bibliography, and an index. Nearly half the volume (95 pages) is devoted to Chaucer, including chapters on "Chaucer and his age" and "Religion." Thus the treatment of Chaucer is much more detailed than that in the *Cambridge history*, while that of the fifteenth century is briefer than the corresponding sections of that older survey. It would be hard to conceive a better account of Chaucer in the space

here used; selection and proportion are admirable, and the judgments expressed are always in keeping with the best knowledge of the present time. It is perhaps a pity that the question of the authorship of *Piers the Plowman* should be begged by unhesitating reference to "Langland" (pp. 10, 12, etc.). There are two or three amusing slips in statement: a reference to Chaucer's tale of Hugh of Lincoln (corrected in an Erratum); mention of the Pardoner in connection with Thomas' wife where Friar must be intended; and an allusion to Reynard as though he were the fox in the *Nun's Priest's tale*. One might question the remark that the Host "rebukes his flock with little respect to their status." Certainly he never rebukes the Knight, the Prioress, or the Man of Law; and he says nothing against the Monk's tale until the Knight has broken the way. Clearly Chaucer means to suggest that the Host exercised great self-control in his relations with the pilgrims. Finally, what is meant by "discrepancies between the *Cook's Tale* and the Prologue" (p. 70) I do not understand.

The section on the fifteenth century, including chapters on the author and his public and on fifteenth-century verse and prose, is, though on a smaller scale, quite as good as the treatment of Chaucer. It may be that a reader will not get from this section a realization that Hoccleve, Henryson, and the author of *The flower and the leaf* wrote better verse than Lydgate or that the English Chaucerians imitated chiefly Chaucer's early works. But the account of prose gives important correctives to Chambers' work on the continuity of English prose and is surely the best survey now in print. The only error that I have noted is the hoary one to the effect that the name "rime royal" is derived from the *Kingis Quair*; see MacCracken's article in *Modern language notes*, XXIV, 31.

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A commentary on the general prologue to the Canterbury tales. By MURIEL BOWDEN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. ix+316.

The scope and purpose of this well-informed book are sufficiently indicated by its title. By

quotations from medieval sources and epitomes of significant published research, it provides a thorough and up-to-date interpretation of the Prologue. The selections from medieval authorities are always pertinent and illuminating. Good judgment is shown in the choice and evaluation of the ideas advanced by scholars. It is natural, perhaps, that sometimes one may not agree entirely with the author's judgment; for example, that Chaucer sometime after 1387, writing about a monk who was not an abbot, modeled his sketch on a man who had been an abbot from 1345 until his death in 1378 seems to me unlikely; and I feel with Tatlock that it is improbable that Chaucer would call an Augustinian canon a monk.

In some instances I think that Miss Bowden misunderstands the text. Thus she writes: "Chaucer tells us that the Clerk adds to his income by teaching" (p. 156). Is there any other authority for this statement than the line: "And gladly would he learn and gladly teach"? Similarly, she writes: (the Monk) "does not hesitate to leave his cloister when it suits his pleasure, to 'ride out' in his fine clothes," etc. (p. 106). Is the meaning of "out-rider" given with the customary evidence in *O.E.D.*, "2. An officer of an abbey or convent, whose duty it was to attend to the external domestic requirements of the community, esp. to look after the manors belonging to it," erroneous? If not, he was not breaking the rule that "expressly forbids a monk to go outside the confines of the monastery." Indeed his being an outrider is an integral part of the portrait of an efficient man who may well become an abbot. Again the author seems to think that the Parson did curse for nonpayment of tithes (pp. 233-34, 264); but Chaucer says "Ful looth were him to cursen." Only four poor manuscripts read *was*.

In a few other instances opinions may differ; e.g., since "worthy" is applied to the Merchant, Wife of Bath, and Friar, one may question that in the account of the Knight it means "brave." Sense 3 of *O.E.D.*: "Holding a prominent place in the community" fits all these cases. Similarly, in line 398 "nice" means "foolish" rather than "scrupulous." I doubt that Chaucer meant by lines 142-45 that the

Prioress "is not greatly concerned over the suffering of her fellow-man" (p. 99).

At least two references to Robinson on the readings of the manuscripts (pp. 54, 142) seem to imply that the author does not know Manly and Rickert's critical text, where definitive information on the readings of all the manuscripts can be found.

Finally, two general observations may be made: Frequent citations of scholars' names probably will not enhance the interest of the general reader; references in notes would have sufficed; and the placing of the notes at the ends of the chapters is an annoying nuisance. Unimportant misprints: pp. 11, 37, 177, 256, 274.

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Enquiry concerning political justice and its influence on morals and happiness. By WILLIAM GODWIN. Photographic facsimile of the third edition corrected, edited with variant readings of the first and second editions and with a critical introduction and notes by F. E. L. Priestley. ("University of Toronto Department of English Studies and Texts," No. 2.) 3 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946.

Professor Priestley's edition meets a definite current need. Though *Political justice* had three authorized and three pirated editions in Godwin's own day and a reprint of the third edition in 1842, all have long been so difficult to procure that it has hitherto been one of the most scarce of famous books. When to this is added the fact that there are important differences among the three editions prepared by the author and that the study not only of Godwin himself but of his relation to Shelley, Wordsworth, and others of his time has reached a point where no further progress is possible without taking these variations into greater account than has hitherto usually been the case, the task which the editor has performed in making them available in one place is especially gratifying. There is also an undoubted recrudescence of interest in the philosopher, and he needs to be rescued from the distortions

with which the nineteenth century loaded him and which the notable articles of B. Sprague Allen some years ago were not sufficient to remove.

Inasmuch as the preparation of the textual apparatus involved not only a great number of variants of the usual sort but some long passages and even whole chapters, it is in itself a considerable achievement. The editor defends his choice of the third edition for photographic reproduction by taking issue with the usual view that the second and third editions watered down the doctrines of the first and by arguing that, though the revisions were extensive and Godwin's views changed on some points, the basic doctrines remained unchanged throughout. There will perhaps be some who will have reservations as to whether this point is fully established; but, even so, there appears to be little reason to quarrel with the editor's choice. It represents the work as it finally left the author's hands; and, though it might seem that the first edition would have a prior claim because of the great extent of its influence, it is doubtful whether even on this ground a case could be made for it.

Beyond the textual task, Priestley's contribution is a long and elaborate essay surveying Godwin's sources, his principal doctrines, and his influence. The treatment is one which no future student of the subject will be able to ignore. In its inception, he sees *Political justice* not as a reply to Burke's *Reflections* and not as a defense of the French Revolution nor yet as an interpretation of French thought to England but rather as a work which sprang, no doubt under the stimulus which the Revolution supplied, from a point which Godwin himself identifies—his sense of the imperfections of Montesquieu. For all that Montesquieu sought in the true empiric manner to base theory on practice, he came up with an analysis of the English political system, considered as representing an ideal, which was conditioned by a political theory out of accord with the constitution as it actually existed. It was the English government thus conceived that Godwin repudiated as representing either the ideal or the best solution of the constitutional problem in France. The editor sees *Political justice* in ex-

actly the right light when he conceives of it as an attempt to find a better solution "not by the historical comparative method, nor by an analysis of existing forms of government, but rather by a strict inquiry into the philosophic bases of all government."

Godwin's investigations led him to emphasize, not the good that political institutions are capable of, but their power for evil; and his problem therefore became, as the editor puts it, "to determine how and to what extent government can be dispensed with." The solution at which he arrived was its eventual complete dissolution as an attainable condition of human society. Priestley calls attention to the fact that this constitutes a major point of difference between Godwin and the French philosophers of the eighteenth century. He also points out that it is a logical deduction from one strain of English dissenting thought. He is less fortunate in the suggestion that it is a logical deduction from Milton's position. Though that writer expressed the belief that the government is best that governs least and would, indeed, agree with Godwin that the ideal condition is no government at all, as Professor Woodhouse has pointed out, yet he conceived of this ideal as possible only in a hypothetical world composed wholly of regenerated men. In a world in which many were unregenerate, government was a necessary thing; and, since "to sequester out of the world into Atlantic and Utopian polities, which can never be drawn into use, will not mend our condition," the problem was "to ordain wisely as in this world of evil in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably." Liberty, in short, has definite external limits beyond which wise men will not expect to go. As the *First defense* puts it: "Without magistrates, and some form or other of civil government, no commonwealth, no human society can subsist, there were no living in the world." This is not to abolish government but to set about contriving it. From such premises followed naturally Milton's use of the contract theory; his republicanism; his commendation of liberty proportionate to merit and of the orders and degrees "which jar not with liberty"; his adherence to

the concept of the mixed state; his acceptance of the ideal of permanence in governmental institutions; and the project of the perpetually healthy state which would last to the end of the world—ideas not only out of accord with Godwin but in several cases specifically repudiated in *Political justice*. The editor's adoption of Woodhouse's point about the ideal Miltonic condition without the careful qualifications of that discriminating scholar is therefore misleading and unfortunate. It should perhaps also be pointed out how different Godwin's project was from the Miltonic one, a frequent aim of dissenting groups, to put power where God intended it to be placed, in the hands of the virtuous, a scheme which is associated in Milton with a relatively simple governmental structure but which is not in itself in theory incompatible with a highly organized political system and which in practice sometimes led to a very great deal of government indeed. The editor's failure to be sufficiently careful in noting distinctions in dealing with Milton on these matters is one of the few weaknesses in his treatment of Godwin's English dissenting backgrounds. In most other respects his discussion of this important matter is admirable. He does not err from an excess of zeal, rightly rejecting the ill-advised attempt of Roussin to explain Godwin almost wholly in terms of the traditions of English Protestantism; gives at least general recognition to the fact that the philosopher rejected as much as he took; and, for the most part, makes no attempt to ignore the other elements in a rather complex background.

He is industrious in drawing distinctions in the treatment of the French sources. Though they are given recognition commensurate with their importance, the insistence on differentiating between the views of Godwin and those of the *philosophes* which marks the treatment of the basic attitude toward government is found throughout the introduction and is a valuable aspect of it. A service is thus performed for the author of *Political justice* of which more than one English political writer of the period is in need. The exposition should go far toward destroying the widespread notion that Godwin gives us a mere patchwork of ideas adopted

bodily from the French philosophers. Yet in several ways Priestley himself falls into the habit of attributing to French sources more influence on English political concepts than they are entitled to. It is, for example, appropriate to discuss Montesquieu on the mixed and balanced state in connection with Godwin; but the implication on page 41 that the prevalence of this concept in England was due to Montesquieu, whose influence, the editor says, was "still strong," is completely misleading. The facts are that this writer simply gave one expression—a very important one, certainly—to an attitude so widely established in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England itself that it is quite impossible to attribute the interest in it to any one writer and certainly not to any eighteenth century French writer. There is a further inaccuracy in the discussion of these matters. Though it is true that in rejecting mixed government Godwin was going against "the main tendency of thought in his time," he was not unique among radical writers in taking this position; and Priestley's equating of the concept with "current forms of democracy," as well as with conservative positions, overlooks the fact that, incorporated as the idea had become into the theory of the English Constitution, it was to some extent a rallying-point for conservatives and a point of attack for radicals. This is amply demonstrated by the controversy over *The rights of man*, in which Paine attacked the mixed state as resting on corruption and representing the "government of this, that, and t'other," and his opponents stoutly defended it as the essence of the wisdom embodied in the English governmental system.

Similar reservations are necessary about Priestley's discussion of the theory that climate influences the temperament and institutions of peoples. Though Godwin was unquestionably writing with an eye on Montesquieu's treatment of the subject, a too exclusive attention to that writer is found in the editor's remarks. Godwin was not concerned to answer Montesquieu alone, but many others who had advanced the theory. Nor is it true that the political implications of the notion as it ap-

pears in either Montesquieu or other theorists were wholly conservative; for, though the theory suggested that liberty required a special climate and that inhabitants of torrid regions were incapable of it and were likely to remain so, it also suggested, by the association of liberty with northern climates, that free institutions were appropriate to the regions in which most of the northern European nations lay—a fact of which widespread use had been made in the political controversies of the seventeenth century, with implications that were anything but conservative. It is of some importance to note that Godwin was concerned to deny the influence of climate, not because the theory was irreconcilable with a philosophy of liberty, but because it was inconsistent with his particular theory of liberty. This was so because the notion that torrid countries were incapable of liberty struck at a central Godwinian contention—that uniformitarianism which led him to assert that, with such possible exceptions as Eskimos, all men, irrespective of climate or other adverse factors, were capable of that enlightenment which would lead them toward the progressive abolition of government.

Still a third respect in which the French example seems rather too exclusively looked at, though adequate justice is done to Swift, is the editor's discussion of Godwin's views on war and related subjects. Such matters as the relative military efficiency of free men and the subjects of a despotism and the values and dangers of standing armies and militias were themes which had been widely discussed in England from the seventeenth century on. There are few chapters in *Political justice* in which Godwin emerges more clearly as the intellectual heir of a long-established English tradition than the discussion of these matters in Book IV, chapter xix.

The treatment of Godwin's metaphysics and psychology and that of his moral philosophy are marked by the emphasis on the Platonic elements in *Political justice*, first developed by Priestley in an article in the *Modern language quarterly*, and the discussion of the relation of Godwin's thought to English Platonic rationalism. In establishing these points, the

editor perhaps unduly minimizes the relation to Hartley. Though it is true that there are important elements in that writer's system which do not appear in *Political justice* and that others are rejected outright, it is also true that Godwin conceived of himself to some extent as building on and correcting Hartley's views. Nothing in the introduction quite so accurately defines his relation to the older philosopher as the note to Book IV, chapter ix, "Of the mechanism of the human mind," in which, in the very act of rejecting the "hypothesis of the celebrated Hartley," Godwin nonetheless declares that "the reasonings of the present chapter, if just, may be considered as giving farther stability to his principal doctrine, by freeing it from the scheme of material automatism with which it was unnecessarily clogged."

The discussion of Godwin's influence is, of necessity, somewhat sketchy, yet it indicates the main paths which any investigator of this subject must travel. Of chief interest are the comments on the poets. Approaching Wordsworth with due regard for the fact that he had well-defined political ideas before the publication of *Political justice*, the editor has a skepticism about Godwin's influence on the *Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff* which is shared by the present reviewer and which he has elsewhere developed at length. To the question of the relation of the poet and the philosopher after the *Letter*, Priestley appears to be curiously indifferent. He dismisses it briefly with the remark that it seems hard to believe that the influence of Godwin was "at all significant," a conclusion which will seem strange not only to those who have read all that has been written about the poet's "Godwinian period" but also to those who reflect that Wordsworth's interest in Godwin is attested by Wordsworth, Coleridge, and a very respectable body of evidence. The discussion of the relation to Shelley recognizes the great debt but insists on distinctions and is a useful corrective to such sweeping assertions as those of H. N. Brailsford. Perhaps the most valuable part of this section is the account of Godwin and Coleridge. Brief though it is, it defines their intellectual and personal relations with acuteness and with an emphasis on elements common to Coleridge,

Godwin, and Burke which suggests some revision of the common notions about the Burkean element in Coleridge. It is a good example of the numerous valuable contributions to knowledge which this edition makes.

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A guide to Trollope. By WINIFRED GREGORY GEROULD and JAMES THAYER GEROULD. Drawings by FLORENCE W. EWING. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. xxv+256.

The revival of interest in Trollope, initiated by Michael Sadleir's *Bibliography and Commentary* some twenty years ago, proceeds apace. Mr. Sadleir has reissued his *Commentary* in revised form, Dr. Chapman has scrutinized many of the texts, the "World's classics" edition of the novels continues to appear, the quarterly *Trollopian* has been formally launched, and such matters as Archdeacon Grantly's "lost" children and Madame Max Goesler's ancestry are discussed in the correspondence columns of the *Times literary supplement*. The inevitable "dictionary" has now been provided by Mr. and Mrs. Gerould in their attractive *Guide to Trollope*. The title is overambitious on two counts, since it excludes all the nonfictional writings, particularly the travel sketches, and it makes only a desultory attempt to index Trollope's ideas. But as a dictionary of scenes and characters in the novels—and in *The noble jill*—the *Guide* will delight all readers of the master. In addition to the alphabetical listing of places and persons, there are a few general headings (Americans, doctors, lawyers, hunting-scenes, and the like), and for each novel there is provided a summary of the plot ("digest" is the word preferred by the authors). The book is handsomely illustrated by a series of nine maps, drawn by Florence W. Ewing, depicting not only Barssetshire, but Framley, Ullathorne, and other important settings in the novels.¹

The compiler of any dictionary of this type

¹ A more accurate map of Barssetshire has recently appeared in the *Trollopian*, accompanied by a careful study entitled "Mapmaking in Barssetshire," by Lance O. Tingay (III [1948], 19-32).

is faced with the vexatious problem of which characters and scenes to include. To list every stableboy and groom, every anonymous maid and butler, would serve no useful purpose, and it is open to question whether every character with a speaking part or every character who appears by name should be entered. Are the "supernumerary" personages who appear at a large gathering such as the Ullathorne party in *Barchester towers* to be included? The Geroulds, one infers, would answer in the negative, even though such a delightful character as Mrs. Clantantum is thereby ruled out. On the other hand, what of the personages who never appear on the scene but are involved in the past experience of some of the characters? These the Geroulds occasionally admit, e.g., Paulo Neroni, the one-time husband of Madeleine Stanhope (in the same novel). The authors of the *Guide* are not so precise in their rules for entry as were, for example, Miss Mudge and Miss Sears in their *George Eliot dictionary*; the preface merely states that all characters and scenes "having a significant role" are to be included—a difficult criterion to use in such a discursive writer as Trollope. A rough check of two or three of the novels will indicate the proportion of characters deemed worthy of separate entries. Of the fifty personages who appear in *Barchester towers*, thirty-one are entered in the *Guide*; of the sixty-four in *Ralph the heir*, thirty-six have separate entries; and—to take a minor novel—of the twenty-one characters in *The struggles of Brown, Jones, and Robinson*, eleven are listed. The reader may thus be assured that the major figures in any novel will find a place; for the less important—though often equally interesting—personages the choice may sometimes be arbitrary. Thus, of the two Curlydown sisters in *John Caldigate*, Jemima is entered (and her role in the subplot is certainly more important), but not Sophia; of the two rascals concerned in the fleeing of Silverbridge at Doncaster (*The duke's children*), Captain Green is entered, but not Gilbert Villiers; of the two wardens of St. Ewold's (*Barchester towers*), Mr. Greenacre is entered, but not Mr. Stiles; Lord James Fitz Howard, the youngest son of the Duke of St. Bungay (*The duke's children*), finds a place, but not his

sisters, the Ladies Adelaide and Flora; the Cumberlow Green Hunt is registered, but not the rival Hitchin Hunt (*Mr. Scarborough's family*); and so on. Typical omissions are the names of Fanny Bolton (*John Caldigate*, chap. xviii), Mr. Ruddles, the Liberal agent at Tankerville (*Phineas redux*, chap. iv), and Mr. Williams, the rector of Polpenno (*The duke's children*, chap. lv).

The mere alphabetical listing of characters involves a special difficulty in the case of Trollope, who wrote so much that even the devoted Trollopian may have difficulty in recalling many of the characters by name. He will probably, however, remember the title of the novel; hence, if all the characters to be indexed were listed after the summary of the plot, any character could be readily located. An example is Samuel Cheesacre, the comical suitor of Mrs. Greenow in *Can you forgive her?* His name is not entered in the "digest" of the novel and not under Mrs. Greenow's name. If the reader is lucky enough to remember Oilymead Farm or Norfolk as the setting, he can locate the character, but otherwise the *Guide* will not help him. Thus, of the thirty-six characters in *Ralph the heir* with separate entries, only ten are listed in the summary of the novel. The summary of *The three clerks* includes the names of only nine characters; for such persons as "Mrs. Val" Scott, Clementina Golightly, Norah Geraghty, Fidus Neverbend and Sir Gregory Hardlines, one has to remember their names and look for them in their alphabetical places.

The longest entries, as one would expect, are given to characters and scenes from the Barsetshire and "political" series. Griselda Grantly seems to receive most space, with Plantagenet Palliser, Archdeacon Grantly, Obadiah Slope, Phineas Finn, and Lord Chiltern following. Less space is given to Lady Glencora and Mrs. Proudie, the latter receiving, in fact, less than Caroline Harcourt. One could well spare the frequent quotations from Walpole and Escott which are included, and too often the entries fail to give a complete biographical sketch of the personage. Thus the entry for Mr. Harding is based only on the incident in *The warden* and the rest of his life

left unrecorded. One would expect to find, too, the official "titles" of characters recorded—that Mr. Harding was precentor of Barchester Cathedral, that Mr. Bonteen was President of the Board of Trade, that Mr. Legge Wilson was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and so on. Sometimes the entries are incomplete because the material has been taken from the chapter in which the character first appears, without noting additional information in subsequent chapters. For example, the five children of Dr. Shand named in chapter v of *John Caldigate* are duly entered, but not Fanny and Jane, who appear much later, in chapter xlix. For the same reason, one concludes, only four of the six daughters of Captain Carroll, the "improvident, worthless, drunken Irishman" in *Mr. Scarborough's family*, are named. Most of the characterizations, it should be said, are complete and well done; the sketch of Lady Laura Kennedy, for example, is a model in every respect.

Since Trollope carries many of his personages from one novel to another, the *Guide* serves usefully in summarizing the life-stories of the innumerable De Courceys, Fawns, Grantlys, and so on. It reminds us of Trollope's fondness for certain names, such as Neverbend and Mildmay. It even finds a place for some of the more famous horses in the novels—"Jemima," "Bonebreaker," and, of course, "Prime Minister." By the inclusion of such names as "Stick-in-the-Mud Mine," the *Goldfinder*, "Jael and Sisera," and the Internal Navigation Office, it will prove a pleasant reminder of many notable episodes in the novels. The books written by Trollope's characters find a place, among them Lady Carbury's *Criminal queens of the world*, *Harding's church music*, and even Sir Thomas Underwood's unwritten work on Francis Bacon—though no mention is made of *The new miracle*, George Robinson's classic work on stockings. Superlatives add to the interest of the *Guide*: Mr. Chaffanbrass is "Trollope's most famous attorney," and Sir Felix Carbury "Trollope's most perfect picture of a cad."

Not many errors of fact are to be noted. Obadiah Slope's Christian name is wrongly given on page 40, and the Christian names of

"Polly" Neefit (Maryanne), Fräulein Tendel (Agatha), and Mr. Carey (Richard) might have been supplied. Bullhampton, it should be noted, was in Wiltshire; and Grex, the country seat of Lord Grex, was in Yorkshire, not Westmoreland. Curry Hall belonged not to Mrs. Montacute Jones, but to her husband.² Folking is not "a parish of Utterden" but the name of Daniel Caldigate's house in the parish of Utterden (*John Caldigate*, chap. i). Under "Plumstead Episcopi" a note should be made for Sadleir's claim of Huish Episcopi in Somerset as the original, and under "Percycross" should be entered not only the Cordwainers' Arms but also the Percy Standard and the Northern Star, the setting for several scenes in *Ralph the heir*. One may object to the adjective "elderly" as applied to Peter Steinmarc, since we are told (*Linda Tressel*, chap. i) that he is under fifty.

In the general headings one misses an entry under "Americans" for Ezekiel Sevenkings, "the great American poet from the Far West, who sat silent and stared . . . in an unpleasant way" (*The duke's children*, chap. lxx). Among former Oxford students should be listed Dr. Stanhope (*Barchester towers*, chap. ix), and in *Alice Dugdale* much is made of the fact that Sir Walter Wanless had attended Christ Church and Mr. Rossiter had been at Wadham. To the list of lawyers should be added Messrs. Snape and Cashett (*Is he Popenjoy?*) and Mr. Turnbull, Lady Ongar's lawyer (*The Claverings*). Dr. Cuttenden in *The vicar of Bullhampton* may be allowed a place in the list of physicians in Trollope. To "newspapers and magazines in Trollope" we may add the *Percycross herald* and the *Walhamshire herald* from *Ralph the heir*; the *Brothershire herald* and the *Brother-ton church* from *Is he Popenjoy?* the *Salisbury Baptist* from *The vicar of Bullhampton*; and the *Slipper*, the *Snapper*, and the *Daily tell-tale* from *John Caldigate*. Some may wish to include the *Anglican devotee* and the other church papers which speculated on the successor to Bishop Grantly, as well as the *Scalping knife* and the other medical journals in which Dr Thorne and Dr. Fillgrave exchanged blows.

² "Curry Hall was the name of Mr. Jones's seat in Gloucestershire, whereas, as all the world knew, Killancodlem was supposed to belong to Mrs. Jones herself" (*Is he Popenjoy?* chap. lviii).

We might also have been reminded that real newspapers and magazines have a place in Trollope's world: the *Daily news*, the *Times*, and the *Morning post* are read in *Ralph the heir* (and in other novels); the Duchess of Omnium reads the *Observer* (*Phineas redux*, chap. lxiii); and Lord Buttercup is envied for his article on "Turkish finances" in the *Fortnightly* (*The duke's children*, chap. lxxv).

In the entries of places one would expect to find Augsburg, the scene of Linda Tressel's flight with Ludovic Valcarm; Avranches, the setting for a large part of *The lady of Launay*; Doncaster, the scene of a spirited incident in *The duke's children* (chap. xliii); Enfield, where Mr. Bagwax was so charmingly entertained at "Apricot Villa" by the Curlydowns (*John Caldigate*, chap. lii); Hastings, where Sophy Wilson was sent to recuperate (*The telegraph girl*, chap. iii); Ireland, where Lord George Germain and Mary Lovelace enjoyed their honeymoon "at Ballycondra on the Blackwater" (*Is he Popenjoy?* chap. iii); Linton in Devonshire, the setting for the honeymoon of Ontario Moggs and Polly Neefit (*Ralph the heir*, chap. liii); Maidenhead, the scene of Miss Boneassen's famous river party (*The duke's children*, chap. xxxi); and Southampton, where Sir Thomas Underwood awaited the coming of his pretty niece, Mary Bonner (*Ralph the heir*, chap. iv).³ Paris, it should be noted, is the setting not only for part of *La Vendée* but for nearly the whole of the misadventures in *Christmas at Thompson Hall*.

The entries grouped under London occupy nearly nine columns of the *Guide* and give a vivid reminder of the extent to which Trollope portrays Victorian London in his novels. Numerous as the entries are, however, they give only a portion of the actual Trollopian scenes. Badminton Gardens, where Samuel Faddle lived (*Ayala's angel*, chap. xxxvi), is not listed; nor are Blackfriars Bridge, the scene of George Robinson's melancholy walks (*The struggles of Brown, Jones, and Robinson*); Cavendish Square, the home of Sir George and Lady Eardham (*Ralph the heir*, chap. lii); the

Haymarket, the scene of Tom Tringle's spectacular assault on Jonathan Stubbs (*Ayala's angel*, chap. xlv); Mayfair, the place (in a passageway between Bolton Row and Berkeley Street) where Mr. Bonteen's body was found (*Phineas redux*, chap. xlvii); the Royal Academy, where Gregory Newton, Ralph of Norfolk, Mary Bonner, and the Underwood girls viewed the Exhibition (*Ralph the heir*, chap. xlix); South Kensington, the scene of the grand "Negro Soldiers' Orphan Bazaar" (*Miss Mackenzie*, chap. xxvii); Pump Court in the Temple, where Richard Quickenham, Q.C., had chambers (*The vicar of Bullhampton*, chap. lv), as did Sir John Joram, in whose rooms Samuel Bagwax convinced Sir John of the supreme importance of the postage marks (*John Caldigate*, chap. xlviii).⁴

A Trollope "guide," it might be argued, should not only list all the scenes and characters in the novelist's works but also provide an index to the books mentioned, the plays visited, the current topics of discussion, the political and religious issues under debate—in short, the whole Trollope "world." Such matters are sporadically entered in the *Guide*. Charles Reade finds a place, for example, because "his play *Shilly shilly* was pirated from the plot of *Ralph the heir*," and Garibaldi, because Carlo Pepé was one of his officers. The *Guide* perpetuates the view that Lord Chiltern

⁴ Among other omissions in the London entries may be cited Camden Town, the suburban residence of Quintus Slide (*Phineas redux*, chap. xxvii); Charing Cross Hotel, where the "other Ralph" stayed while in London (*Ralph the heir*, chap. xxiv); Duke Street, Piccadilly, where Tom Tringle had lodgings (*Ayala's angel*, chap. xlv); Fulham Road, the location of Bolsover House (*Ralph the heir*, chap. xli); Kensington Gardens, where Lucy Dormer frequently walked with Isadore Hamel (*Ayala's angel*); Little St. Dunstan Court, the office in Lincoln's Inn Fields of Messrs. Slow and Bideawhile (*Miss Mackenzie*, chaps. x, xvii); Lowndes Square, the home of the Rev. Joseph Emilius (*Phineas redux*, chap. xlvii); the New Road, where stood the offices of Rubb and Mackenzie (*Miss Mackenzie*, chap. i); the "Prince's Feathers" in Conduit Street (*Ralph the heir*, chap. lii); St. James's Square, where the town house of the Marquis of Brotherton was located (*Is he Popenjoy?* chap. lx); St. James's Street, where Ralph Newton lived (*Ralph the heir*, chap. viii); Victoria Street, the scene of the "luxurious lodgings" of Augustus Scarborough (*Mr. Scarborough's family*, chap. xxxvii); and Wigmore Street, where the Baroness Banmann lived (*Is he Popenjoy?* chap. lx).

³ Other scenes in *Ralph the heir* to be added are Barford Heath, Barnfield, Cookham, Florence, Margate, Peele Newton, Swaffham, and Swallowfield.

really represented Lord Hartington, afterward Duke of Devonshire (though Trollope denied this), but it does not point out that Mr. Turnbull was based on John Bright or that Mr. Gresham was based in part on Robert Peel. Nor is the Victorian world—so brilliantly mirrored in Trollope's novels—as well represented as it might be. It is a world where purchases are made at Marshall and Snelgrove's (*Ralph the heir*, chap. lv); where Mr. Boncassen reads at the British Museum and does a "little light reading" on Sundays at the Athenaeum (*The duke's children*, chap. xxxiii); where the new Moldavian dance, the "Kappakappa," creates a sensation when presented at the home of Mrs. Montacute Jones in Grosvenor Place (*Is he Popenjoy?* chap. xxxviii); and where—on more august levels—"H.R.H. the Duke of Windsor" stands godfather to the "real" Popenjoy (chap. lxiii), and Royalty arrives at the "Universe" to "speak a few benign words and blow a few clouds of smoke," just before the unfortunate quarrel between

Phineas Finn and Mr. Bonteen (*Phineas redux*, chap. xlvi). It is a world in which "decimal coinage" and the ballot are under discussion and where Conservative and Liberal principles clash; in which High and Low Church struggle for supremacy in Barchester; where Charlotte Stanhope can inquire whether one is "a Whewellite or a Brewsterite"; where the publication of Froude's *Remains* can "teach men to think upon religion"; and in which the whole Tractarian movement, with the defection of its great prophet, can profoundly alter the destiny of such a man as the Rev. Francis Arabin. Such matters might well be included in a "revised and enlarged" edition of the *Guide*. Within its present limits, as an index to the more important scenes and characters in the novels, it will remind Trollopians of many old friends and perhaps lead others to make the acquaintance of this rich and varied gallery of persons and scenes.

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